

LE MONDE BYZANTIN
DU XIII^e AU XV^e SIÈCLE
ANCIENNES OU NOUVELLES
FORMES D'IMPÉRIALITÉ

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édité par
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&
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ABRÉVIATIONS

- ACO* *Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum*, ed. instituit E. Schwartz, continuavit J. Straub, Berlin 1914-1940.
- Actes de Chilandar* 1-2 (AA 5) : *Actes de Chilandar. 1, Actes grecs*, publiés par L. Petit (Supplément à *VV* 17 – Actes de l’Athos 5), Санктпетербургъ 1911 ; 2, *Actes slaves*, publiés par B. Korablev (Supplément à *VV* 19 – Actes de l’Athos 5), Санктпетербургъ 1915, réimpr. Amsterdam 1975.
- Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20) : *Actes de Chilandar. 1, Des origines à 1319*, éd. diplomatique par M. Živojinović, V. Kravari, Ch. Giros (Archives de l’Athos 20), Paris 1998.
- Actes de Dionysiou*, éd. diplomatique par N. Oikonomidès (Archives de l’Athos 4), Paris 1968.
- Actes de Docheiariou*, éd. diplomatique par N. Oikonomidès (Archives de l’Athos 13), Paris 1984.
- Actes d’Esphigménou*, éd. diplomatique par J. Lefort (Archives de l’Athos 6), Paris 1973.
- Actes d’Iviron. 1, Des origines au milieu du XI^e siècle*, éd. diplomatique par J. Lefort, N. Oikonomidès, D. Papachryssanthou, avec la collab. de H. Métrévéli (Archives de l’Athos 14), Paris 1985 ; 2, *Du milieu du XII^e siècle à 1204*, éd. diplomatique par J. Lefort, N. Oikonomidès, D. Papachryssanthou, avec la collab. de V. Kravari et de H. Métrévéli (Archives de l’Athos 16), Paris 1990 ; 3, *De 1204 à 1328*, éd. diplomatique par J. Lefort, N. Oikonomidès, D. Papachryssanthou, V. Kravari, avec la collab. de H. Métrévéli (Archives de l’Athos 18), Paris 1994 ; 4, *De 1328 au début du XVI^e siècle*, ed. J. Lefort, N. Oikonomidès, D. Papachryssanthou, V. Kravari, H. Métrévéli (Archives de l’Athos 19), Paris 1995.
- Actes de Kutlumus*, nouv. éd. remaniée et augm. par P. Lemerle (Archives de l’Athos 2), Paris 1988.
- Actes de Lavra. 1, Des origines à 1204*, éd. diplomatique par P. Lemerle, A. Guillou, N. Svoronos, avec la collab. de D. Papachryssanthou (Archives de l’Athos 5), Paris 1970 ; 2, *De 1205 à 1328*, éd. diplomatique par P. Lemerle, A. Guillou, N. Svoronos & D. Papachryssanthou (Archives de l’Athos 8), Paris 1977 ; 3, *De 1329 à 1500*, éd. diplomatique par P. Lemerle, A. Guillou, N. Svoronos & D. Papachryssanthou (Archives de l’Athos 10), Paris 1979 ; 4, *Études historiques, actes serbes, compléments et index*, éd. diplomatique par P. Lemerle, A. Guillou, N. Svoronos & D. Papachryssanthou (Archives de l’Athos 11), Paris 1982.
- Actes du Prôtaton*, éd. diplomatique par D. Papachryssanthou (Archives de l’Athos 7), Paris 1975.
- Actes de Saint-Pantéléèmon*, éd. diplomatique par P. Lemerle, G. Dagron, S. Ćircović (Archives de l’Athos 12), Paris 1982.

- Actes de Vatopédi. 1, Des origines à 1329*, éd. diplomatique par J. Bompaire, J. Lefort, V. Kravari, Ch. Giros (Archives de l'Athos 21), Paris 2001 ; 2, *De 1330 à 1376*, éd. diplomatique par J. Lefort, V. Kravari, Ch. Giros & K. Smyrlis (Archives de l'Athos 22), Paris 2006 ; 3, *De 1377 à 1500*, éd. diplomatique par J. Lefort, Ch. Giros, V. Kravari, K. Smyrlis, R. Estangüi Gómez (Archives de l'Athos 23), Paris 2019.
- Actes de Xénophon*, éd. diplomatique par D. Papachryssanthou (Archives de l'Athos 15), Paris 1986.
- Actes de Xèropotamou*, éd. diplomatique par J. Bompaire (Archives de l'Athos 3), Paris 1964.
- Actes de Zographou*, publiés par W. Regel, E. Kurtz & B. Korablev (Supplément à VV 13 – Actes de l'Athos 4), Санктпетербург 1907, réimpr. Amsterdam 1969.
- AnBoll* *Analecta bollandiana*. Bruxelles.
- AOC Archives de l'Orient chrétien. Paris.
- BCH* *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*. Paris.
- BHG* *Bibliotheca hagiographica graeca*, 3^e éd. mise à jour et considérablement augmentée, Bruxelles 1957.
- BLANCHET, *Scholarios* : M.-H. BLANCHET, *Georges-Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400 – vers 1472) : un intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de l'Empire byzantin* (AOC 20), Paris 2008.
- BMGS* *Byzantine and modern Greek studies*. Leeds – Cambridge.
- BSl.* *Byzantinoslavica : revue internationale des études byzantines*. Praha.
- Byz.* *Byzantion : revue internationale des études byzantines*. Wetteren.
- Byz. Forsch.* *Byzantinische Forschungen : internationale Zeitschrift für Byzantinistik*. Amsterdam.
- BZ* *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*. Berlin.
- CCSG Corpus christianorum. Series graeca. Turnhout.
- CEFR Collection de l'École française de Rome. Rome.
- CFHB Corpus fontium historiae byzantinae.
- Chalkokondyles, ed. Darkó : *Laonici Chalcocandylae historiarum demonstrationes*, rec. E. Darkó, 2 vol., Budapestini 1922-1927.
- Chalkokondyles, trad./transl. Kaldellis : Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *The Histories*, transl. by A. Kaldellis (Dumbarton Oaks medieval library 33-34), Cambridge Mass. – London 2014.
- CPG* *Clavis patrum graecorum*. Turnhout 1974-2003.
- CSHB Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae.
- DARROUZÈS, *Ὁφφίκια* : J. DARROUZÈS, *Recherches sur les Ὁφφίκια de l'Église byzantine* (AOC 11), Paris 1970.
- DChAE* *Δελτίον τῆς Χριστιανικῆς ἀρχαιολογικῆς ἐταιρείας*. Ἀθήνα.
- De cer.* Constantin VII Porphyrogénète, *Le livre des cérémonies*, sous la dir. de G. Dagron & B. Flusin (CFHB 52, 1-5), Paris 2020.
- DEMETRAKOS Δ. ΔΗΜΗΤΡΑΚΟΣ [D. DÈMÈTRAKOS], *Μέγα λεξικὸν ὅλης τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς γλώσσης*, 15 vol., Ἀθήνα 1933-1964.

- DGE* *Diccionario griego-español*, red. bajo la dir. de F. Rodríguez Adrados, 8 vol., Madrid 1980-.
- DOP* *Dumbarton Oaks papers*. Washington DC.
- DOS* *Dumbarton Oaks studies*. Washington DC.
- Doukas* *Ducas, Istoria turco-bizantină (1341-1462)*, ed. critică de V. Grecu = *Ducæ Historia turcobyzantina (1341-1462)*, ex rec. B. Grecu, Bucureşti 1958.
- EEBS* Ἑπετηρίς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν σπουδῶν. Ἀθήνα.
- EHB* *The economic history of Byzantium : from the seventh through the fifteenth century*, A. E. Laiou, ed.-in-chief (DOS 39), Washington DC 2002.
- ÉO* *Échos d'Orient : revue d'histoire, de géographie et de liturgie orientales*. Bucarest.
- ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ*, *Byzance face aux Ottomans* : R. ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans : exercice du pouvoir et contrôle du territoire sous les derniers Paléologues, milieu XIV^e-milieu XV^e siècle* (Byzantina sorbonensia 28), Paris 2014.
- FM 1-* *Fontes minores*, hrsg. von D. Simon (Forschungen zur byzantinischen Rechtsgeschichte), Frankfurt am Main 1976-.
- GCS* *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller*. Leipzig – Berlin.
- GRBS* *Greek, Roman and Byzantine studies*. Durham.
- Gregoras*, ed. Schopen / ed. Bekker : *Nicephori Gregoræ Byzantina historia, graece et latine. 1-2*, cura L. Schopeni; 3, ed. I. Bekker (CSHB 18), Bonnae 1829-1855.
- Gregoras, Geschichte* : Nikephoros Gregoras, *Rhomäische Geschichte*, übers. und erl. von J.-L. Van Dieten (Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur 4, 8, 9, 24, 39, 59, 66), 6 vol., Stuttgart 1973-2007.
- IRAIK* *Известия Русского археологического института в Константинополе [Bulletin de l'Institut archéologique russe à Constantinople]*. Одесса, София.
- JANIN, Géographie 1, 3* : R. JANIN, *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'Empire byzantin. 1, Le siège de Constantinople et le patriarcat œcuménique. 3, Les églises et les monastères*, Paris 1953, 1969².
- JGR* *Jus graecoromanum*, cur. J. & P. Zepos, Athenis 1931, réimpr. Aalen 1962.
- JHS* *The journal of Hellenic studies*. London.
- JÖB* *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*. Wien.
- JÖBG* *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft*. Wien.
- JRS* *The journal of Roman studies*. London.
- Kantakouzenos*, ed. Schopen : *Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum libri IV, graece et latine. 1-3*, cura L. Schopen (CSHB 20), Bonnae 1828-1832.
- Kantakouzenos, Geschichte* : Johannes Kantakouzenos, *Geschichte. 1-3*, übers. und erl. von G. Fatouros & T. Krischer (Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur 17, 21, 71), Stuttgart 1982-2011.
- KRIARAS* Ε. ΚΡΙΑΡΑΣ [et al.], *Λεξικό της μεσαιωνικής δημόδους γραμματείας : 1100-1669*, Θεσσαλονίκη 1968-.
- Kydones, Apologies 1, 2, 3* : *Apologia 1*, dans G. MERCATI, *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia*

- e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV* (StT 56), Città del Vaticano 1931, p. 359-403; *Apologia 2, ibid.*, p. 403-425; *Apologia 3, ibid.*, p. 313-338.
- Kydones, *De non reddenda Callipoli* : PG 154, col. 1009A-1036A.
- Kydones, *Lettres* : Démétrius Cydonès, *Correspondance*, publiée par R.-J. Loenertz o.p. (StT 186, 208), 2 vol., Città del Vaticano 1956-1980.
- Kydones, *Briefe* : Demetrios Kydones, *Briefe*, übers. und erl. von F. Tinnefeld (Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur 12, 16, 33, 50, 60), 5 vol., Stuttgart 1981-2003.
- Kydones, *Pro subsidio Latinorum* : PG 154, col. 961A-1008B.
- LAMPE *Greek patristic lexicon*, ed. by G. W. H. Lampe, Oxford 1961.
- LSJ (& Rev. suppl.) : *A Greek-English lexicon with a revised supplement*, comp. by H. G. Liddell & R. Scott, rev. and augm. throughout by H. S. Jones, Oxford 1996.
- MB 1-7 *Μεσαιωνική βιβλιοθήκη ἢ Συλλογὴ ἀνεκδότων μνημείων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἱστορίας, ἐπιστάσις* K. N. Σάθας [éd. K. N. Sathas], Βερεῖα 1872-1894.
- MEG *Medioevo greco : rivista di storia e filologia bizantina*. Alessandria.
- MM 1-6 *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana collecta*, ed. F. Miklosich et J. Müller, 6 vol., Vindobonae 1860-1890, réimpr. Aalen 1968.
- MTM *Monographies de Travaux & mémoires*. Paris.
- OCA *Orientalia christiana analecta*. Roma.
- OCP *Orientalia christiana periodica : commentarii de re orientali aetatis christianae sacra et profana*. Roma.
- ODB *Oxford dictionary of Byzantium*, A. P. Kazhdan ed. in chief, 3 vol., New York 1991.
- OLA *Orientalia lovaniensia analecta*. Louvain.
- Pachymeres Georges Pachymères, *Relations historiques. 1-2, Livres I-III, IV-VI*, éd., introd. et notes par A. Failler et trad. française par V. Laurent (CFHB 24, 1-2), Paris 1984; *3-4, Livres VII-IX, X-XIII*, éd., trad. française et notes par A. Failler (CFHB 24, 3-4), Paris 1999; *5, Index*, tables générales et lexique grec par A. Failler (CFHB 24, 5), Paris 2000.
- Palamas, ed. Chrestou : *Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα. 1-6*, εκδ. Π. Κ. Χρήστου *et al.* [P. K. Chrèstou], Θεσσαλονίκη 1962-2015.
- PG *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca*, accur. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1856-1866.
- PL *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series latina*, accur. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1844-1865.
- PLP *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit*, erstellt von E. Trapp, Wien 1976-1996.
- PP 1-4 *Παλαιολόγια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*, [éd.] Σ. Λάμπρου [S. Lampros], ἐν Ἀθήναις 1912-1930.
- PRK 1-3 *Das Register des Patriarchats von Konstantinopel. 1, Edition und Übersetzung der Urkunden aus den Jahren 1315-1331*, hrsg. von H. Hunger & O. Kresten (CFHB 19, 1), Wien 1981; *2, Edition und Übersetzung der Urkunden aus den Jahren 1337-1350*, hrsg. von H. Hunger, O. Kresten, E. Kislinger & C. Cupane (CFHB 19, 2), Wien 1995; *3, Edition und Übersetzung der Urkunden aus den Jahren 1350-1363*, hrsg. von J. Koder, M. Hinterberger & O. Kresten (CFHB 19, 3), Wien 2001.

- Pseudo-Kodinos : Pseudo-Kodinos, *Traité des offices*, introd. texte et trad. par J. Verpeaux (Le monde byzantin 1), Paris 1966.
- RALLÈS – POTLÈS 1-6 : *Σύνταγμα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων*, ὑπὸ Γ. Α. Παλλάη καὶ Μ. Ποτλῆ, ἐν Αἰθῆναις 1852-1859.
- REB *Revue des études byzantines*. Paris.
- REG *Revue des études grecques*. Paris.
- Regesten 3-5 F. DÖLGER, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453*. *Regesten 3, Regesten von 1204-1282*, 2. erweiterte und verbesserte Auflage, bearb. von P. Wirth, München 1977; *Regesten 4, Regesten von 1282-1341*, München 1960; *Regesten 5, Regesten von 1341-1453*, unter verantwortlicher Mitarbeit von P. Wirth, München 1965.
- Regestes 4-7 *Les registres des actes du patriarcat de Constantinople*. 1, *Les actes des patriarches*. 4, *Les registres de 1208 à 1309*, par V. Laurent, Paris 1971; 5, *Les registres de 1310 à 1376*, par J. Darrouzès, Paris 1977; 6, *Les registres de 1377 à 1410*, par J. Darrouzès, Paris 1979; 7, *Les registres de 1410 à 1453*, par J. Darrouzès, Paris 1991.
- RESEE *Revue des études sud-est européennes*. București.
- RGK 1-3 *Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten 800-1600*. 1, *Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Großbritanniens*, erstellt von E. Gamillscheg, D. Harlfinger & H. Hunger, Wien 1981; 2, *Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Frankreichs*, erstellt von E. Gamillscheg & D. Harlfinger, Wien 1989; 3, *Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Roms mit dem Vatikan*, erstellt von E. Gamillscheg, unter Mitarb. von D. Harlfinger & P. Eleuteri, Wien 1997.
- RHT *Revue d'histoire des textes*. Turnhout.
- RSBN *Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici*. Roma.
- SC Sources chrétiennes. Paris.
- Scholarios 1-8 Γενναδίου τοῦ Σχολαρίου ἅπαντα τὰ εὗρισκόμενα = *Œuvres complètes de Georges-Gennade Scholarios*. 1-8, publiées par L. Petit, X. A. Sidéridès, M. Jugie, Paris 1928-1936.
- SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken* : P. SCHREINER, *Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*. 1, *Einleitung und Text*; 2, *Historischer Kommentar*; 3, *Teilübersetzungen, Addenda et Corrigenda, Indices* (CFHB 12), Wien 1975-1979.
- Souda *Suidae Lexicon*, ed. A. Adler (Lexicographi graeci recogniti et apparatu critico instructi 1), Lipsiae 1928-1938.
- Sphrantzes Giorgio Sfranze, *Cronaca*, a cura di R. Maisano (CFHB 29), Roma 1990.
- StT Studi e testi. Città del Vaticano.
- Subs. hag. Subsidia hagiographica. Bruxelles.
- Teubner Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum teubneriana. Lipsiae – Berlin.
- TIB *Tabula Imperii Byzantini*. Wien.
TIB 1 : J. KODER & F. HILD, *Hellas und Thessalia*, Wien 1976.
TIB 3 : P. SOUSTAL & J. KODER, *Nikopolis und Kephālēnia*, Wien 1981.
TIB 12 : A. KÜLZER, *Ostthrakien (Eurōpē)*, Wien 2008.
- TLG *Thesaurus linguae graecae*.
- TM *Travaux & mémoires*. Paris.

- TRAPP, *Lexikon* : *Lexikon zur byzantinischen Gräzität besonders des 9.-12. Jahrhunderts*, erstellt von E. Trapp, Wien 1994-.
- Variorum CS Variorum reprints collected studies series. London – Aldershot.
- VV *Византийский временник* [*Chroniques byzantines*]. Москва.
- WBS Wiener byzantinistische Studien. Wien.
- ZRVI *Зборник радова Византолошког института* [*Actes de l'Institut byzantin*]. Београд.

AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE EARLY PALAEOLOGAN PERIOD, ca. 1259–1300 FROM THE ARCHIVES OF MT. ATHOS AND WEST ASIA MINOR*

by Efi RAGIA

INTRODUCTION

In many ways, the forty-year period from the ascent of Michael VIII Palaeologos until the loss of Asia Minor is one of the most important in Byzantine history. The rise of the first Palaeologos to power is generally seen as marking the victory of the higher aristocracy, the deepening of the feudalization process, and the weakening of the Byzantine state, which was thereafter characterized by accelerated decentralization. This critique relies heavily on the sources; in effect, it is hard to avoid blaming Michael VIII for the economic breakdown of the late 13th century. To a large degree, the economic policy of Michael VIII had been dictated by the way he came to power; following this logic, Andronikos II's policy was necessitated by the deep rift that his father's reign had opened in the Byzantine society.¹ The reign of the early Palaeologoi was also juxtaposed

* Abbreviations:

Patmos 1: *Βυζαντινὰ ἔγγραφα τῆς μονῆς Πάτμου. Α΄, Αὐτοκρατορικά, γενικὴ εἰσαγωγή, ευρετήρια, πίνακες* ὑπὸ Ε. Α. Βρανούση [E. Branouse], Ἀθῆναι 1980.

Patmos 2: *Βυζαντινὰ ἔγγραφα τῆς μονῆς Πάτμου. Β΄, Δημοσίων λειτουργῶν*, ἐκδ. Μ. Νυσταζοπούλου-Πελεκίδου [M. Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou], Ἀθῆναι 1980.

The present paper is devoted to the memory of my teacher Nikos Oikonomides, since he was the one who first charged me with studying the archive of Theotokos of Lembos, so many years ago. I also wish to offer my sincere thanks the editors of this volume, R. Estangüi Gómez and M.-H. Blanchet, for their understanding, cooperation and support. Because of the pandemic, the completion of this study would not have been possible without their invaluable help.

1. Gregoras, ed. Schopen, vol. 1, pp. 153.20 – 154.5. See G. OSTROGORSKI, *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine* (Corpus bruxellense historiae byzantinae. Subsidia 2) Bruxelles 1954, p. 92, 174; P. CHARANIS, On the social structure and economic organization of the Byzantine Empire in the thirteenth century and later, *BSL* 12, 1951, pp. 94–153, here pp. 105–8, 115–7; *Id.*, The monastic properties and state in the Byzantine Empire, *DOP* 4, 1948, pp. 53–118, here pp. 98–101; H. GLYKATZI-AHRWEILER, La politique agraire des empereurs de Nicée, *Byz.* 28, 1959, pp. 51–66, here pp. 65–6; A. LAIOU, The Byzantine aristocracy in the Palaeologan period: a story of arrested

with that of the Lascarids. This angle is also found in the sources, but in the modern analysis it is implied that the new emperor had limited choices as he would have to reward his supporters for bringing him to the throne. Hence, the association of the aristocracy in government also led to the imperial authority having “less and less substance.”² Thus, the coup d’état of 1258–9 becomes a loop which conveniently explains all decisions of internal and foreign policy.

There can be no doubt that Michael VIII was strongly supported by the aristocracy and the Church. Nonetheless, the discussion so far has denied any initiative and innovation to Michael VIII Palaeologos, and thereby, as a direct result of his policy, also to Andronikos II. Despite the allegations of Nikephoros Gregoras that Michael VIII had full authority on financial issues even before being crowned,³ there is no evidence that he tampered with the finances of the state before January 1259, because none of his documents can be dated to before this time. Nonetheless, their number, preserved in many an archive, makes his reign one of the best documented when the archival material is taken into consideration. The evidence shows that Michael VIII Palaeologos approached statesmanship with thoughtfulness, seriousness and caution. This is already apparent in the many acts preserved, particularly in the chartulary of Theotokos of Lembos.⁴ This impression, arising from the study of the documents, is in line with his own declarations in an early Novel, where the emperor expounded his view that justice should govern the public affairs, and especially the financial aspects of the provincial administration and the actions of the military commanders with regard to their economic benefits. However, as the modern approach sets the frame outlined above, his propositions were taken as disingenuous,⁵ although the same concern is expressed in a *horismos* by Empress Theodora for Lembos as well and in the emperor’s own *horismos* about the competences of Andronikos II, dated to 1272.⁶

These reasons make the attempt to re-interpret the agrarian policy of the early Palaeologan period almost imperative. The selected time frame begins with Michael VIII Palaeologos’ ascent to the throne in 1259 and ends in 1300. This choice is not only founded on the fact that the empire was fundamentally different after the disaster of 1302; it is also driven by the necessity to incorporate the material from Asia Minor into

development, *Viator* 4, 1973, pp. 131–51; A. KAZHDAN, State, feudal, and private economy in Byzantium, *DOP* 47, 1993, pp. 83–100, here pp. 92–3. On Pachymeres’ critique see below.

2. Pachymeres, vol. 1, pp. 65–73. See the analysis of M. ANGOLD, *A Byzantine government in exile: government and society under the Laskarids of Nicaea (1204–1261)*, Oxford 1974, pp. 27, 80–93 and Theodore II Laskaris’ views about government in D. ANGELOV, *Imperial ideology and political thought in Byzantium, 1204–1330*, Cambridge 2007, pp. 209–12, 215–26; also of interest is the comparison with Blemmydes’ views, *ibid.*, p. 294.

3. Gregoras, ed. Schopen, vol. 1, pp. 69–70; ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 88–90.

4. MM 4, nos. 82–3 (pp. 153–5), 121–2 (pp. 208–11), 135–7 (pp. 221–4), 149.I (pp. 238–9), 149.III (pp. 241–2), 159 (p. 254), 161–3 (pp. 255–8), 166 (pp. 261–2), 179.III (p. 285). To these fifteen acts, which are *horismoi* and *prostagmata* about various disputes of the monastery, the chrysobull should be added: *ibid.*, no. 5 (p. 26–8).

5. L. BURGMANN & P. MAGDALINO, Michael VIII on maladministration, *FM* 6, 1984, pp. 377–90. The editors thought that the Novel was “an effort [by Michael VIII] to ingratiate himself with the public,” especially because the new emperor had a “great talent for publicity.”

6. MM 4, no. 165 (pp. 260–1), and also see below.

the discussion. While the archives of Mt. Athos are precious because they capture all the changes and modifications in the fiscal administrative method after 1259, the chartulary of Theotokos of Lembos, which ends exactly in the year 1300,⁷ holds key information about the policy of the first Palaeologoi. The analysis that follows is developed to highlight the management techniques of the fiscal administration of the period, in particular that of the resources of the provinces and the human capital, meaning the peasants. Although a list of the recipients of imperial grants as it derives from the archival sources is found at the end, the reader must be aware that it is not the intention of the present study to confer judgement on the generosity of the emperors or to connect it with the political complications of these two reigns.⁸ No answer is provided with regard to the question of “feudalization” which has defined opinions so far, nor about the issue of the taxation of individual peasant households.⁹ All these aspects would require different approaches and principles which do not fall within the purposes of this research. However, with the intention to dive beneath the surface of what the documents are telling us, material coming from the archives dating up to 1320/1330, and from as far back as the 11th century, has been used to illuminate further the methods of the Palaeologan dynasty in its first forty years of rule. By the end of this paper it becomes apparent that the state maintained its role as manager and distributor of the wealth of the diminishing empire, which underscores its centralization ever more clearly.

THE AGRARIAN POLICY UNDER THE FIRST PALAEOLOGOI

The registration method before 1259

The changes effected in the census method of the Byzantine Empire under the first Palaeologoi become immediately evident to the student of the monastic archives. The first *praktikon* of the Palaeologan era, dating from 1262, is substantially different from the previous *praktika*, as it meticulously describes the households of cultivators and strikes through their taxes, which were granted as *oikonomia* (fiscal income) to the monastery of Iviron.¹⁰ This *praktikon*, however, does not reveal anything about the fiscal process in the first years of Michael VIII Palaeologos’ reign, but rather represents the culmination of the Lascarid method of registering the workforce of the countryside, the assets belonging to the farmers’ households, and their corresponding imposition. The Lascarid census system had evolved toward re-evaluating the working potential of the peasants. A few texts, which are discussed below, have been signaled for illuminating this evolution. But, ironically, while so many archives exist both from Asia Minor and Macedonia, the only

7. MM 4, no. 172 (pp. 268–9). The act concerns the affairs of the *tzaousios* George Melissenos.

8. See to this effect K. SMYRLIS, *La fortune des grands monastères byzantins (fin du x^e-milieu du xiv^e siècle)* (MTM 21), Paris 2006; ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans*.

9. The taxation of peasant households with an analysis of the long descriptions of households and their corresponding taxes has been studied by J. LEFORT, *Fiscalité médiévale et informatique : recherche sur les barèmes pour l’imposition des paysans byzantins au xiv^e siècle*, *Revue historique* 512, 1974, pp. 315–56.

10. *Actes d’Iviron* 3, no. 59. The farmers lived in six villages, Hierissos, Kamena, Hermeleia, Kato Bolbos, Xylorygion and Melintziane. The term *oikonomia* is only found in the introduction of the *praktikon* (l. 2).

true *praktikon* from the Lascarid era seems to be that of Lampsakos for the Venetians of Constantinople, dated to 1219, which so far remained unnoticed. Presumably it copies, in Latin translation, a Byzantine *praktikon* without many changes.

The text lists the taxes of a domain of Lampsakos, beginning with those of the farmers, classed as *zeugaratoi* (possessors of a pair of oxen),¹¹ *boidatoi* (possessors of an ox), *aktemones* (using only their own workforce) and *aporoi* (poor); it continues with the various properties belonging to the domain, meaning mills, olive groves, fishing installations, a *skala* with its rights, etc., and the attached impositions, and finishes with the *exaleimmata* (*disertis*, “abandoned” land) and *angareiai*.¹² To each class of farmers belongs an aggregate sum of taxes. The sequence shows that each class paid approximately twice the amount of the previous one. As these sums are admittedly very high, they probably incorporate a series of impositions: the *morte*, meaning the landlord’s right to the harvest which included the land tax, the personal taxes of the farmers, presumably representing the workforce (i.e., the possession of oxen, hence their classification into *zeugaratoi*, etc.) and the hearth tax, as well as that of the *autourgia* of the *paroikoi* (vines and olive trees).¹³ Additionally, the *praktikon* is also precious for the main taxes imposed on the domain, called *kephalaia*, under the Lascarids.

Although the information about the domain of Lampsakos, as it is recorded in its *praktikon*, is quite rich, the registration method is similar to that followed in the *praktikon* of Adam, dated to 1073. The farmers of the Alopekai domain near Miletus were classified under each *proasteion* (estate); the census explicates the farmers’ households comprising family members and working force (including domestic animals such as pigs), which was thus distributed to the *proasteia*, and their corresponding taxes. As in the *praktikon* of Lampsakos, various taxes (*epitelesmoi*) were added in the description of the estate, and in particular the *ennomion*, the tax of olives, etc., to be paid by the *paroikoi*, and the lease (*pakton*) for various fields leased to third parties. Because the *paroikoi* of Alopekai had

11. Apart from the pair of oxen (working power and fiscal category), the *zeugarion* is connected to the surface the pair can cultivate. On the various meanings of the *zeugarion* see N. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, Contribution à l’étude de la pronoia au XIII^e siècle, *REB* 22, 1964, pp. 158–75, here pp. 169, 173; A. LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society in the late Byzantine Empire: a social and demographic study*, Princeton 1977, pp. 161–4; J. LEFORT, The rural economy. Seventh-twelfth centuries, in *EHB*, vol. 1, pp. 231–310, here pp. 247–8. M. BARTUSIS, *Land and privilege in Byzantium: the institution of pronoia*, Cambridge 2012, pp. 215–17, 247–9. Bartusis observed that the *zeugarion* became a tool for assessing the taxable properties and was substituted with the *posotes* (amount) soon after the ascent of Michael Palaeologos. On the fiscal value of these categories see below.

12. See D. JACOBY, The Venetian presence in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261): the challenge of feudalism and the Byzantine inheritance, *JÖB* 43, 1993, pp. 141–201, here pp. 164–82 for commentary and pp. 199–200 for the text of the document. Cf. ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 222–3. On the *angareiai* see below.

13. JACOBY, Venetian presence (quoted n. 12), p. 199.2–6. The *zeugaratoi* paid 9.9 coins; the *boidatoi*, 4.8; the *aktemones* 2.6, and the *aporoi* only one coin. The *morte* consists of the delivery of a third of the harvest which included the land tax: cf. F. SCHMID, Byzantinisches Zehntwesen, *JÖB* 6, 1957, pp. 45–110, here pp. 53–67; N. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Fiscalité et exemption fiscale à Byzance (IX^e-XI^e s.)* (Εθνικό Ίδρυμα Ερευνών, Ινστιτούτο Βυζαντινών Ερευνών. Μονογραφίες 2), Athènes 1996, pp. 128–9; ID., The role of the Byzantine state in the economy, in *EHB*, vol. 3, pp. 973–1058, here pp. 1001–2. The *autourgia* are assets entailing multiple investment returns: see A. LAIOU, The agrarian economy. Thirteenth-fifteenth centuries, in *EHB*, vol. 1, pp. 311–75, here pp. 357–8.

been paying *pakton* for the land they cultivated, this was calculated separately at the end of the *praktikon*.¹⁴ This is the only essential difference between the two *praktika*. However, the thoroughness by which the separate assets belonging to the domain of Lampsakos are registered (mills, vivaria and fishing installations, vineyards and docking rights) is surprisingly similar to the best *praktika*, and in particular that of Iviron monastery dated to 1301.¹⁵ This comparison shows that the method of registration concerning the assets, meaning the separate exploitations of a domain, had been standardized by the beginning of the 13th century, following the principles as we know them from the *praktikon* of Adam.

The material dated to around 1100, closer to the *praktikon* of Adam, confirms the minimal interest in the peasant households as fiscal units. Gregorios Chalkoutzes' cadaster extract for the monastery of Iviron lists separately, with the remark "by the community of this *chorion*," properties from which distinct revenue derived.¹⁶ In lists of farmers included in various *praktika* and deliveries of the 12th century the peasant holdings are nowhere described except for their working power (as *zeugaratoi*, etc., along with the members of their family).¹⁷ Following the same method, the *praktikon* of delivery for the monastery of Theotokos of Lembos drafted by the *stratopedarches* Michael Phokas in 1235 signaled the *boidatoi* and the *aktemones* (farmers without oxen). The *praktikon* of George Zagarommates of 1254 only contained household members and taxes.¹⁸ It has been suggested that the state maintained its right to collect from the farmers either the *pakton*, the *morte* or the tax, and allot them to beneficiaries.¹⁹ Moreover, when the document under examination is a *praktikon* delivering the land and its resources to a beneficiary, the changes effected to the value of the land, e.g. the addition of a vine, the construction of a mill, or the abandonment of fields and *staseis*, would be added to the general description of these ensembles of assets, because essentially, these acts describe fiscal units, meaning

14. *Patmos* 2, no. 50 and pp. 25–35 for commentary. Oikonomides suggested that the discrepancy observed between the amount of the taxes of the *paroikoi* and the thirty coins actually handed over to the beneficiary of Alopekai, Andronikos Doukas, might be due to the possibility that the *paroikoi* owned land, which was not ceded to Doukas. In the absence of evidence, accepting this view is rather precarious: N. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ [N. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ], 'Η "Πείρα" περί παροίκων, in *Αφιέρωμα στον Νίκο Σβορώνο*. 1, εκδ. Β. Κρεμμύδας [B. Kremmydas] et al., Ρέθυμνο 1986, pp. 232–41, here pp. 240–1. This follows the suggestion of N. SVORONOS, *Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin et la fiscalité aux XI^e et XII^e siècles : le cadastre de Thèbes*, *BCH* 83, 1959, pp. 1–166, here pp. 139–41; also see LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), pp. 147–8. NYSTAZOPOULOU-PELEKIDOU, in *Patmos* 2, pp. 29–30, has explained the discrepancy of the figures much more convincingly.

15. JACOBY, Venetian presence (quoted n. 12), pp. 8, 9, 11–18, 25. Cf. *Actes d'Iviron* 3, no. 70.

16. *Actes d'Iviron* 1, pp. 263–8 and no. 30.3–4, 9, 26, 31.

17. See *Actes de Lavra* 1, no. 65.62–74 (1181); *Actes d'Iviron* 2, nos. 48.13–21 (1098–1103), 51.35–75 (1103), 52.212–19, 231–40, 504–10, 564–95 (1104); L. PETIT, Le monastère de Notre-Dame de Pitié en Macédoine, *IRAIK* 6, 1900, pp. 1–153, here, no. 8 p. 38.10–24 (1152). On this type of registration see R. ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, Richesses et propriété paysannes à Byzance (XI^e–XIV^e siècle), in *Le saint, le moine et le paysan : mélanges d'histoire byzantine offerts à Michel Kaplan*, éd. par O. Delouis, S. Métivier & P. Pagès (Byzantina sorbonensia 29), Paris 2016, pp. 171–212, here pp. 177–82.

18. MM 4, pp. 13–4 and F. DÖLGER, Chronologisches und Prosopographisches zur byzantinischen Geschichte des 13. Jahrhunderts, *BZ* 27, 1927, pp. 291–320, here pp. 296–7 note 4; *Patmos* 2, no. 65, and cf. the restitutions, nos. 66, 68.

19. N. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, Terres du fisc et revenu de la terre aux X^e–XI^e siècles, in *Hommes et richesses dans l'Empire byzantin*. 2, VIII^e–XV^e siècle, éd. par V. Kravari, J. Lefort & C. Morrisson (Réalités byzantines 3), Paris 1991, pp. 321–37, here pp. 323–8.

domains (such as those of Lampsakos and Alopekai), therefore they also list the attached farmers.²⁰ The addition of a draft animal, on the other hand, changes the working power and therefore the fiscal value of, and income from the peasants, and is normally registered in the peasant *stichoi*, if the farmers were its owners.²¹ The best example demonstrating this is that of Theotokos Eleousa at Stroumitza, where the *paroikoi* had increased their workforce and were, for this reason, harassed by the fiscal officials.²² This might as well be the reason why in the *praktikon* of Lampsakos the households' taxes are fused into one large sum per fiscal category instead of analyzing them separately—although this difference might also be the choice of the Latin translator instead of copying a list of *stichoi* with the corresponding tax. This type of census does not mean that the *paroikoi* did not own their properties, which were separate from those of the domain they were working on, neither can it be presumed that the state was not monitoring these properties closely for imposing the corresponding taxation. This problem is examined below.

Fiscal rate readjustment under the Lascarids

Until the middle of the 13th century, the fiscal value of the peasant workforce had increased. This was combined with what seems to be a parallel decrease of the taxation of the land. Both these aspects of the fiscal imposition of late Byzantium are known from the regulatory text known as *Apokope psomion* (Ἀποκοπή ψωμίων), which dates from 1232.²³ In the previous period the possessor of a pair of oxen was valued at 24 coins, one with a single ox at 12 and a *pezos* (cultivating the land by himself) at 6 coins. Thus the analogy was set at 4:2:1; the land, divided into qualities (first, second and third), was also valued at the same rate.²⁴ As we have seen, this was the rate maintained for the farmers of Lampsakos (although the *praktikon* might reflect the situation before 1204). But by 1232, the value of a farmer possessing a pair of oxen (*zeugaratos*) had been augmented 2.5 times compared to the previous period, while the value of single ox possessors (*boidatos*) as well as farmers who only relied on their own capacity (*pezos* or *aktemon*) had been tripled. Based on this, the fiscal analogy among the farmers had been modified to become 3:2:1 (or 60:40:20 coins).²⁵ The tax rates of irrigated land, of first and second quality, set in the

20. Thus the renewal of the contract of the vines (*anakampsis*) is recorded in the *praktikon* of Lampsakos: JACOBY, Venetian presence (quoted n. 12), p. 199.16.

21. The domains also possessed draft animals. Two pairs of buffaloes and a pair of oxen were found at the domain of Alopekai in 1073: *Patmos* 2, no. 50.121. A *stichos* describes the properties of a single taxpayer and comprises the tax of the households, meaning the *staseis*.

22. PETIT, Notre-Dame de Pitié (quoted n. 17), no. 8. See OIKONOMIDÈS, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 207–8; ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, Richesses (quoted n. 17), pp. 178–9, 203–5; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 85–6. On the monastery of Eleousa, see M. KAPLAN, Retour sur le dossier du monastère de la Théotokos Eléousa à Stroumitza, *ZRVI* 50, 2013, pp. 479–92.

23. A. BEIHAMMER, *Griechische Briefe und Urkunden aus dem Zypern der Kreuzfahrerzeit: die Formularsammlung eines königlichen Sekretärs im Vaticanus Palatinus Graecus 367* (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte Zyperns 57), Nicosia 2007, no. 7.12–13.

24. *Géométries du fisc byzantin*, éd., trad., commentaires par J. Lefort et al. (Réalités byzantines 4), Paris 1991, pp. 62.28–30; 253–4. Based on *Actes de Lavra* 1, p. 289, no. 56.45–51, a *zeugaratos* was valued as two *boidatoi* and four *pezoï*. See OIKONOMIDÈS, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 67–70.

25. Cf. LEFORT, *Fiscalité médiévale* (quoted n. 9), pp. 29–30, 48–9; OIKONOMIDÈS, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 67–70; K. SMYRLIS, Taxation reform and the pronnoia system in thirteenth century

Apokope at 48:1 and 100:1 respectively, are those maintained in the *praktika* of the late 13th century (50:1, 100:1), although in the *praktika* the rates apply in a general manner to the various qualities of the land, while the *Apokope* is much more thorough when it comes to determining the quality and the fiscal value of the fields.²⁶

The *Apokope* in fact reveals a delicate readjustment of the fiscal rates. First, it seems that the base of this valuation was no more the single ox, but rather the pair, on which the rate is fixed. Thus, the farmer possessing an ox was now valued at two thirds of the workpower of the *zeugaratos*, and the *aktemon* at a third. Second, there is no correspondence of the workforce fiscal rate to that of the land tax.²⁷ In other words, in the principle revealed by the *Apokope*, the workforce of the peasant household (the possession or not of oxen) defines the farmer's fiscal category in a manner that is independent from the taxable matter, the land. This is also established in an example attached to the *Apokope*, entitled *Interpretation of the Apokope psomion* (Ἑρμηνεία εἰς ἀποκοπὴν ψωμίων), where it is clearly to be seen that the *zeugarion* was a logistical unit for defining the fiscal categories and the tax.²⁸ Despite the disassociation of the peasant household from the land, the system had been designed in such a manner that the state would not lose anything from the drop of the fiscal assessment rate of the land.²⁹ In the *Apokope* it is complemented with the registration of *autourgia* of the *paroikoi*, in particular vines, orchards and installations but also movable assets—specifically draft animals, which was not new.³⁰ But, as the rates by which the land was assessed were now different from those of the assessment of the farmers, it cannot be maintained that the fiscal value of the households in the *Apokope* remained in proportion to their working force.³¹ Despite the fact that the private landed property of the dependent peasants is not signaled in these texts, the shift from the land to the peasant household is clear; apparently, the workforce put to the field acquired significance and became the main source of the wealth deriving from the land, and the farmer possessing a pair was taxed proportionately much more than in the previous era.³²

Byzantium, in *Change in the Byzantine world in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries : first international Sevgi Gönül Byzantine studies symposium : proceedings*, ed. A. Ödekan et al., İstanbul 2007, pp. 211–17, here pp. 211–2; LAIOU, Agrarian economy (quoted n. 13), p. 332, attributed the change to the devaluation of the coin.

26. BEIHAMMER, *Briefe* (quoted n. 23), no. 7.24–6. Even the tax of the land that was irrigated all year round was decreased by a third of its previous value (supposing it, too, was valued at 1:24); this category should refer to the land of the rich alluvial river plains. The land is imposed according to its quality (first, second and third) at 24:1, 48:1 and 72:1.

27. Cf. SMYRLIS, Taxation reform (quoted n. 25), pp. 215–6.

28. BEIHAMMER, *Briefe* (quoted n. 23), no. 84.15–16.

29. The average fiscal value of the peasant households would be 60,86 coins, very close to the theoretical value of a *zeugaratos*. On the *dekateia* implying sometimes the *pakton* and/or the *morte*, see LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), p. 216; EAD., Agrarian economy (quoted n. 13), pp. 338–9 and tables 2A–B.

30. BEIHAMMER, *Briefe* (quoted n. 23), no. 7.19, 22 and pp. 326–7. The installations are signaled as *chanoutin* in the *Apokope*, and probably signify wine or oil presses: TRAPP, *Lexikon*, vol. 8, p. 1980, s.v. χανούτιον.

31. This seems to have been suggested by LAIOU, Agrarian economy (quoted n. 13), pp. 329–32.

32. LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), pp. 152–7, already suggested that the farmers were seen as producers of goods and revenue by the donor, meaning the state.

A third text associated with the evolution of the fiscal system, dated generally to the middle of the 13th century, is the model of the delivery of *paroikoi* to *pronoia* holders, titled *Attribution of paroikoi to a soldier by the local duke* (Παράδοσις παροίκων παρὰ τοῦ κατὰ χώραν δουκὸς πρὸς στρατιώτην). The method followed here is simple: land counted in *zeugaria*—or the equivalent fiscal value—was delivered to the *pronoia* holders who were the beneficiaries of its fiscal revenue. This revenue was produced by the *paroikoi* assigned. The registration of the farmers' assets is as minimal as in the *praktikon* of Adam, and restricted to their oxen, cattle, sheep and pigs. The model does not clarify whether the *paroikoi* would be paying tax, *pakton* or *morte* to the *pronoia* holder.³³ Presumably, the description of this block of land, if included in a *pronoia praktikon*, would be complemented with the enumeration of the separate assets found in it (e.g. the mills and the vines or olive groves, fisheries and so on), but this is only a hypothesis. Oikonomides, studying the earlier *praktika*, suggested that the old registration method was not very meticulous. While the state was able to follow the changes effected in the value of private land and these were factored in for the readjustment of the taxation, it maintained no such interest for land held under privilege, because it had forfeited many of the taxes to the beneficiaries.³⁴ This is a simplistic interpretation, but it might explain why the archives are so parsimonious about the agrarian society before the Palaeologan era; it also indicates that the *Attribution* might indeed reflect the situation prior to the 13th century. Calculating the taxation of the peasant households and the land on different fiscal rates eventually led, under the first Palaeologoi, to the creation of separate subsets of revenue deriving from manpower and diverse properties, as these are registered in the *praktika* of the late 13th and the 14th century. Unlike the previous period, under the Palaeologoi the land tax and the taxes of the farmers are neatly separated, which means that the workforce and the peasant households were assessed differently and independently from the taxable matter. There can be little doubt that the fiscal method evolved for exercising strict control, evaluation and imposition of this matter, whether it belonged to the peasants, the beneficiaries or the domains. The effect was that the accounting of state revenue was maximized and conveniently served the state economy, as it was handed over as a privilege. However, at the same time, by assigning major significance to the peasants' privately owned assets, the state had in fact come to recognize that the main driving force of wealth-producing growth in the provinces was effectively the peasant household.

Nevertheless, this conclusion raises the question: how did the state monitor the private property of the *paroikoi*? The material coming from the second half of the 13th and the 14th century reveals that the assets of the dependent farmers were being registered in *biologia*, according to the expression of Michael VIII Palaeologos found in a *horismos* from 1262 for the monastery of St. John Theologos. The same term appears

33. OIKONOMIDÈS, Contribution (quoted n. 11), pp. 158, 160.13–19; ID., Role (quoted n. 13), p. 1043–4, and the extensive analysis of BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 213–25. Oikonomides believed that the text was not much older than 1259. SMYRLIS, Taxation reform (quoted n. 25), p. 216, examined it in relation to the *zeugarion* and the *zeugaratoi* and understands that “the model *praktikon* is only interested in fiscal revenue.” The *Attribution* vaguely recalls the corresponding report of Niketas Choniates on the *pronoia*: See *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, rec. I. A. van Dieten (CFHB 11), Berolini – Novi Eboraci 1975, pp. 208–9.

34. OIKONOMIDÈS, Πείρα (quoted n. 14), pp. 235–6. This view concerned the privileged domains.

in a slightly different form in the *praktikon* of Lavra monastery dated to 1321: *boiotikion*, for designating the properties.³⁵ The word derives from *bios* (βίος, βιός which means “life, fortune, property”).³⁶ The archive of the monastery of St. John Prodromos of Mt. Menoikeos preserves a document under the title “the [properties] of the *paroikoi* of this monastery;” it contained a list of fields of seven *paroikoi*, recording in addition inheritance, dowries and joint ownership.³⁷ Despite the fact that the terminology is missing and the register seems to be a private one, drafted for the monastery, its existence further demonstrates the importance of the land of the dependent farmers. The archive of Theotokos of Lembos indeed reveals that their properties were sources of fiscal income allocated to *pronoia* holders other than the farmers’ landlord. Consequently, there can be no doubt that the state indeed kept records of the properties of the dependent peasants, despite the fact that both these terms are rare in the sources. In other words, it is not to be discarded that at this time the term *biologion/boiotikion* signaled the registers kept for the properties and exploitations of dependent cultivators, with the purpose of differentiating them from free farmers and keeping track of the changes effected to them, and for this reason only, it is inextricably connected to the *abiotikion*, meaning the incorporation of the uninherited properties of dependent farmers in the domains.³⁸ It appears that because of these registers the fiscal administration was able to record the changes of ownership brought to these assets and claim their tax from the new proprietors after their alienation. This tax was called *epiteleia*, and will be briefly discussed below.

The changes effected under Michael VIII

The first *praktikon* of the Palaeologan era dates from 1262 and is saved in the archive of Iviron Monastery. One of its novelties is the combination of the old with the new registration method. The peasants were recorded as holding land *zeugaratiken*, *boidatiken*, *aktemoniken* or *aporitiken* or *gen oligen*, which refers to their tenures in the domains. The poorest were valued only for their personal workforce and were marked as *aktemon*, *aporos* or *anypostatos*. The *praktikon* includes in each peasant *stichos* the work and draft animals of the households (cows, horses and so on), but seems much more thorough as it records all the *autourgia* in the peasants’ possession, meaning vines, mills, boats and

35. *Patmos* 1, no. 30.4–6; *Actes de Vatopédi* 2, nos. 98.51, 128.10; *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 109.989–990, on which see the proposed restitution by SVORONOS in *Actes de Lavra* 4, p. 208: ἄνευ τῆς μερίδος τῆς κατεχομένης παρὰ τοῦ Φαρμάκη, νομίσματα δύο· [illisible] ὑπὲρ τοῦ [illisible] ἀπὸ τῶν ξενοπαροίκων ἀπάσης περιοχῆς καὶ τοῦ ἐκεῖσε βοιωτικίου (“without the share possessed by Pharmakes, two coins; [...] for [...] from the *xenoparoiikoi* of the entire region and the *biotikion* there”). In this context I take the last phrase to indicate the whole of the farmers’ private properties. ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 209–10 speculated that the *biologion* might be a separate register for properties under the control of the state. A single piece of information indicates that the *biologion* might have been a tax in Epirus: see MM 5, p. 83; A. KONTOGIANNOPOULOU, La fiscalité à Byzance sous les Paléologues (13^e–15^e siècles) : les impôts directs et indirects, *REB* 67, 2009, pp. 5–57, p. 41 n. 226.

36. *Etymologicum gudianum*. 1, rec. E. L. de Stefani, Leipzig 1909 (repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1965), p. 270.B.6–9. Cf. *Actes de Lavra* 3, App. XI.93. Also see DEMETRAKOS, vol. 2, pp. 1415–6, s.v. βίος and βιός.

37. L. BÉNOUS, *Le Codex B du monastère Saint-Jean-Prodrome (Serrès). 1, XIII^e–XV^e siècles* (Textes, documents, études sur le monde byzantin, néohellénique et balkanique 2), Paris 1998, no. 141.

38. The *abiotikion* is discussed below.

vivaria.³⁹ In addition, it also records in the *stichoi* the fields of the farmers measured in *modioi*, which is not seen in any other *praktikon*. These are distinct from their tenures of land *zeugaratike*, etc.⁴⁰

The delivery (*paradounai*) for St. Panteleemon dating perhaps from 1271 was also drafted along the same lines, but clarifies that the *paroikoi* were given “with their fields, their *peribolia* and the rest of their possessions” without elaborating further.⁴¹ However, in 1279 Alexios Amnon and Constantine Tzimpeas composed a *periorismos* (delimitation) and a *praktikon* which described the domains and named the few *paroikoi* of the Zographou monastery in the villages of Hierissos and Symeon with their assets, including their fields, marked as *agroï*, and their taxes, and listed separately the land of the monastery with its tax (at a rate 50:1). Although designating as such the fields of the *paroikoi* is archaic practice because it recalls the cadastre of Thebes⁴² and therefore betrays some uncertainty of the *apographeis* regarding the suitable terminology, this is in reality the first *praktikon* which differs essentially in the registration method.⁴³ The *praktika* coming from the early years of Andronikos’ reign and the island of Lemnos, dressed at the same time (1284–5) and probably by the same person, the duke of Lemnos Michael Makrembolites, follow with the same characteristics: the recording is thorough and detailed, comprising in the *stichoi* of the peasants not only their working capacity (household members and draft animals) but also any other asset in their ownership: domestic animals and herds, vines, boats, houses, mills, fields and dowries that had changed hands. Indeed, these *praktika* for the first time give a clear picture of the peasant households on the island of Lemnos. The *praktikon* of the monastery of Archistrategos on the other hand, although drafted by the same person, Michael Makrembolites, and unlike the *praktika* of Lavra, lists the assets of the domain separately from the *paroikoi*, but without the taxes corresponding to the land and its assets as might have been expected. A mutilated *praktikon* of Esphigmenou dated by Lefort preferably to 1283/1284 should also be counted among these first documents; in it we have the first mention of the whole of the peasants’ taxes as *oikoumenon* (literally “that which is found in the households”).⁴⁴

Still, we have to wait for the *praktikon* of Iviron Monastery, dated to 1301, to see the new census method fully deployed. In it the *oikoumenon* of the *paroikoi*, the land tax, the taxes pertaining to the domain, those attached to the *oikoumenon* and the *pakton* of separate

39. *Actes d'Iviron* 3, no. 59.

40. As the *praktikon* only contains the fiscal revenue of the *paroikoi*, the editors observed that the farmers’ taxes were too high compared to the following *praktika*: *Actes d'Iviron* 3, p. 95.

41. *Actes de Saint-Pantéléemôn*, no. 9. The *paroikoi* assigned to St. Panteleemon were apparently too poor and only one of them is marked as possessing fifty sheep.

42. Cf. SVORONOS, Cadastre (quoted n. 14), p. 11 (A.I.14), 12 (A.I.40). The standard word in the *praktika* of the 13th century is *choraphion* (field) followed with the surface expressed in *modioi*, which is also missing in the *praktikon* of 1279.

43. *Actes de Zographou*, nos. 52, 53 pp. 115–20; see the remarks of LEFORT in *Actes d'Esphigmenou*, p. 78, for the date and comments on Alexios Amnon, on whom also see PLP 793. BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 271–4, seems to classify this *praktikon* among those describing *pronoiai* although he acknowledges, with relation to the terminology of the *pronoia*, that it is “fluid,” and that “officials were trying to codify a new way of viewing property.”

44. *Actes de Lavra* 2, nos. 73, 74, 77; *Patmos* 2, no. 74; *Actes d'Esphigmenou*, no. 7. On Makrembolites see PLP 16353.

properties are neatly distinguished from each other.⁴⁵ As concerns Megiste Lavra, only the *praktikon* of 1320 lists the revenue of different blocks of assets and economic activities (land, vines, *pakton*, fishing rights, etc.) at the end of the long farmers' lists. However, a chrysobull of Andronikos II dated to 1298 confirms that the same method of separating the *oikoumenon* from the land tax was applied to Lavra's estates as well, although no explicit references to it are found in the first *praktika* of the monastery, which only register the fiscal revenue from the *paroikoi*. The example of Toxompous village demonstrates how the economy of privileges worked in the act: Toxompous was paying as land tax 260 coins to the fiscus, but these were reduced gradually by emperor Andronikos II until 1298. In 1317, when the great *praktikon* of the village is dated, no land tax is included. The *paroikoi* of Toxompous paid the *ennomion*, *aer*, the flax processing tax, a series of taxes burdening various transactions, the *katagogion*, and the *opsonion* and *tritomoiria* for their fishing installations, and the tax for two fairs. Their dues were completed with the *oikomodion*, which was delivered in kind to the monastery and represented the dominant cultivations of the farmers. This means that the monastery of Lavra was now the ultimate beneficiary of the ensemble of taxes of Toxompous and also kept the land tax, which the state had forfeited.⁴⁶ Another clear example concerns the patriarchate: Theodore II Lascaris had already allotted to the patriarchate the *ekleptorika dikaia* (lease, *pakton*) of the village of Mormou; in 1272 Michael VIII added the *exaleimmata* around the villages he restored to its possession in the area of Smyrne along with the *pakton* and a series of taxes, including the *poros* (crossing), the *kommerkion*, the *ennomion* and the *topiatikon*, with the exception of those taxes that had been incorporated in *pronoiai*.⁴⁷

Technically, the changes affected in the census method do not constitute a fiscal reform. It seems that all the elements of the new system are also found under the previous one. Under the early Palaeologoi the taxation system evolved to become much more thorough and elaborate. By 1300, we see the full range of the economic activities pertaining to the exploitation of the land and its resources: arable land, pastures, forests, water, installations and natural formations used for industrial production such as flax

45. The *pakton* is used for assets leased out to third parties, such as the vines of Xylorygion. For the *pakton*, see ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Terres* (quoted n. 19), pp. 329–32. The *oikoumenon* comprising the land tax is only found once in Monomachos' *praktikon* of 1333: *Actes de Zographou*, no. 29, p. 71.83–4, where, perhaps because of negligence, the land and the *exaleimmata* are listed before and after the *oikoumenon*. On the *oikoumenon*, see F. DÖLGER, *Zum Gebührenwesen der Byzantiner*, in Id., *Byzanz und die europäische Staatenwelt*, Darmstadt 1964, pp. 232–60, here pp. 252–5; OSTROGORSKI, *Féodalité* (quoted n. 1), pp. 311–12; LEFORT, *Fiscalité médiévale* (quoted n. 9), pp. 26–7; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 371–2; Ν. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ [N. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ], *Αγροτικό περίσσευμα και ο ρόλος του κράτους γύρω στο 1300*, in *Ο Μανουήλ Πανσέληνος και η εποχή του*, εκδ. Α. Μαυρομμάτης [L. Maurommates] & Κ. Νικολάου [K. Nikolaou] (Το Βυζάντιο σήμερα 3), Αθήνα 1999, pp. 195–205, here p. 198; ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 35), pp. 9–10.

46. *Actes d'Iviron* 3, no. 70; *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 109.941–86. On Toxompous, see *ibid.*, no. 89.80–90 and cf. no. 104.165–76. On this blatant exemption of Toxompous, see *Actes de Lavra* 4, p. 157; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Περίσσευμα* (quoted n. 45), pp. 197–8. On the taxes, see ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 35), pp. 14–15, 34–6, 38, 39; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), p. 95 note 54; E. SCHILBACH, *Byzantinische Metrologie*, München 1970, p. 206; *Actes de Lavra* 4, p. 163–4. On the *oikomodion*, received in wheat, barley and wine, see ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 35), p. 27; ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans*, p. 494–7.

47. *JGR*, vol. 1, no. 30 (pp. 662–3).

retting pools, etc., had been assigned a fiscal value and taxed accordingly, incorporated either in the *stichoi* of the peasants or the domains. The diversification observed in these documents is not the manifestation of an oppressive state overtaxing its subjects; it rather reveals the economic diversification and particularization of the industrial production of the peasants. The novelty of the Palaeologan system consisted in the disassociation of the peasants as workforce, meaning their persons and their oxen, and their households with everything that pertained to them, from the domanial land. These were now assessed separately. In the new system, the land they owned themselves is also included in their *stichoi*. This is the reason why purchases and assets held in co-ownership are often found in their *stichoi* in the *praktika*, while previously only the *autourgia* had been registered. It has been proposed that, as the peasants often owned property in areas other than their village territory, and many fields or other assets (e.g. vines and trees) were given in dowry, this method allowed the state to better follow the changes made to them over time.⁴⁸ However, this impression is somewhat mitigated when it is taken into account that the peasant properties had been previously registered in the *biologia*, which would have facilitated the fiscal processes of the administration. The archival material certainly shows that the *apographeis* had no difficulty moving the peasants between domains or tenures, or assigning land to the farmers. Thus, in 1259 Emperor Michael VIII ordered that the *paroikoi* who had moved after “a *paradosis* of the *praktor* or the duke or the *apographeus*” be returned to Toxompous village because it was transferred to the possession of Megiste Lavra;⁴⁹ the multiple examples of the *epiteleia* found in Lembos’ chartulary also show that the properties of the *paroikoi* were normally taxed. These procedures are discussed below.

The editors of the Iviron archive distinguished four groups of taxes (“unités fiscales”) found in the *praktikon* of 1301: the taxes of the *paroikoi*, the attached taxes (*aer*, *opheleia*, *ennomion*, etc.), the land tax, and other state taxes that might have been allotted to a beneficiary (i.e. *opsonion*, etc.).⁵⁰ If this calls for some modification, it would concern the domains: domanial assets are listed and taxed distinctly as in the previous period (cf. the *praktikon* of Adam and that of Lampsakos); important monocultures and exploitations such as the cereal monoculture of Radolibos (*ekleioma*, apparently of at least 500 *modioi*), the vines of the *paroikoi* of Thessalonike (about 150 *modioi*), and the profitable fishing installations of Toxompous. The *pakton* (lease) of the domanial assets, either of the

48. *Actes d'Iviron* 3, pp. 153, 191 (and see introduction to the volume, p. 8 and n. 6); LEFORT, *Fiscalité médiévale* (quoted n. 9), pp. 39–40, 48–50. In the census of 1301 all peasant houses (including the poorest) were imposed with a tax of a $\frac{1}{4}$ *hyperpyron* (or a third in some cases); in that of 1316 the burden was only a $\frac{1}{12}$. The ox was also taxed with a $\frac{1}{4}$ *hyperpyron* (assessed at 12 coins). LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), pp. 161–4, 176–81, tried to answer the question of why the *zeugaria* are taxed at a much lower rate than the land. The transition from the older system of the cadaster to that of the *praktika* catered to the need of registering the properties of the landowners wherever they were found: see OIKONOMIDÈS, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 61–3; ID., *Role* (quoted n. 13), pp. 1031–2.

49. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 71.36–39. A similar order was given by John III Vatatzes when he had Theotokos of Lembos renovated: MM 4, no. 166 (pp. 261–2). On the allotment of land to the farmers, see below.

50. *Actes d'Iviron* 3, pp. 25–9; cf. *Actes d'Esphigménou*, p. 101; SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 209–10, 216–7.

farmers of the territory or others from outside the domains, is also noted separately.⁵¹ What belonged to the private ownership of the beneficiaries, which often represented their investments, usually remained untaxed or the tax was calculated with the land tax or even independently from the rest of the taxable matter, depending on the privileges awarded to each of them (mostly fields and vines; mills were normally, but not always, imposed),⁵² and the *praktika* show no interest as to how the beneficiaries exploited these assets. This elaborate method of domanial asset registration is the reason why the taxes of separate blocks of cultivations and assets belonging to a domain (i.e. usually *exaleimmata* but also mills and other properties) enter into the *praktika* of *pronoia* holders.

Therefore, the individualization of the personal taxes of the farmers, combined with the diversification of the taxable matter, facilitates the transfer of the workforce between different recipients and the allocation of separate elements of this matter to a number of different beneficiaries.⁵³ From this time onwards information about the farmers' abode is not always included. This is because the beneficiary could use them invariably for exploiting his private assets or the *exaleimmata*, etc., mostly through the *angarei*,⁵⁴ but the fiscal administrator was interested in their taxes. When they were forfeited to the beneficiary, an individual or a monastic foundation, the total income could rise out of proportion. The fiscal income of Megiste Lavra in 1320 was calculated to around 3,000 *hyperpyra*. The bulk of this sum (a third) came from the *paroikoi*'s household imposition; the attached taxes, the land tax, the rent of the vines (*ampelopakton*), fishing taxes and various rights, etc., followed. Plausibly, the largest part of the tax was paid to Lavra in kind, but the profit of the beneficiary was enormous either way.⁵⁵

51. *Actes d'Ivion* 3, no. 74.333–4; *Actes de Lavra* 2, nos. 104.176–9; 109.945–6, 952–3. Ἐκλείωμα comes from λειῶμα, the mass of broken wheat after the threshing, called ἄλωξ in antiquity. See *Η παραδοσιακή καλλιέργεια στηρίων στην Κύπρο*, Λευκωσία 2012, pp. 14–17. It is generally considered that Ἐκλείωμα comes from the verb λειῶ: to crush, make even, see DEMETRAKOS, vol. 5, p. 4290, s.v. λειῶ, p. 4291; s.v. λειῶμα, λειῶμα and cf. vol. 3, p. 2353, s.v. ἐκλειῶ, ἐκλειωματικός, ἐκλειῶσις. Cf. LSJ, p. 75, s.v. ἄλωξ: grain on the floor; DEMETRAKOS, vol. 1, p. 294, s.v. ἄλωξ, ἄλω. However, it is not entirely to be discarded that λειῶμα is the medieval vulgar equivalent of ἄλωξ, because ἄλωξ-λειῶ-λειῶμα are phonetically close. The *ekleioma* of Radolibos can be surmised from the tax; it was either 500 *modioi* or a 1,000 *modioi*, as its tax was calculated at 20 *hyperpyra* (rate 1:25 or 1:50). On the cultivation of cereals of Radolibos (without this reference), see J. LEFORT, Radolibos : population et paysage, *TM* 9, 1985, pp. 195–234, here 207–15; ID., Rural economy (quoted n. 11), pp. 305–6. It was generally believed that the *ekleiomata* signified land clearing. This view has to be discarded, as well as the older view that *ekleioma* was synonymous of *exaleimma*, which was sustained by Bartusis: M. BARTUSIS, Ἐξάλειμμα : escheat in Byzantium, *DOP* 40, 1986, pp. 55–81, here pp. 79–81.

52. It is thought that the tax of the Gomatou estate of Ivion is explained if the tax of the vines (70 *modioi*) is calculated together with the land tax: see *Actes d'Ivion* 3, p. 154. On mills, see A. LAIOU & D. SIMON, Of mills and monks : the case of the mill of Chantax, in EAD., *Economic thought and economic life in Byzantium* (Variorum CS 1033), Farnham 2013, no. X.

53. LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), p. 181.

54. In the context of agrarian exploitation, the *angarei* delivered to the landlord served the maintenance of the estate: see A. ΣΤΑΥΡΙΔΟΥ-ΖΑΦΡΑΚΑ [A. STAVRIDOU-ZAFRAKA], Η αγγαρεία στο Βυζάντιο, *Βυζαντινά* 11, 1982, pp. 22–54, here pp. 46–50; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 105–12; LAIOU, Agrarian economy (quoted n. 13), pp. 334–6; KONTOGIANNOPOULOU, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 35), pp. 16–8.

55. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 109 and see the analysis in pp. 220–2. Each of the *opheleia*, *aer* and *choirodekateia* amounted to 100 *hyperpyra*, the *dimodaion* amounting to 150 *hyperpyra*.

Trying to date this “reform” is nonetheless challenging. Considering that the first *praktikon* which applies the new fiscal method is the *praktikon* of Amnon and Tzimpeas for Zographou Monastery dated to 1279, the new method is clearly to be attributed to Emperor Michael VIII. We are, in fact, alerted to fiscal modifications put into effect during the reign of this emperor by George Pachymeres. However, the context in which Pachymeres frames it has proven utterly misleading, as it has been discussed so far as a military reform. The person credited for it is Constantine Chadenos. Chadenos had started his career in a low position, but he was *megas logariastes* in 1269, as is attested by an order sent to him by the emperor saved in the archive of St. John Theologos of Patmos. Later he was promoted *eparchos* of Constantinople as a reward for his services.⁵⁶ Apparently, his appointment as *megas logariastes* and not, as Pachymeres claims, governor of a province, gave him jurisdiction to proceed with the “reform,” which may therefore be dated to around 1270. The report of George Pachymeres is illuminating when examined in a different light: Chadenos discovered that the soldiers serving along the Byzantine-Turkish frontier were “profoundly rich” (βαθυπλούτους), as they possessed “many lands and herds.” He allowed them a net sum of 40 coins (εἰς τεσσαράκοντα νομίσματα τῷ ἐνὶ συμποσώσας) which came from their own taxes (ἐκ τῶν σφετέρων ἐκείνων) and appropriated for the treasury (τῷ βασιλικῷ ταμείῳ εἰσκομίζεσθαι) the rest of their taxation, “which was not little.”⁵⁷

Although the extract refers to the effect of the reform on the soldiers, and Pachymeres, connecting it with them, conveniently explains the retreat of the Byzantines from the eastern frontier, what it gives away is exactly what is discussed here: specifically that wealth coming from various resources (land and herds are signaled by the author) was no longer left to the exploitation and benefit of the soldiers, but was appropriated by the state. This is why, later on, Pachymeres claims that the soldiers “could not possess their own [properties]” (τὰ γὰρ σφέτερα οὐκ εἶχον κατέχειν).⁵⁸ In the context of private ownership, this means that the exemptions the soldiers had been enjoying were partially annulled. In the context of the *pronoia*, however, the dues of the agrarian capital and the resources that might have been hitherto included in a *pronoia* allotment were diverted to the treasury. Consequently, the *pronoiai* revenues would have suddenly become smaller. What Pachymeres described was in reality the fiscalization of distinct blocks of exploitations belonging to the *pronoiai*.⁵⁹ This interpretation is indeed corroborated by George Pachymeres himself. Elsewhere, the author claims that the Paphlagonians had everything

56. MM 4, no. 179.3 (p. 285); *Patmos* 1, no. 35 and p. 284 for the prosopographical report of Branouse; A. FAILLER, Chronologie et composition dans l'histoire de Georges Pachymères, *REB* 38, 1980, pp. 5–103, here pp. 18–19; Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 31.29; *PLP* 30346.

57. Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 33.5–9.

58. Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 33.20–1.

59. Cf. H. AHRWEILER, La concession des droits incorporels : donations conditionnelles, in *Actes du 12^e congrès international des études byzantines (Ochrid, 10-16 septembre 1961)*. 2, Beograd 1963, pp. 103–14, here 112. The author brings this in connection with the *Attribution of paroikoi* by pointing out that the difference between the *Attribution* and Chadenos' intervention is a “fiscalization” of the *pronoia*.

they needed except for coin, because it was all taken away as taxes.⁶⁰ Regrettably, no *praktika* of *pronoia* holders have been preserved from the end of Michael VIII's reign, but if they were, it is probable that they would resemble the *praktika* of the 1320s and not the early text of the *Attribution*.⁶¹ There is also no reason to believe, along with Bartusis, that the frontier soldiers were "patrimonial landowners," which would mean, "if they could not possess their own," that Michael VIII implemented encompassing confiscations of private property along the eastern frontier.⁶² There is, in fact, no proof that the state disrespected private ownership; on the contrary, it is amply proven that it was its grasp of what was considered state property and revenue that became stronger under the first Palaeologoi.

The tools of the fiscal administration: the apographe, the perisseia and the exaleimmata

Thus the fiscal process is found fully developed under Andronikos II's reign, but it seems that it had already taken its final form in the last years of Michael VIII's reign, and certainly before 1279. This method preconditions professionalism and accuracy in the registration of the taxable matter, its evaluation and taxation including the workforce that was put to the field, and allowed for the utmost precision in the taxation procedure. The end result was the exhaustive registration of the farmers' households with their properties as well as of properties which belonged to the domains, the beneficiaries and their fiscal assessment: vineyards (*ampelia*), *exaleimmata*, peasant tenures and properties that had passed to state possession (*staseis*, also often marked as *exaleimmatikai staseis*), cereal cultivations (*ekleiomata*, only noted rarely), *vivaria*, mills and so on, as well as of those assets owned by the beneficiaries. The latter acquired, by donation, purchase or investment, fields, gardens and orchards, mills, *vivaria*, and vineyards; only some of these are marked as privately owned (*idiokteta*), but in general few of them reflect the beneficiaries' ameliorations to the land, such as vines, *vivaria* and other fishing installations, gardens and mills. It becomes apparent that this method of census of the human resources and the assets of the countryside provided the state with a basis of much more reliable information on the taxpayers and the taxable matter than that of the previous era, by closely tracking any changes of size and value effected with time on the properties, and it enabled the taxation of various assets as well as the handing out of

60. Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 293.9–12. Cf. the notes of OIKONOMIDÈS, *Contribution* (quoted n. 11), pp. 173–4 on the process of the *pronoia* attribution. LAIOU, *Agrarian economy* (quoted n. 13), p. 321, considered this as evidence for the decline of Asia Minor.

61. See the *pronoia praktika* in *Actes de Xénophon*, nos. 15, 16; P. SCHREINER, *Zwei unedierte Praktika aus der zweiten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts*, *JÖB* 19, 1970, pp. 33–49; *Actes de Zographou*, no. 29, pp. 68–71, is dated to 1333; C. PAVLIKIANOV, *The Byzantine documents of the Athonite Monastery of Karakallou and selected acts from the Ottoman period, 1294–1835* (Universitetska biblioteka 513), Sofia 2015, no. 4 pp. 88–101, dates from 1342 (see the older edition in P. LEMERLE, *Un praktikon inédit de Karakala (janvier 1342) et la situation en Macédoine orientale au moment de l'usurpation de Cantakouzène*, in *Χαριστήριον εἰς Α. Κ. Ὀρλάνδον* [Βιβλιοθήκη τῆς ἐν Ἀθῆναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς ἐταιρείας 54], Ἀθῆναι 1965, vol. 1, pp. 278–98, here pp. 281–6). See N. OIKONOMIDÈS, *Notes sur un praktikon de pronoiaire (juin 1323)*, *TM* 5, 1973, pp. 335–46.

62. M. BARTUSIS, *The late Byzantine army: arms and society, 1204–1453*, Philadelphia 1992, pp. 54–7, and cf. the author's view about these "smallholding soldiers" in pp. 157–61, 188–90. This view, however, involves a lot of speculation.

diverse privileges which were now defined, and thereby restricted. The determination of the fiscal value of each of these taxable items—from the peasants' households, meaning the workforce, and the most valuable possessions, meaning the vines, to the humblest assets such as the simple *monoxyla* (boats)—enabled its attribution to the beneficiaries as fiscal revenue. This revenue is called *oikonomia* or *posotes*.⁶³ In this system the properties belonging to, or exploited by, different beneficiaries, farmers and others, are neatly separated from each other. In reality, by registering this wealth, the state “re-appropriated” it and gave it back as a privilege. Consequently, the beneficiaries' rights to it seem now confined to what the state was willing to allow; for this reason, the privileges ceded at this time are very important for the expansion potential of the recipients of these benefits, because the state could balance out their growth with simple procedures embedded in the fiscal method.⁶⁴

In this context, it has been argued that the distinction between the legal rights of ownership (*kyriotes*, *despoteia*) and possession (*katoche*, *nome*), hereditary or not, are of major significance for the overall economic policy of the Palaeologoi, because the state always maintained its right to take back the allotments at any time. How much private ownership was being disrespected should be a matter for further investigation, especially because land and income came predominantly from the emperor's generosity at this time and the state held on to its sources of wealth ever more vehemently.⁶⁵ Ownership in Byzantium was recognized under conditions other than the creation of a legal act, and possession did not always entail ownership. Hence, the allotments of land or other properties only rarely came with *despoteia* attached, and ownership, as claimed by the beneficiaries, was always mitigated.⁶⁶ Additionally, as they were coupled with the definition

63. On these terms see BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 242–58.

64. Cf. T. MANIATH-KOKKINI [T. MANIATE-KOKKINE], *Αυτοκρατορικές και ηγεμονικές δωρεές προς ξένους και από ξένους στο βυζαντινό χώρο* (Το Βυζάντιο και οι ξένοι 5), Αθήνα 2003, pp. 15–8; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 179–86. The grant of *exkousseia*, meaning the exemption from the payment of certain taxes, is very specific in the chrysobulls and more often than not concerns secondary taxes. Cf. ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Richesses* (quoted n. 17), pp. 198–207. The author proposes a similar distinction of the domanial land into actually belonging to the beneficiaries and that belonging to the *paroikoi*, where the beneficiaries had no access but only claimed the fiscal revenue. In this case the significance of the *posotes* is even more important, because it is used to keep the beneficiaries away from certain wealth resources.

65. See D. KYRITSES, The “common chrysobulls” of cities and the notion of property in late Byzantium, *Σύμμεικτα* 13, 1999, pp. 229–45, here pp. 240–3; ANGELOV, *Ideology* (quoted n. 2), pp. 147–9; KAZHDAN, *Economy* (quoted n. 1), pp. 88–90, 95–8. The verbs *κατέχειν* and *δεσπόζειν* are certainly not synonymous, contrary to Kazhdan's claim. Cf. BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 404–8; ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Richesses* (quoted n. 17), pp. 176–82.

66. There are three ways by which ownership is obtained: by contract (such as sale or donation), use (*nome*, *chresis*), other (such as court decision, chrysobull, etc). Ownership is also conditioned by the physical delivery of the object (*paradosis*) and the time of use (several time limitations exist from ten to forty years, depending on the specifications of each case, including the good/bad faith of the possessor) and restricted by the rights of neighborhood or limitations to the owner's right (e.g. to sell): see E. ΠΑΠΑΓΙΑΝΝΗ [E. PAPAGIANNI], *Η νομολογία των εκκλησιαστικών δικαστηρίων της βυζαντινής και μεταβυζαντινής περιόδου σε θέματα περιουσιακού δικαίου. Ι. Ενοχικό δίκαιο-εμπράγατο δίκαιο* (Forschungen zur byzantinischen Rechtsgeschichte. Athener Reihe 6), Αθήνα 1992, pp. 149–75. For the time of use to count in favor of the possessor's rights, the latter's time of possession would have to lapse uncontested. The author observed that obtaining ownership by chrysobull is a “particular way

of a fiscal value calculated in coin, the confiscation of the corresponding revenue became very common very early under the first Palaeologoi and in particular under Andronikos II. This generated conflict, aggravated by the social and economic impact of the territorial losses of the empire, which left its mark in the sources. For this reason, private ownership, especially that of the peasant households, gained paramount significance for the state because it was in fact the farmers who produced this wealth, while, on the other hand, the insecurity of recipients of imperial privileges in the form of land and revenue allotments deepened. This also explains the emphasis laid on the *perisseia*—excess land with a fiscal revenue that the state would not cede to the beneficiaries—and the *abiotikion*—the right of the landlord to absorb the properties of vacant peasant holdings.⁶⁷ A unique piece of evidence showing the intention of the landlords with regard to such properties is found in an augmented copy of emperor Andronikos III's chrysobull for Lavra Monastery (1329), filled with interpolations based on Michael VIII's chrysobull of 1259; according to the notice explaining the *abiotikion*, the beneficiaries asserted full ownership of these properties (*exousian kai kyrioteta*).⁶⁸

That the older registration system devolved into this detailed census method for serving an economy oriented toward the distribution of fiscal income, in particular *pronoiai*, can hardly be doubted, because the archives provide ample proof. A series of *apographai* (censuses) is attested in the first years of Michael VIII's reign, the first already dating to 1261 with the purpose of discovering *exaleimmata* for accommodating soldiers' *pronoiai* in the Meander valley. At the same time, an *apographe* held in the region of Smyrne and in particular in the estates of Theotokos of Lembos discovered the excess tax or *perisseia*; of the total tax corresponding to it, 15 coins were left to the monastery and the rest was brought into the imperial treasury. The census in the theme of Thessalonike took place in 1262, and was followed by the census on Rhodes island and the Cyclades in 1263. Kos Island, which belonged to the domain of Empress Theodora,⁶⁹ underwent revision (*anatheoresis*) or *apographe* at least once more until 1268. The purpose of such generalized procedures, as explicitly stated in the *praktikon* of 1262, was to confirm the possession of the beneficiaries' resources and to perform restitutions when necessary.⁷⁰ In other words, the intention was to register in detail the wealth the beneficiaries, lay and ecclesiastical, enjoyed, and discover its sources, whether it was composed of the farmers' or the properties' taxes. The subsequent removal from the beneficiaries' possession of properties

of asset allocation" which should not be classified among the ways of attaining ownership by contract. The absence of long-term possession also came up as an argument of the state in the fourteenth century in order to proceed to the confiscations: see I. ŠEVČENKO, Nicolas Cabasilas' "Anti-zealot" discourse : a reinterpretation, *DOP* 11, 1957, pp. 79–171 and esp. p. 95.11–14.

67. On the *perisseia* see SVORONOS, Cadastre (quoted n. 14), pp. 126–7; ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 217–20. The *perisseia* is based on the method of the *epibole*: see in this respect ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 56–61. On a case of application of the *exiosis/epibole* which resulted in the discovery of *perisseia*, dated to the end of the 11th century, see N. SVORONOS, L'épibolè à l'époque des Commènes, *TM* 3, 1968, pp. 375–95.

68. *Actes de Lavra* 3, App. XI.91–93, and cf. *ibid.*, no. 71.80.

69. A.-M. TALBOT, Empress Theodora Palaiologina, wife of Michael VIII, *DOP* 46, 1992, pp. 295–303, here pp. 296–7.

70. *Patmos* 2, nos. 66.4, 8; 68.15–17; *Patmos* 1, nos. 31.8–9; 32.2; 34.1; MM 4, no. 159 (p. 254); *Actes d'Iviron* 3, no. 59.1–2.

and revenues that were being held in excess comes as no surprise. The constant allotments and re-allotments of land and *paroikoi* seem to become normalized as a phenomenon, although clear references come from the reign of Andronikos II.⁷¹ The land of 400 *modioi* allotted to the monastery of Zographou by Andronikos was found in possession of the soldier Gazes, who held it “beyond the quantity of his own *praktikon*” (ἐπέκεινα τῆς ποσότητος τοῦ πρακτικοῦ αὐτοῦ). Excess land was also taken away from the possession of the bishopric of Anastasioupolis and the domain of Akropolitissa and granted to the small monastery of St. George Kalamyziotes; and the excess land of Probatas and Michael Keroulas was added to the *pronoia* of Michael Sabentzes.⁷² Especially in the first example it is obvious that the *posotes*, always counted in coin, is fixed in the *praktika* for confining the maximum benefit of the beneficiaries to a certain level.⁷³ Determining the amount of the *posotes* in reality facilitated the removal of excess income, its appropriation by the state and its reallocation.

Emperor Michael VIII disclosed the importance of the *perisseia* in his *horismos* which defined the conditions of Andronikos’ powers after he was crowned co-emperor in 1272. Andronikos was advised not to extract the sums he needed for rewarding his men from existing vacant *pronoia* ensembles or from the taxes (*kephalaia*), but from the *perisseia* and the assets (*pragmaton*) brought to the fiscus via the confiscation of goods found to be possessed illegally.⁷⁴ The *perisseia* represents the profit of the fiscus and the farmers’ expansion. Finding the ameliorations and imposing taxation on them was of paramount importance, especially when this practice is evaluated against the background of the diminishing empire. The state preserved the right to cede the surplus wealth to the beneficiary or to bring it into the treasury, as it happened with the *perisseia* of the monastery of Lembos, or to confiscate it altogether, meaning to remove it from the possession of the beneficiary and re-allot it, as it happened in the aforementioned cases. Indeed, the discovery of the *perisseia* in the process of the *apographe* did not primarily turn against the farmers—unless they were occupying fields or other assets illegally—but against the beneficiaries when the newly discovered wealth was taken away from them. Therein lies a special aspect of the privileges a beneficiary might have been given. In Michael VIII’s chrysobull of 1263 for Lavra Monastery, it is explicitly stated that the properties recently donated by the emperor’s brother, Despot John Palaeologos, would remain in its firm and uncontested possession not only as they were found at the time, but also as they would be found later with all the ameliorations effected by the existing *paroikoi* or the new *paroikoi* that would settle in the domain in the future.⁷⁵

Unlike the *perisseia*, the emperor did not spare a word for the *exaleimmata*, the abandoned land, *staseis* or other assets. However, the dominant position of properties marked as such, usually found at the end of the *praktika*, is striking. The significance of the

71. ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans*, pp. 79–80.

72. See *Actes de Zographou*, no. 10 p. 28.27–9); *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, no. 23.10–11, 13–14 (1296 or 1311); *Actes de Xénophon*, no. 15.17–19 (1321).

73. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, Περὶ σσευμᾶ (quoted n. 45), pp. 203–4.

74. A. HEISENBERG, *Aus der Geschichte und Literatur der Palaiologenzeit* (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse 10), München 1920, p. 40.84–93.

75. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 72.61–8.

exaleimmata as a fiscal tool had changed more than a century before Michael VIII ascended the throne.⁷⁶ In late Byzantium, the *staseis* of fleeing *paroikoi* were maintained whole and, through the application of the *abiotikion*, were absorbed into the state domains. In the *praktika* the *staseis* are even registered with the name of their original owner and it is thus easy to follow them for many years.⁷⁷ Many such *staseis* and *exaleimmata* were attached to the monastic domains and sometimes they included fields of substantial proportions. Occasionally their tax is noted, but no farmer is found attached, therefore the landlords might have been exploiting them directly with the farmers' *angareiai*. When, on the other hand, the *exaleimmata* are found in the farmers' *stichoi*, they are signaled with the phrase *apo exaleimmatos*, followed usually by the name of the original owner.⁷⁸ The blocks of *exaleimmata* granted to the monastery of Lips by Empress Theodora, of 500 and 1,400 *modioi*, were located in two villages and were valued at 18 coins and 42 coins respectively.⁷⁹

The *exaleimmata* did not belong to anybody; declaring abandoned land as *exaleimma* meant primarily that the state retained its right to absorb the land and allot it to the beneficiary of its choice. As such, they were meant to complement income shortfalls for the recipients. The state recognized the natural process of abandoning and reclaiming the land, therefore it claimed its tax while retaining its right to handle these assets as it saw fit. This is obvious also from a case of exemption: in 1270 Michael VIII ordered that the *exaleimmata* of the small monastery of St. Anargyroi which had been granted to Vatopedi not be removed or taxed.⁸⁰ Under the Palaeologoi, the yield of the *exaleimmata* and various land blocks distributed to *pronoia* recipients was calculated at two thirds of its fiscal value with the highest tax rate (1:50), as revenue, introduced with the phrase "in place of the tax" (ἀντὶ οἰκουμένου).⁸¹ However, in the domain of Lampsakos in the beginning of the 13th century the amount is fixed at half their value. The *praktikon* demonstrates further that the *exaleimmata* of Lampsakos had been leased to the farmers.

76. BARTUSIS, Escheat (quoted n. 51), pp. 50–61, and 68–75. The author has pointed out that the first time the administrative method of allotting *exaleimmata* was applied is noted in the reign of Alexios I Komnenos.

77. I.e. the *stasis* of Petrakas, described both in Skaranos' testament and in the *praktikon* of 1262 of Iviron Monastery, ended up in the possession of the Xeropotamou after Skaranos' death, and it is still found among its possessions in the 15th century: *Actes de Xeropotamou*, nos. 9.A.29–31; 9.B.45–47; 29.10, 20–21; *Actes d'Iviron* 3, no. 59.87.

78. *Actes d'Iviron* 3, nos. 59.62, 64, 87–8; 70.156–7, 229–37, 241–2; *Actes de Lavra* 2, nos. 73.51–2, 68–9; 74.37; 77.78; *Actes d'Esphigmenou*, no. 8.14–20; *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), App. II p. 295; *Actes de Xeropotamou*, no. 10.40–2, 44; PAVLIKIANOV, *Karakallou* (quoted n. 61), no. 5.5, 37–9; L. MAVROMMATIS, La *pronoia* d'Alexis Comnène Raoul à Prévista, *Σύμμεικτα* 13, 1999, pp. 203–27, here pp. 216.39–40; 218.64, 65, 66, 67–8, 70.

79. See H. DELEHAYE, *Deux typica byzantins de l'époque des Paléologues* (Mémoires de l'Académie royale de Belgique. Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques 13, 4), Bruxelles 1921, pp. 132.30 – 133.2; on the monastery's properties see SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 62–3.

80. *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, p. 15 and no. 19.9–10; BARTUSIS, Escheat (quoted n. 51), pp. 65–6.

81. See ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, Notes (quoted n. 61), pp. 341–4; Id., Contribution (quoted n. 11), pp. 171–2; T. MANIATH-KOKKINH [T. MANIATE-KOKKINE], Εργαζόμενοι και μη εργαζόμενοι δικαιούχοι γαιοπροσόδων στην εποχή των Παλαιολόγων, in *Χρήμα και αγορά στην εποχή των Παλαιολόγων*, εκδ. Ν. Μοσχονάς [N. Moschonas] (Byzantium today 4), Αθήνα 2003, pp. 219–36, here pp. 222–3, 228–9; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 372–4.

In the sum thus calculated the *praktikon* included the labor and the *morte*.⁸² The handover of separate land blocks and *exaleimmata* allowed for the intensification of the exploitation without any cost or effort invested by the state. When they were taken back, these assets might have returned to its possession with a profit. This aspect explains why the fields were distributed to the *pronoia* holders with an estimated fiscal value attached; moreover, it illuminates the reasoning behind the frequent *apographai* and *perisseia* extractions.

As most of the beneficiaries were variously privileged, the state monitored their workforce, increased it when increasing the benefit was the objective, or removed it for reasons of fiscal readjustment. The monastery of Iviron suffered a dramatic decrease of its *paroikoi* at Hierissos between 1262 and 1301 (from 83 to 36 farmers), which caused a painful loss of income from this specific area alone (from over 200 to barely 30 *hyperpyra*). However, as a fiscal adjustment, it did not affect its revenues from the theme of Thessalonike.⁸³ Another method for increasing the benefits was the allotment of land and/or small *staseis* to the peasants.⁸⁴ This method is noted at Kastrion of Chilandar,⁸⁵ Stephaniana, Brasta, Portarea and perhaps at Chrousobo and Siderokausia of Esphigmenou,⁸⁶ while the *praktikon* of the monastery of Karakala bears signs that this method was applied on its domains as well.⁸⁷ At Prebista, allotted to Alexios Raoul in 1297 as *oikonomia*, the farmers already had small fields before the reparcelling.⁸⁸ The *praktika* of the monastery of Esphigmenou are the most explicit with regard to this method. In others, it can be surmised that the same process was followed because the farmers are found possessing land in round numbers. Thus, land of 20, 25, 50 or even 100 *modioi* is registered in the *stichoi* of the farmers, which is the reason why this information survives. The testimonies indicate that the size of the allotments depended on the peasant workforce (as *zeugaratoi*, *boidatoi*, etc.), but the status of the land, whether granted in full ownership or possession in the context of domain management, remains unclear.⁸⁹ The

82. JACOBY, Venetian presence (quoted n. 13), pp. 180–1 and 200.27–8.

83. On the income from the *paroikoi* of Hierissos compare the tables in *Actes d'Iviron* 3, pp. 24, 27, and see the observations of LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), pp. 232–42, 264–6 about the demographic data from the *apographai* between 1300 and 1321, esp. with reference to Gomatou village at Hierissos, Selas and Gradista. On the significance of these ameliorations see generally EAD., *Agrarian economy* (quoted n. 13), pp. 352–3.

84. LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), pp. 156–7; M. ΜΑΤΘΑΙΟΥ (M. MATTHAIΟΥ), *Η ακίνητη περιουσία λαϊκών στη Βυζαντινή Μακεδονία και Θράκη την εποχή των Παλαιολόγων*, thesis, University of Athens, Αθήνα 2006 (DOI 10.12681/eadd/19766), pp. 60–1; ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans*, pp. 180–1. P. LEMERLE, *The agrarian history of Byzantium from the origins to the twelfth century: the sources and problems*, Galway 1979, pp. 185–8, although starting from the *exaleimmata* and following a different syllogism which applies to the 11th century, already suggested that the allotment of land to *paroikoi* was a longstanding practice of the Byzantine state.

85. *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), App. II pp. 290–3.

86. *Actes d'Esphigmenou*, nos. 8 *passim*, 14 *passim*.

87. PAVLIKIANOV, *Karakallou* (quoted n. 61), no. 5 (end of 13th – beginning of the 14th century).

88. MAVROMMATIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 78), pp. 213–9 *passim*. This is suggested by the acreage in possession of the farmers: 24, 54, 60, 70 *modioi*, etc., instead of 25 or 50.

89. See ΜΑΤΘΑΙΟΥ, *Ακίνητη περιουσία* (quoted n. 84), pp. 51–2, 55–6, 311–5, who raises issue of ownership (*kyrioteta*) or possession (*katoche*) of these allotments. Cf. EAD., *Εκχώρηση γης σε μικρούς αγρότες-παροίκους την εποχή των Παλαιολόγων, Βυζαντινά σύμμεικτα* 24, 2014, pp. 111–27; also see the comments of ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ in *Actes de Dionysiou*, p. 146.

earliest application of this method seems to come from 1284 and Lemnos Island,⁹⁰ but the testimonies suggest that it was a systematic practice between the 13th and 14th centuries. Although most of the aforementioned estates had been held by the beneficiaries as *oikonomia*, the case of Lemnos indicates that it was not restricted to domains allotted as such, meaning that the benefit of the beneficiary was not the primary concern. The state surveilled the agrarian setting closely, the objective being primarily to maximize the production in a specific area and the income therefrom and perhaps to repopulate thinly inhabited areas. Humanitarian reasons also might have come into consideration; the aforementioned *praktika* of Esphigmenou attest to allotments to the poorest farmers, and a single piece of information from the Lembiotissa archive dating from 1239 betrays the concern of the state that the farmers be given aid for paying their taxes.⁹¹ Whatever the reasons, in this process the intervention of the Byzantine state seems to have contributed to the creation of a large stratum of middle-class farmers in the provinces.

The military taxes and the kephalaia

A single piece of information preserved in the archive of the monastery of Vatopedi reveals that the monastery suffered confiscation specifically for financing campaigns against enemies “who have carved up tyrannically from the Roman dominion and subjugated the Roman lands already many years ago.”⁹² The procedure followed would have taken place in the context of the *apographai* of the time, presumably that of 1262, and the confiscation would have been decided rather for reasons of fiscal convenience; perhaps it was followed by the accommodation of *pronoia* holders in the land that was taken away. No such other events are attested, therefore there is no reason to assume that a generalized policy was applied. On the other hand, Michael VIII is the last emperor who levied the tax of the *strateia* for funding military campaigns. This is reported in a *horismos*, dated preferably to 1274 and dealing with a case of the monastery of Theotokos of Lembos. The *paroikoi* refused to pay their dues and fulfill their *angareiai* to the monastery; in addition, they had borrowed 55 *hyperpyra* “when the *strateia* was accomplished a long time ago” (στρατείας γενομένης πρὸ καιροῦ) and refused to disburse the amount to the monks.⁹³ The monastery, with multiple imperial *horismoi* and *prostagmata*, had secured its exemption from the payment of the *strateiai* that burdened the population of the area of Smyrne under the Lascarids, but even under John III Vatatzes, it had not avoided the levy, called *exelasis ploïmon kai kontaraton* in the chrysobulls, *dosis* or *kephalaion* or *nomismata ton ploïmon* in the imperial documents, and the emperor had severely reprimanded the officials in charge. In a document of Despot John Palaeologos for the monastery of Theotokos Makrinitissa the same tax is called *syndosia ploïmon*.⁹⁴

90. Michael Makrembolites proceeded to allotments of fields to several *paroikoi* in 1284: *Actes de Lavra* 2, nos. 73.60–1, 92–3; 74.36–7, 43–4, 74–5, 77, 105–6; 77.70.

91. MM 4, p. 86. Paroikos Kakabas was relocated for this reason by the *apographeus*.

92. *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, no. 16.1–13 and p. 164.

93. MM 4, no. 161 (pp. 255–6).

94. See the testimonies in MM 4, nos. 156, 157 (pp. 249–50); 158.1–4 (pp. 251–3); cf. pp. 4 and 21, where the list of exemptions is found; in nos. 4 (pp. 22–6) [1258], 5 (pp. 26–8) [1262] and 6 (pp. 28–32) [1284] there is no specific exemption list; cf. the chartulary of Theotokos Makrinitissa, *ibid.*, no. 6 p. 343. In contravention to its privileges, the monastery of Lembos was asked repeatedly to provide

Under Michael VIII this particular privilege of Theotokos of Lembos seems to have been effectively cancelled. Connecting this piece of information with one of the military encounters of the time for pinning the *strateia* to a particular year would be difficult because the period is rife with confrontations. In 1265, the examination of the disputed by the monastery of Stylos *exaleimma* of Gounaropoulos showed that it had been placed under *paroikia* and by *praktikon* to the monastery of Lembos “for [the payment of] the royal and military *kephalaion*” (ὕπὲρ κεφαλαίου βασιλικοῦ καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ). The specification points to a special tax raised for military purposes.⁹⁵ However, the information is problematic; although the *exaleimma* of Gounaropoulos was indeed included in the initial allotment and is mentioned in the delimitation of 1235 to which the document of 1265 alludes,⁹⁶ the monastery had been exempted from the payment of the *strateia*. Why then would the *exaleimma* be granted with the specific purpose of raising the *strateia*? Additionally, no other similar case is recorded in the archives, meaning that no other grant of land for the payment of specific taxes burdening only a particular plot and no other asset of the beneficiary or landowner is attested. The possibility that the document of 1265 confuses two different administrative procedures, that of the initial grant which was followed by the delimitation of 1235, and the restitution of the *exaleimma* attested in the first years of Michael VIII’s reign, cannot be excluded. Since its allotment, the *exaleimma* of Gounaropoulos had been withheld and exploited by the clan of the *apographeus* John Konstomares, notably the Manteianos and Pothos families, for many years.⁹⁷ This long dispute was apparently settled in 1259–60.⁹⁸ The exemption of Lembos with regard to the *strateia* was lifted, but the *strateia* itself was soon substituted with the military *kephalaion* at a later time, but certainly before 1265.

The terminology used in these documents makes further clarification challenging. It appears that the *exelasis ploimon* raised on the estate of Lembos could also be called *strateia*, but it was also called *kephalaion*. However, equating the terms *strateia* and *kephalaion* is problematic because of the different fiscal methods applied. While the *strateia* was an old practice depending on the specific cost of the recruits, which was then distributed to the farmers, the *kephalaion* was a fixed amount. The *kephalaia* broadly represent the “king’s rights.” Under the Lascarids, only the *agape* and the *sitarkia* are mentioned as such, and

the equivalent for sailors (1.5 sailors raised on the village of Baris), *kontaratoi*, or animals and carts and draft animals. Technically, the *exelasis ploimon* and the *strateia* are not the same; the *exelasis* concerns the recruitment of soldiers while the *strateia* the expenses for the recruitment. See ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 115–6, 117–21 on the *exelasis* and the *strateia*, and Id., *Περίσσευμα* (quoted n. 45), pp. 199–200; ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 225, 233. BARTUSIS, *Byzantine army* (quoted n. 62), pp. 145–7, concluded that “there were no ‘military taxes’ in late Byzantium.”

95. See MM 4, p. 94. *Kephalaion* generally means the tax, although it might have different meanings depending on the context; taxes levied in kind could also be called *kephalaia*: SVORONOS, *Cadastre* (quoted n. 14), pp. 21–2, 112–4.

96. MM 4, p. 14.

97. John Konstomares, *apographeus* in the year 1239, was probably the son of Gounaropoulina and Konstomares, who had already died before 1194: see MM 4, nos. 31 (pp. 85–6); 105 (pp. 184–5); 128 (p. 215). On this perplexing document see Π. ΓΟΥΝΑΡΙΔΗΣ (P. GOUNARIDIS), *Σημείωμα για ένα (:)* έγγραφο της Λεμβιώτισσας, *Σύμμεικτα* 11, 1997, pp. 83–96. On the *apographeus* John Konstomares, see H. AHRWEILER, *L’histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne entre les deux occupations turques, particulièrement au XIII^e siècle*, *TM* 1, 1965, pp. 1–204, here pp. 159–60.

98. MM 4, nos. 121–2 (pp. 208–10); 137 (pp. 223–4).

the *paroikoi* of Baris near Smyrne had not been exempted from their payment.⁹⁹ A similar mention is found in Michael VIII's chrysobull of 1272 for the patriarchate, where "the *kephalaia* outside those belonging to the *pronoiai*," meaning the *ploimoi*, the *agape*, and the *sitarkia*, are brought up.¹⁰⁰ On the contrary, Michael VIII's first chrysobull for Lavra includes a vague reference to the *kephalaia* found among the exemptions of the monastery. The emperor excluded Lavra from the payment of the *phonikon*, *parthenophthoria* and *abiotikion* "or whatever *kephalaion* is and will be asked."¹⁰¹ The implication is that Michael VIII might have imposed the levy of the *kephalaion stratiotikon*, and the acts of Theotokos of Lembos point to an early application of this measure for the funding of the early campaigns. The mention of the *strateia* of the *ploimoi* in the chrysobull of 1272 cannot be used to prove otherwise; indeed, if the *strateia* had already been abolished, it cost nothing to grant it to the patriarchate. It is then plausible that if the *strateia* was levied in 1259, the military *kephalaion* might have been first imposed between 1260 and 1265, a suggestion which, however, can hold true on condition that the document of 1265 does not simply use an elaborate expression, *kephalaion basilikon kai stratiotikon*, for denoting the old *strateia*. Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologos' early measures, meaning the levy of the *strateia* and the subsequent levy of the *kephalaion* for military purposes, combined with systematic *apographai* all over the realm, could cause great dissatisfaction among the subjects of the empire.¹⁰²

Michael VIII was accused of having an overly harsh fiscal policy.¹⁰³ In his *horismos* of 1272 issued for defining the competences of Andronikos II, the emperor explained that the *kephalaia* "must be secured for the distributions and *rogai* (rewards) for the benefit of Romania."¹⁰⁴ The expression chosen here, although general, recalls Pachymeres' allegations about the large amounts of money sent to the West.¹⁰⁵ George Pachymeres' *History* indeed indicates that there was need for gold and silver. It seems that to a certain extent, Michael VIII asked for the monetization of taxes delivered hitherto in kind. This is reported with regard to the northeastern provinces of Asia Minor.¹⁰⁶ Pachymeres did not spare his criticism against the new fiscal policy, which he clearly attributed to the emperor's political pursuits. His account is split in two parts, the first in contrast to the Lascarids, and the second in connection with the soldiers, prompted by his review of the situation in the northeastern provinces (an aspect that will be discussed below).

99. MM 4, pp. 3–4 and cf. p. 86. On these taxes see below.

100. JGR, vol. 1, no. 30 p. 663.

101. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 71.80–2. The *phonikon* and the *parthenophthoria* represent the rights of the fiscus when murder or violation are reported: see OSTROGORSKI, *Féodalité* (quoted n. 1), pp. 362–4; A. LATOU, Le débat sur les droits du fisc et les droits régaliens au début du 14^e siècle, *REB* 58, 2000, pp. 97–122, here pp. 106–9; KONTOGIANNOPOULOU, Fiscalité (quoted n. 35), pp. 21–4.

102. See N. OIKONOMIDÈS, À propos des armées des premiers Paléologues et des compagnies de soldats, *TM* 8, 1981, pp. 353–71, here p. 357; ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), p. 225. The author observed that the *strateia* of the *ploimoi* and the levy of funds for other categories of soldiers disappeared as an exemption in the beginning of the 14th century, but connected it to the *pronoia* and the hiring of mercenaries.

103. See in detail ANGELOV, *Ideology* (quoted n. 2), pp. 269–85.

104. HEISENBERG, *Geschichte* (quoted n. 74), p. 40.87–9.

105. Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 291.23–5.

106. Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 293.11–12.

Pachymeres outspokenly associated the fiscal policy of the first Palaeologos emperor with the political issue of his acceptance by the people. According to him, it was “common secret” (τὸ ὑπ’ ὀδόντα λεγόμενον) that he meant to keep the population of the countryside subjugated by overtaxing them. Despite Pachymeres’ reserve, this estimate, supported by the random fact that the farmers around Nicaea revolted after John IV Lascaris’ blinding, has sometimes been taken at face value by researchers.¹⁰⁷

Commuting some of the taxes to coin could cause great dissatisfaction among the farmers. Michael VIII seems to have surpassed his predecessors in his effort to secure the necessary amounts of precious metal for the treasury because of the increased external pressure resulting from the return of Constantinople to the empire. Admittedly, though, he was not the first emperor to apply a more rigorous fiscal policy in that direction, nor was he the first who resorted to a proportional adulteration of the gold coin.¹⁰⁸ It seems indeed that taxation in kind was usual under the Lascarid emperors, and Skoutariotes informs us that goods and foodstuffs were accumulated in the public warehouses. This was probably accomplished through the *sitarkia*, a *kephalaion* levied in kind.¹⁰⁹ Pachymeres corroborated this view from a more realistic perspective. He confirmed that John III Vatatzes had gathered a large amount of supplies for the army and provincial garrisons and for being able to distribute rewards and benefactions. The tax raised systematically for this reason was the *sitarkia*. Pachymeres called the taxation of John III and Theodore II *syndosia*, an archaic term which signifies shared funding, and noted that Theodore II was even more drastic in demanding that it be paid in gold. Nevertheless, the burden was smaller for each contributor because the tax was shared among the taxpayers and what remained to them was plenty because of the emperor’s subsidizing policy. Nikephoros Gregoras paints the same image of self-sufficiency as the economic model on which the Empire of Nicaea operated.¹¹⁰ But, while taxation was seen as definitively positive under the Lascarids, and the censuses were even praised by Skoutariotes,¹¹¹ Michael VIII was accused of abusing this administrative tool which aimed, as we have seen, at discovering the changes made to the taxable matter. The emperor, like the Lascarids before him, also

107. See the extensive report in Pachymeres, vol. 1, pp. 259–67 on the revolt and pp. 291.22 – 293.12 on the report about the fiscal policy. See A. LAIOU, *Constantinople and the Latins: the foreign policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328*, Cambridge Mass. 1972, p. 22; ANGELOV, *Ideology* (quoted n. 2), p. 274.

108. See SMYRLIS, Taxation reform (quoted n. 25), pp. 213–4. The reduction of the gold content of the *hyperpyron* (from 16 to 15 carats) followed shortly after the recapture of Constantinople: see M. HENDY, *Studies in the Byzantine monetary economy, c. 300–1450*, Cambridge 1985, pp. 526–7; LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 15–16.

109. *Georgii Acropolitae Opera. I*, rec. A. Heisenberg, corr. P. Wirth, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 285.23 – 286.2; Skoutariotes: *Ἀνώνυμου Σύνοψις χρονική*, MB 7, p. 507.2–9. On the *sitarkia* in the 13th century see below.

110. Acropolites (quoted n. 109), pp. 285.23 – 287.8 (Skoutariotes [quoted n. 109], p. 507.9–13); Gregoras, ed. Schopen, vol. 1, pp. 41–4. See ANGELOV, *Ideology* (quoted n. 2), pp. 289–90, 292–6 for a review of the critique against Theodore II Lascaris. Cf. the report of Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 99.6–19. KONTOGIANNOPOULOU, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 35), p. 43 and note 234 believes that the *syndosia* was paid in kind, but the testimony of Pachymeres indicates that it was monetized under Theodore II Lascaris.

111. Acropolites (quoted n. 109), p. 286.14–16; (Skoutariotes [quoted n. 109], p. 507.21–4); Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 97.25–30.

used the *syndosia*; it is found in the exemptions' list in Lavra's first chrysobull of 1259, where it is stated that it served the needs of staff or the army on the move.¹¹²

The domestikoi of the themes

Michael VIII is also blamed for his choice of collaborators; in Pachymeres' view, those who took up the duty of *anagraphai* and *exisoseis* were "nobodies" (ἀνδράσιν οὐδέσιν), whereas before his reign men such as emperor Romanos I Lakapenos and the emperor's own father, Andronikos Palaeologos, had served in this position. By remarking that these had indeed brought the taxes into the imperial treasury, Pachymeres implied that Michael VIII's men lacked honesty and morals for doing the same.¹¹³ As we have seen, one of the emperor's collaborators was Constantine Chadenos; he is deceptively blamed for reforming the soldiers' funding system along the eastern frontier, while his measures reflect rather the fiscal policy applied all over the Byzantine state. On the other hand, Michael VIII himself had served in Bithynia and maintained strong bonds with Thessalonike. These provinces, and many others were subjected to *apographai* in the first years of his reign; the *apographai* in reality prepared the changes effected in the fiscal system in the 1270s. It appears then that the accusations levelled against the emperor, assigning ulterior political motives regarding specifically the northeastern provinces of Asia Minor, do not hold under scrutiny. According to Pachymeres, fiscal justice was among his primary concerns already before his ascent.¹¹⁴ But Michael VIII himself was fully aware of the complaints and the burden he put on his subjects. His *horismos* for Andronikos II reveals that fiscal righteousness was central in the emperor's thoughts about governing: "you must not disregard the plea of a city or an entire province," he counseled Andronikos, when the objective was justice against the abuses of the *energountes*. Even under Michael's reign, Andronikos II was authorized to listen to the grievances of the people, to transfer the officers to another post or even to ask for the return of the money that the employee had appropriated if it was done unjustly.¹¹⁵

The office of the *domestikos* of the themes of the East and the themes of the West was created by Michael VIII in the 1270s. The first mention of a *domestikos* of the themes of the West is found in the testament of Theodore Kerameas, archbishop of Thessalonike, dated to April 1284, referring to his brother.¹¹⁶ The earliest mention of *pansebastos sebastos* Nikolaos Kerameas, without his office, is found in the testament of Theodosios Skaranos, dated approximately to between 1270 and 1274. Skaranos had been unjustly

112. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 71.81. The *syndosia* is included without details in *ibid.*, no. 72.86; MM 5, p. 13. Earlier references in Lembos' chrysobulls are equally vague: see MM 4, pp. 4, 21.

113. Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 293.2–9.

114. Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 131.21–2.

115. HEISENBERG, *Geschichte* (quoted n. 74), p. 41.96–105. The *energon* or *kraton* was the financial manager of an area or a particular property with a duty to deliver its revenue to the state. See OIKONOMIDES, *Role* (quoted n. 13), pp. 1027–8; F. DÖLGER, *Beiträge zur byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung, besonders des 10. und 11. Jhs* (Byzantinisches Archiv 9), München 1927, pp. 74–7; A. ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ [A. ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ], *Η εσωτερική πολιτική του Ανδρονίκου Β' Παλαιολόγου: διοίκηση, οικονομία* (Βυζαντινά κείμενα και μελέται 36), Θεσσαλονίκη 2004, pp. 219–20; SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 199–200.

116. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 75.9, 23–4, 27.

criticized for his wealth, but the emperor in his mercy ordered that Kerameas keep what he had been given by *praktikon*.¹¹⁷ Kerameas in Skaranos' testament can be no other than Nikolaos Kerameas. The affair described might as well have been part of the duties of an *apographeus*; no other *apographeus* is known at this time in the region of Thessalonike. Around 1280, Kerameas apparently also delivered the village of Antigoneia to Demetrios Mourinos. However, because of the investigative nature of Skaranos' affair, it is probable that he was already acting as *domestikos* of the western themes at this point, which means that the act of delivery to Mourinos was drafted with this authority as well.¹¹⁸

The *domestikoi* of the themes of the East and West are known from the treatise on offices of Pseudo-Kodinos (mid-14th century). The text included a brief summary of their duties, where it is stated that they were ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν δημοσίων πραγμάτων: this expression might signify that they "supervised the affairs of the state," or specifically the "properties of the state."¹¹⁹ As we have seen, the first Palaeologoi attached paramount importance to state property with a view to maximizing its exploitation. Although this necessity alone would be a compelling reason for the innovation, the duties of the *domestikoi* of the themes point to a systematic effort to bring some equilibrium to the management of the resources by the state and their misuse by the beneficiaries. The competences of the thematic *domestikoi* appear more encompassing than those of the *logariastes ton ktematon* of the emperor, who was a general manager of the imperial domains. Nikolaos Promountenos signed the *praktikon* of Panteleemon Monastery in 1271 in this capacity, but the office is not attested in the precedence list of Pseudo-Kodinos.¹²⁰ The *domestikos* is clearly superior, as his jurisdictions included judicial authority regarding unlawful enrichment as well as investigative and coordinating authority in the provinces. Considering that a large part of the imperial properties had, by the 1270s, been allotted to various beneficiaries, and that the state moved to reclaim its assets with the methods described above, it is probable that the creation of the office was necessitated by the fiscal reform for dealing with the disputes arising in the imperial domains. A seal attributed to Nikolaos Kerameas also points to

117. *Actes de Xéropotamou*, nos. 9.A.31–2, B.47–9.

118. See *Actes de Docheiariou*, no. 9.25 and p. 105, for a prosopographical note of Nikolaos Kerameas; cf. *PLP* 11641, 11642. Oikonomides dated Michael VIII's chrysobull for Mourinos to 1280/1281. The delivery of Antigoneia was apparently the last grant to Mourinos. Theodore Tzimpeas and Alexios Amnon served as *apographeis* of the theme of Thessalonike in 1279, so Kerameas could not also have been *apographeus* in the same region. See *Actes de Zographou*, pp. 119–20.

119. Pseudo-Kodinos, p. 188.1–8. See R. GUILLAND, *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines*. 1 (Berliner byzantinistische Arbeiten 35) Berlin – Amsterdam 1967, pp. 588–91.

120. *Actes de Saint-Pantéléemôn*, no. 9.38–9. It is not known if the *logariastes* acted under the command of the *logothetes ton oikeiakon* or the *megas logariastes*; the first was superior to the latter according to Pseudo-Kodinos, pp. 138.20–1, 182.24–7. On the *logariastes* see N. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, L'évolution de l'organisation administrative de l'Empire byzantin au XI^e siècle (1025–1118), *TM* 6, 1976, pp. 125–52, here p. 140. R. GUILLAND, Études sur l'histoire administrative de l'Empire byzantin. Le logariaste, ὁ λογαριαστής; le grand logariaste, ὁ μέγας λογαριαστής, *JÖB* 18, 1969, pp. 101–13. Several *logothetai ton oikeiakon* are known for the reigns of both Michael VIII and Andronikos II: R. GUILLAND, Études sur l'histoire administrative de l'Empire byzantin. Les logothètes, *REB* 29, 1971, pp. 5–115, here pp. 95–100.

the investigative aspect of the office.¹²¹ Nikephoros Choumnos bitterly complained about Kerameas' activity against his own friends;¹²² he accused him for "devouring greedily the livelihood" of "those who favor the benign and gentle and god-crowned king," "devouring also what public [property] he was entrusted with." Nikolaos Kerameas was indeed "arraigned in all [kinds of] trials."¹²³ Elsewhere Choumnos charged him with avarice (πολὺς τὰς ἀρπαγὰς) and called on him to "give back [what he has taken], if not double or even more, then as they were," because the charges levelled against many were false, and to "give back the public [property]."¹²⁴ It is not unthinkable that the deposition of his brother, archbishop of Thessalonike Theodore Kerameas, made the accusations against Nikolaos easier to launch, but it seems that this did not shake the trust Andronikos II had in him. Be that as it may, the evidence indicates that the state had indeed proceeded to retrieve resources that had been escaping from its control for many years. This might have happened indeed in the first decade of Michael VIII Palaeologos' reign.

The acts of the *domestikoi* of the themes of the East, Manuel Sgouropoulos, preserved in the archive of Theotokos of Lembos, show that the *domestikoi* had general supervision and jurisdiction, coordinating the provincial administration with regard to the affairs of the imperial estates and their beneficiaries. Sgouropoulos conferred the task of examining specific cases to the *basilikos bestiarites*, Phokas Pakourianos, his son-in-law Manuel Kritopoulos (who had no time to deal with the affair on account of his appointment as duke of Chios), and to the metropolis of Smyrne. After the examination of these affairs which involved individuals of higher status, namely Manuel Doukas Aprenos and Michael Komnenos Branas, Sgouropoulos issued two letters, both qualified as *gramma apokatastatikon* (restitution letter), summarizing the results of the administrative procedure. Apparently, Sgouropoulos was in office at least until 1293, to be succeeded by Michael Atzymes, known from Manuel Philes' poems.¹²⁵ Sgouropoulos' acts seem to be along the same lines as Nikolaos Kerameas' reallocation of the properties to Skaranos; their content also confirms the allegations of Choumnos about the (re-)appropriation of public wealth. After the loss of Asia Minor we only have *domestikoi* of the themes of the West, attested in the Athonite archives, who signed *praktika* drafted for the monasteries of Lavra and Vatopedi.¹²⁶

121. See X. ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΙΔΗ [C. KONSTANTINIDE], Η Αχειροποίητος-Φανερωμένη των πρώτων Παλαιολόγων, *DChAE* 24, 2003, pp. 89–100, here pp. 89–91; G. SCHLUMBERGER, *Sigillographie de l'Empire byzantin*, Paris 1884, pp. 50 no. 52; 157–8 no. 5.

122. Ed. F. Boissonade, *Anecdota nova*, Paris 1844, no. 21 p. 27.

123. *Ibid.*, no. 22.B, pp. 27–8.

124. *Ibid.*, no. 23.B pp. 28–9.

125. *MM* 4, no. 144 (pp. 229–30); no. 178.I (pp. 273–5); p. 279); no. 178.V (pp. 281–2). See GUILLAND, *Recherches* (quoted n. 119), p. 590; AHRWEILER, *Smyrne* (quoted n. 97), p. 150; *PLP* 25030. On Atzymes see *PLP* 1633.

126. *Actes de Lavra* 2, nos. 104, 105, dated to 1317, are acts of the *domestikoi* of the West George Strategos. *Domestikos* Zomes delivered a property to the monastery of Prodromos in the beginning of the 14th century and is mentioned as already deceased in a chrysobull of Andronikos II dated to 1324; his term in this office should predate that of Strategos: see *Actes de Vatopedi* 1, no. 62.49–50; *PLP* 6651. On the *domestikoi* of the themes see L. MAKSIMOVIĆ, *The Byzantine provincial administration under the Palaiologoi*, Amsterdam 1988, pp. 192–6.

Fiscal measures under Andronikos II

Apparently, Andronikos II Palaeologos' reign began on the same principles: closer surveillance of the provinces via the *domestikoi* of the themes, imposition of the military *kephalaion* and *taxation* that was based on detailed registers. George Pachymeres, however, draws attention to a measure which first appeared in 1283 for financing Michael Tarchaneiotes' campaign to the west. It consisted of the appropriation by the state of 10% of the *pronoiai* as a shared contribution. According to the narrative, Andronikos II examined the possibility of extracting the necessary amounts "from the treasury" (ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ ταμείου), but he was advised against it.¹²⁷ Indeed Michael VIII, as we have seen, discouraged touching the *kephalaia*, meaning the taxes gathered in precious metal in the treasury.¹²⁸ In 1283 it was decided that the method of shared funding (*ek koinēs sygkroteseos*) would be applied once again. However, this time the method differed from what had been practiced so far, which apparently is the reason why Pachymeres presents the measure as a novelty. Instead of levying a *kephalaion*, which could be called *stratitikon* as it happened under Michael VIII and would be the usual tax, Andronikos II opted to ask the *despotai* to forfeit a tenth of their own *pronoia* income. In his account of the recruitment of soldiers from Crete, Pachymeres recalled this type of taxation again and called it *syndosia*. The discontentment of the *paroikoi* was widespread because the *pronoia* holders passed the levy onto their contributors.¹²⁹

Typically, the measure of 1283 was not a new tax; it was not a new *kephalaion*, neither is it comparable to the military *kephalaion* of Michael VIII, so it is not correct to interpret it as an attempt to tax the *pronoia* holders, who were typically tax-exempted. On the contrary, Pachymeres' narrative points to something fundamentally different, namely the effort to appropriate for the treasury the revenues of that part of Byzantine society that enjoyed considerable privileges, revealing that re-examining the amounts apportioned as *pronoia* income was an option under consideration even in the very first years of Andronikos II Palaeologos' reign. In reality the levy was intended as a horizontal cut of 10% imposed on all *pronoiai* notwithstanding the actual amount each soldier received; therefore, a possible readjustment of the *pronoiai* was not yet being planned and the tenth of the *pronoiai* extracted in 1283 did not translate into reduction of the yearly revenues transferred onto the *praktika* of the *pronoia* holders. In other words, at this stage there was no plan to revise the *pronoiai* as a principle, or to proceed to a sweeping restructuring of the amounts distributed. Although George Pachymeres described the method as a special *syndosia*, it was specifically designed for redirecting to the managerial authority of the state a part of the taxes paid to the *pronoia* holders, which had always been, clearly and primarily, state revenue. However, the author's ambivalent use of the term *despotai* provides one of those instances where possession is deliberately mistaken for ownership, although it wouldn't have been the emperor's intention to cause such a confusion.

127. Pachymeres, vol. 3, p. 81.10–16.

128. HEISENBERG, *Geschichte* (quoted n. 74), p. 40.87.

129. Pachymeres, vol. 3, p. 237.2–8. See LAIOU, Débat (quoted n. 101), pp. 102–3; EAD., *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 38–9, 186–7, 189; ANGELOV, *Ideology* (quoted n. 2), pp. 290–2, 298–301; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 431–6.

In 1304 the author once again recorded that the emperor resorted to this method for paying the Catalan mercenaries, but the levy amounted to a third of the *pronoiai*.¹³⁰ By that time this type of *syndosia* was already a usual method for funding campaigns. More than once Pachymeres had the opportunity to stress in his narrative that it was practiced often. After its first application, meaning after 1283, resorting to this type of fund raising was easier. Nevertheless, the frequency casts suspicion as to whether the author always meant by *syndosia* the curtailment of the *pronoiai*, or the imposition of compulsory contributions of coin and foodstuff, which was, by the end of the 13th century, an old method applied for supplying the army.¹³¹

The difference might have been insignificant to Pachymeres, but from a political and economic perspective, burdening the recipients of imperial privileges could entail grave political consequences which Andronikos II would have to counterbalance.¹³² The Alan mercenaries, on the other hand, were given everything they needed for campaigning, supplies and horses; for the Catalans in particular, Andronikos II imposed a tax called *sitokrithon*. It consisted of the delivery of six *modioi* of wheat and four *modioi* of barley “for the harvest of every *zeugarion*” (ὕπὲρ συγκομιδῆς ζευγίτιδος). This tax recalls the *dimodaion*, which appears rarely in the sources. Pachymeres clearly revealed that the *sitokrithon* was not a new tax but had been, up to that point, a negligent impost. Its rate compared to the *dimodaion*, as it appears in the archives in the beginning of the 15th century, was in fact tripled for meeting the needs of the mercenaries.¹³³

Notwithstanding the frequency of the *syndosia*, it remained an extraordinary levy added to existing burdens. The *kephalaia* attested at this time do not seem regular either. Of all the domains of Iviron Monastery, the *proasteion* of Radolibos is noted for paying a tax to the state; in 1316 the *praktikon* of its estates of Radolibos, Obelos and Dobrobikeia

130. Pachymeres, vol. 4, p. 541.2–3.

131. Cf. J. HALDON, Theory and practice in tenth-century military administration : Chapters II, 44 and 45 of the *Book of ceremonies*, *TM* 13, 2000, pp. 201–352, here p. 213.144–5. The *syndosia* concerns the co-funding of soldiers, but the same liability is also called *strateia*; a specific exemption from its payment was given to privileged beneficiaries. See OIKONOMIDÈS, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 114–15, 119–20 and 293 table I.

132. See the discussion in LAIOU, *Débat* (quoted n. 101), pp. 114–16.

133. Pachymeres, vol. 3, p. 237.2; vol. 4, pp. 323.14–15; 339.8–12; 539.27–30; Gregoras, ed. Schopen, vol. 1, pp. 204–5. Gregoras especially emphasizes the atrocities committed by the Catalans in West Asia Minor and bypasses the problem of their funding: *ibid.*, pp. 220–4. On the *sitokrithon*, see KONTOGIANNOPOULOU, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 35), p. 44; EAD., *Πολιτική* (quoted n. 115), pp. 245–6; LAIOU, *Débat* (quoted n. 101), pp. 103–4; EAD., *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 89–90, 141, 187–8; K. SMYRLIS, Financial crisis and the limits of taxation under Andronikos II Palaiologos, in *Power and Subversion in Byzantium*, ed. by D. Angelov & M. Saxby (Society for the Promotion of Byzantine studies. Publications 17), Farnham – Burlington 2013, pp. 71–82, here pp. 74–7. References to the *dimodaion* are very rare. The most explicit reference is found in *Actes de Lavra* 3, no. 157.6–8, dated to 1405, revealing that it concerned the compulsory purchase of wheat at a price of four *hyperpyra* per *modios*. The tax depended on the number of *zeugaria* of the farmers. See the commentary of OIKONOMIDÈS in *Actes de Docheiariou*, p. 276. As the pairs the proprietors owned could increase or decrease, the tax readjusted not according to the cultivated surface, but according to the number of the *zeugaria*. Four *hyperpyra* per *modios* of wheat is half the price given at Constantinople in 1402, so it is perceivable why the *dimodaion* represented in fact a monetary loss for the proprietors of *zeugaria*: see C. MORRISON & J.-C. CHEYNET, Prices and wages in the Byzantine world, in *EBH*, vol. 2, pp. 815–78, here p. 828 (table 5).

ended with the note that the monastery, out of the total amount of taxes it collected, ought to deliver 200 coins (out of the total 520) as *kephalaion* to the fiscus. It appears that a hint about this tax is also found in a chrysobull of 1310, thereby providing a *terminus ante quem*. By contrast, the monastery of Lavra enjoyed *exkousseia* for the totality of the *kephalaion*, meaning the entirety of the taxes collected on its estates, as was explicitly clarified by the emperor in the chrysobull of 1298; in effect, the emperor guaranteed that its *kephalaion* would not diminish by any new imposition.¹³⁴

The method followed with Iviron Monastery cannot be compared to earlier practices regarding the *kephalaia*. As we have seen, the taxes flowing into the treasury were called *kephalaia* by Michael VIII in his *horismos* of 1272. The military *kephalaion* was a tax collected specifically for funding the campaigns. It has been suggested that the appropriation of the revenues of the monastery of Iviron recalls the appropriation of a tenth or third of the *pronoiai*, and the curtailment suffered by the monastery is close to the latter tariff.¹³⁵ However, there was a difference: the *kephalaia*, unlike the *syndosia*, were saved for the treasury and, apparently, were paid in coin. This seems to have been at least the intention of Michael VIII. In 1302, after the retreat of Michael IX and his army from Magnesia, the Turks flooded into west Asia Minor. Andronikos II seriously considered the option of re-directing a part of the monastic and ecclesiastical *pronoiai*, as well as those of the imperial guard and perhaps the magnates, to the military. When he informed the patriarch, Athanasios I sent him an olive branch instead of a verbal response, but Pachymeres clearly states that it was impossible to implement the decision at that time.¹³⁶

The evidence of the Iviron archive is unique, although the sum retracted as *kephalaion* cannot be compared to the *pronoiai* curtailment. Andronikos II in effect tried to tax the revenue, but there is not enough evidence for suggesting that this method ever became standard policy, while, on the other hand, the information indicates that reshuffling the *oikonomiai* was an ordinary procedure of the fiscal administration before and after 1300. This does not only relate to the *pronoiai*, but to any fiscal revenue and asset granted by the state to any beneficiary, lay, ecclesiastical and monastic, under the titles of use (*nome*) and possession (*katoche*), and was facilitated by the fiscal change effected under Michael VIII, meaning the assignment of a fiscal value and determination of an accounting revenue for all domains, lands and various properties.¹³⁷

134. *Actes d'Iviron* 3, nos. 72.74–9, 74.334–6; *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 89.157–63.

135. LAIOU, *Débat* (quoted n. 101), pp. 102–3.

136. Pachymeres, vol. 4, pp. 425.23 – 427.4. See LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 119–20; SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 180–1. However, also see the alternative reading of A. FAILLER, *Pachymeriana alia*, *REB* 51, 1993, pp. 248–58, followed by K. SMYRLIS, *The state, the land, and private property : confiscating monastic and Church properties in the Palaiologan period*, in *Church and society in late Byzantium*, ed. by D. G. Angelov (Studies in medieval culture 49), Kalamazoo 2009, pp. 58–87, here pp. 63–4; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 302–3, 305–6; Δ. ΚΥΡΙΤΣΗΣ [D. KYRITSSES], *Από χωρικοί, στρατιώτες : άλλο ένα σχόλιο σε γνωστό χωρίο του Παχυμέρη* (XI.9), in *Ψηφίδες : μελέτες ιστορίας, αρχαιολογίας και τέχνης στη μνήμη της Στέλλας Παπαδάκη Okland*, εκδ. Ο. Γκράτσιου [O. Gratzio] & Χ. Λούκος [C. Loukos], Ηράκλειο 2009, pp. 87–94.

137. See ÉSTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans*, pp. 242–6 and SMYRLIS, *The state* (quoted n. 136), pp. 64–6, 75–9.

The conclusion that Andronikos II tried to appropriate for the state at least a part of the benefits that had long been abandoned to the various beneficiaries, lay and ecclesiastical, is difficult to shake. If Michael VIII Palaeologos disassociated the funding of the campaigns from the *strateia* by imposing a general tax collected on all taxpayers, namely the military *kephalaion*, Andronikos II's solution seems to have targeted the heart of the problem and was therefore more radical. His administration seems to have recognized that what was needed was not to increase the taxation, but to divert to the treasury a part of the amounts the recipients of imperial privileges had been collecting for themselves. Michael VIII's western policy had depleted the treasury in the 1270s, and for refilling it no new tax and no emergency military *kephalaion* were necessary, but a true reform, a readjustment of the fiscal policy of the empire. Yet Andronikos II could not avoid reverting to conservative policies already chosen by most of his predecessors in office.

Around 1300, after he returned to Constantinople from Thessalonike, the patriarch John XII Kosmas criticized Andronikos for his excessive taxation of basic commodities like salt and iron. The emperor responded that "it is not natural to do without money anything of what has to be done; that he does not love gold nor silver at all, if it is not helpful for the needs of the Romans."¹³⁸ Andronikos also debased the gold coin further, and repeatedly suspended the salaries of the officials and staff of the palace.¹³⁹ These measures were necessitated by the emergency of the times, but showcase how erratic the economic policy was in the beginning of the 14th century.¹⁴⁰ Andronikos II was harshly criticized by his contemporaries, but none of his critics ever accused him of a lack of decisiveness, because there was none. The emperor seems to have wavered between reformism and conservatism. Indeed, without this angle it is difficult to explain why the cutback of the *pronoiai* was increasingly common in the first part of his reign without taking that final step of reforming the *pronoia* system in general, why the monastery of Ivron was taxed with almost a third of its revenue but other monasteries enjoyed complete exemptions, why some *pronoiai* were being curtailed, revoked and re-distributed while others remained intact and were indeed turned to hereditary, or why the taxes increased and new ones were imposed. If Andronikos II's reign lacked something, it was not intention; neither was there any dearth of ideas and solutions, but it ultimately does not display the consistency and resoluteness needed for the times of crisis the empire was going through.

The abiotikion

The critique against Andronikos II was collected and processed by Thomas Magistros in his speech *On the imperial office* (*Περὶ βασιλείας*), composed perhaps around 1304–6,

138. Pachymeres, vol. 4, pp. 323.12–15; 325.15–19. See LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 123–4.

139. Pachymeres, vol. 4, pp. 325.19–21; 435.29 – 437.1; 541.3–4.

140. A comprehensive survey of the financial situation of the empire in the years 1260–1320 is found in SMYRLIS, *Financial crisis* (quoted n. 133), pp. 72–4. Also see LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 186–8; HENDY, *Studies* (quoted n. 109), pp. 526–32; C. MORRISON, *Byzantine money: its production and circulation*, in *EHB*, vol. 3, pp. 909–66, here pp. 933, 939–40, 961–2; KONTOGIANNOPOULOU, *Πολιτική* (quoted n. 115), pp. 272–7.

judging from the references to the treachery of foreign mercenaries.¹⁴¹ Magistros complained about the surcharges (*eisphoras*) raised on the population by questioning the necessity that generated the additional taxation. This opinion was based on the assumption that the state treasury was filled with treasures.¹⁴² Thomas examined in particular the εὔρεσις θησαυροῦ (finding of treasure),¹⁴³ the plunder of shipwrecks, advocating on behalf of merchants,¹⁴⁴ and the *abiotikion*.¹⁴⁵ The latter practice, which concerns the state's confiscation of the property of *paroikoi* who died childless, is of particular interest for the present examination.¹⁴⁶

Ample evidence coming from the archival material of the time illuminates exactly how the state handled the *exaleimmata* and the holdings of its deceased *paroikoi*. Thomas underscored the right of the “relatives” of the deceased (τοῖς προσήκουσιν, τοὺς προσήκοντα) to the inheritance, insisting that previous emperors appropriated in reality “the lot of others” (ἄλλοτρίους κλήροις), wanting to “possess what you do not have, and all at once become the despot of everything.” Yet Thomas did not consider it absolutely just that all the relatives inherited, unless these were grandchildren of the deceased or really poor. Although the degree of poverty is not clarified, the argument raises a significant question: who was legitimized to claim those orphan assets? In Thomas' view, the soul of the dead has more rights than the relatives and those who “are irrelevant” (τοὺς μὴ προσήκοντα). This curious expression conceals what Thomas thought about the rights

141. *Theoduli Magistri Oratio de regis officiis ad Andronicum II Palaeologum*, PG 145, cols. 460–1 chap. θ'. The references to the mercenaries seem to allude to the behavior of the Catalans: see LAIOU, Débat (quoted n. 101), pp. 98–101; ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans*, pp. 435–7; on Thomas Magistros see PLP 16045; Σ. ΣΚΑΛΙΣΤΗΣ [S. SKALISTES], *Ο Θωμάς Μάγιστρος: ο βίος και το έργο του*, Θεσσαλονίκη 1984; N. GAUL, *Thomas Magistros und die spätbyzantinische Sophistik: Studien zum Humanismus urbaner Eliten in der frühen Palaiologenzeit*, (Mainzer Veröffentlichungen zur Byzantinistik 10), Wiesbaden 2011.

142. *Theoduli Magistri Oratio* (quoted n. 141), cols. 447–96, here col. 481 chap. κα'; LAIOU, Débat (quoted n. 101), p. 113.

143. *Theoduli Magistri Oratio* (quoted n. 141), cols. 477–80 chap. κ'. On the εὔρεσις θησαυροῦ, see LAIOU, Débat (quoted n. 101), pp. 109–10; C. MORRISON, *La découverte des trésors à l'époque byzantine: théorie et pratique de l'éύρεσις θησαυροῦ*, *TM* 8, 1981, pp. 321–43.

144. *Theoduli Magistri Oratio* (quoted n. 141), cols. 481–4 chap. κβ'. On the legislation about shipwrecks, see in particular Σ. Ν. ΤΡΩΙΑΝΟΣ [S. TROIANOS], *Τα ναυάγια, η Νεαρά 64 Λέοντος του Σοφού και το κείμενο των Βασιλικῶν*, in *Οι Νεαρές Λέοντος ζ' του Σοφού, προλεγόμενα, κείμενο, απόδοση στη νεοελληνική, ευρετήρια και επίμετρο*, Σ. Ν. Τρωϊάνος, Αθήνα 2007, pp. 515–26.

145. *Theoduli Magistri Oratio* (quoted n. 141), cols. 484–5 chap. κδ'. The term, however, is not mentioned in the text and is on the whole only rarely found in the sources.

146. Μ. ΤΟΥΡΤΟΓΛΟΥ [M. TOURTOGLOU], *Το “Αβιωτίκιον”*: συμβολή εις τὸ Βυζαντινὸν κληρονομικὸν Δίκαιον, in *Ξένιον: Festschrift für Pan. J. Zepos anlässlich seines 65. Geburtstages am 1. Dezember 1973*, 1, hrsg. von E. von Caemmerer et al., Athen 1973, pp. 633–46, here pp. 635–7, suggested that the *abiotikion* is the right of the state to the inheritance of those who have died without relatives and without heirs (*bona vacantia* in the Roman legislation). However, the term is late Byzantine; it is not found in the earlier legislation as such, therefore it cannot be claimed that it was used for properties that belonged to free owners. Also see P. LEMERLE, *Un chrysobulle d'Andronic II pour le monastère de Karakala*, *BCH* 60, 1936, pp. 428–46, here p. 439–42. On practical aspects of the application of the *abiotikion*, see ΜΑΤΘΑΙΟΥ, *Ακίνητη περιουσία* (quoted n. 84), pp. 266–73.

of the state on such properties. In his opinion the holdings of heirless farmers should be given to the Church.¹⁴⁷

Karpozelos, followed by Laiou and recently by Papagianni, suggested that the *abiotikion* did not concern only *paroikoi*, but was generally applied to all uninherited properties notwithstanding their owner. Laiou in addition believed that Thomas' accusations proclaimed the right of individuals to private ownership and free disposal of their belongings.¹⁴⁸ This would be a revolutionary idea in Byzantium, but there are problems with it. On the one hand, Laiou's interpretation impinges on the existence of detailed, and quite ancient, inheritance laws which regulated the transmission of the assets of heirless and intestate individuals. No contestation of the rights of the surviving relatives—parents, but also other side relatives, e.g. siblings—on the inheritance is attested in these cases.¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, Thomas' proposal, which allowed very limited rights to the grandchildren and the destitute among the relatives of the deceased, is hard to reconcile with the liberality of defending private ownership. In fact, in the long paragraph on the *abiotikion* it becomes clear that the relatives were indeed excluded, and among them also the grandchildren who were the direct descendants of the deceased. The government officials responsible for such affairs in the grand domains—the *energountes*, *logariastai* or *apographeis*—might have been in fact discarding the rights of a grandchild in his/her patrimonial inheritance in cases where the parent, meaning the direct offspring of the dead farmer, had died too. Consequently, in the context of the *abiotikion* there can be no discussion about the rights of parents, siblings or collateral or ascending relatives. For this reason Thomas' discourse on the *abiotikion* cannot refer to “free” owners, but

147. *Theoduli Magistri Oratio* (quoted n. 141), cols. 485BD.

148. A. ΚΑΡΠΟΖΕΛΟΣ [A. KARPOZELOS], Αβιωτίκιον, *Δωδώνη* 8, 1979, pp. 73–80; ΛΑΙΟΥ, *Débat* (quoted n. 101), pp. 112–4, 117–8; EAD., *Peasant society* (quoted n. 12), pp. 187–8; ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 35), p. 25; EAD., *Πολιτική* (quoted n. 115), p. 244–5; ΣΜΥΡΛΙΣ, *Financial crisis* (quoted n. 133), pp. 77–8; ΑΓΓΕΛΟΥ, *Ideology* (quoted n. 2), pp. 302–3. Also see the encompassing study of Ε. ΠΑΠΑΓΙΑΝΝΗ [E. PAPAGIANNI], Η συμμετοχή του δημόσιου στις κληρονομίες κατά την ύστερη Βυζαντινή περίοδο : παρατηρήσεις σχετικά με το “άβιωτίκιον”, in *Antecessor : Festschrift für Spyros N. Troianos zum 80. Geburtstag*, hrsg. von V. Leontaritou, K. Bourdara & E. Papagianni, Αθήνα 2013, pp. 1275–308, esp. pp. 1281–6, with full bibliography and sources. Papagianni denies the connection of Thomas' text with the law on the *abiotikion* and speaks for a “system” that developed in late Byzantine times regarding all uninherited properties, which was, however, subject to the abuses of the state officials. This reconstruction preconditions a good amount of speculation about what is said and what is not said in the Novel, which, however, specifically refers to the *paroikia*. It should also be acknowledged that later testimonies from the end of the 14th century and the 15th century betray that the term *abiotikion* was generalized and that it even concerned amounts of cash and—perhaps seemingly—all proprietors, not only dependent cultivators.

149. ΤΟΥΡΤΟΓΛΟΥ, Αβιωτίκιον (quoted n. 146), pp. 635–6, signaled the chapters found in the legislation regarding the inheritance law of those who died intestate. It seems that Constantine VII Porphyrogenetos first effected changes to the stipulations about properties that remained without heir and/or those whose owner had died intestate. There can be no doubt about the tripartite division of the assets of the deceased into three equal parts, for the relatives, the state, and the Church. In case no relatives were found, two thirds were claimed by the state and a third by the Church: see *JGR*, vol. 1, pp. 236–7; ΤΟΥΡΤΟΓΛΟΥ, Αβιωτίκιον, pp. 237–8; ΠΑΠΑΓΙΑΝΝΗ, Παρατηρήσεις (quoted n. 148), pp. 1275–9; ΛΑΙΟΥ, *Débat* (quoted n. 101), p. 105 and note 27; EAD., *Peasant society* (quoted n. 12), pp. 186–7.

only to *paroikoi*, meaning dependent cultivators. Additionally, at this time the term is not attested in relation to free landowners.

It is not by chance that Thomas Magistros speaks for the claim of the Church on the assets of heirless farmers. By the 14th century, a great part of the attached manpower is found in ecclesiastical, monastic, or state domains. The landlords did not shy away from claiming what was rightfully theirs, including the properties of childless *paroikoi*. The law of Patriarch Athanasios I on the *abiotikion*, sanctioned by Andronikos II in 1306, explicitly speaks about such properties being grasped at by the public sector and monastic foundations. The state apparently systematically proceeded to appropriations of uninherited *hypostaseis*, thus increasing the assets, meaning fields, vines, gardens, orchards, mills and so on, belonging to its estates. The beneficiaries, especially religious institutions, apparently did the same in their lands. Both the state and the beneficiaries gained from this regulation, because often the *paroikoi*'s properties included very profitable cultivations such as vineyards and olive groves or mills and other assets. Their appropriation was perhaps the only way for state, Church and monasteries to increase their properties despite the state's ever-diminishing territorial expansion. In this context, the peasant tenures, meaning the *paroikikai hypostaseis* described in detail in the archival material, actually become very important. What Thomas describes constituted in reality a severe curtailment of the rights of the *paroikoi* on their privately owned assets in the context of the *abiotikion*, and barely allowed a share in the inheritance to some relatives, with conditions. The law of 1306 on the other hand ceded to "whomever survived them" a third of the property. The expression most probably refers to spouses. Only in the absence of a spouse, or if the spouse had died too, "the father, mother, blood relatives and others" stood to inherit. Under the new regulation the property was divided into three shares, for the landlord, the relatives, and the Church, or was divided between state and Church if no relatives were alive. Furthermore, the stipulation leaves no doubt that it concerned the *paroikoi* and their properties.¹⁵⁰ Thus it is indirectly confirmed once again that ascendants or lateral relatives were barred from inheriting a *paroikos* prior to its promulgation.

Patriarch Athanasios I is known as one of the most severe and unrelenting patriarchs of Byzantium, but there can be no doubt about his genuine humanism, which emanated from his interest for the people; it was in fact this interest that became the source of his

150. *JGR*, vol. 1, p. 534 α' (Novel no. 26); *Regestes* 4, no. 1607. The law explicitly forbids that the farmers should experience confiscation "by those churches or monasteries who hold them in *paroikia*." TOURTOGLOU, Αβιωτίκιον (quoted n. 146), pp. 638–9, rightly concluded that this law clearly referred to the *paroikoi*, but that the state rescinded its right to a third of their assets. What he didn't take into consideration, however, is that the state possessed its own *paroikoi* working in its estates. The landlord—be he the state, the Church or a monastery or even a private person—would take a third. The landlord was therefore excluded from two thirds of the property of his *paroikos*. When, however, the *paroikos* died without any member of his family surviving him, the property was divided in two shares. In this case there was no conflict between the state and the Church or the monastery, because they would both take a half. A good question arising from the last point is what would happen if the *paroikos* worked for a private owner. A tripartite division in this case whereby the state substituted for the relatives, although logical and plausible, is not attested at this time. However, dividing the property into two shares in favor of only state and Church would constitute a major injustice to the private landowners.

criticism against the regime of his time.¹⁵¹ Therefore, Andronikos II's sanctioning of the patriarchal stipulations regarding the *abiotikion* should not be seen just as a result of the pressure of public opinion. In reality the patriarch and the emperor set aside a genuine class distinction by equating the *paroikoi* with private individuals in inheritance matters. This conclusion indeed mitigates the impression that it was the great landlords who benefitted from the regulation.¹⁵² Similar stipulations were in force regarding all those who died intestate and without heirs, but the *abiotikion* until the beginning of the 14th century only prevented the ascending and lateral relatives of *paroikoi* from inheriting. We must also bear in mind that in the 13th century the state was still the employer of the vast majority of *paroikoi*. Since the *paroikikai hypostaseis* were important for the *pronoia* distribution, by acknowledging the rights of spouses, grandchildren, and side relatives to the inheritance of the *paroikoi*, Andronikos II in reality protected the interests of the state and the assets which funded the *pronoiai* from being completely absorbed by the Church and private landlords. By comparison, the suggestions of Thomas Magistros do not seem as innovative as the law of Patriarch Athanasios and Emperor Andronikos; on the contrary, they even seem conservative and aristocratic, because in effect he claimed for the benefit of the Church those properties which lay outside the ecclesiastical domain, namely those that had hitherto belonged to the state and private landowners.

THE MANAGEMENT OF LAND AND INCOME GRANTS

Monasteries and individuals

The grants distributed to the beneficiaries from this time onwards were extremely diversified. Although the Byzantine administration already had a variety of options, the fact that almost everything acquired a accounting fiscal value and/or revenue facilitated further this diversification as seen in the documents from the end of the 13th century onwards. The full registration of the peasant households in the *praktika*, accomplished for the first time, as we have seen, in 1262, comprised only a part of the gains of the religious foundations and individual recipients of imperial grants from the contributors, specifically that which represented the rights of the state in the form of taxes (i.e. personal taxes, *oikomodion/oionometrion*, *kaniskia* and *angareiai*, etc.). In this context, revenues that lay beyond its reach and reflected the possessors' private deals with the farmers,—

151. On this remarkable patriarch see primarily *The correspondence of Athanasius I Patriarch of Constantinople*, an ed., transl., and commentary by A.-M. Maffry Talbot (CFHB 7), Washington 1975, pp. xvi–xxviii, in particular xviii–xix, xxiv, with references; A.-M. TALBOT, *The patriarch Athanasius (1289–1293; 1303–1309) and the Church*, *DOP* 27, 1973, pp. 11–28; LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 194–9; *PLP* 415.

152. TOURTOGLOU, Ἀβιωτίκιον (quoted n. 146), pp. 641–4, posed the question of who benefited from the *abiotikion* when an exemption from its application was granted, and concluded that after such a grant the monasteries would absorb the totality of their *paroikoi*'s assets. However, after the promulgation of Andronikos' Novel on the *abiotikion*, which recognized the rights of widows and other heirs on the properties of the *paroikoi*, there is no proof that the monasteries would ignore the law. Rather, the state gave up its own right on a property totally uninherited. Additionally, the monasteries were protected from attempted future abuses and arbitrary interpretations of the law by the state employees.

meaning the *morte*, which was the landlord's right to the harvest, were of no interest to the *apographeis*, therefore the *morte* almost vanished from the Athonite archives. The following chapter provides observations on the grants of the first Palaeologoi. A list of the beneficiaries and the allotments known from the archives, with dating and full source references, is provided as an Appendix at the end of the present study.

Few monasteries received land defined in *zeugaria* from the first Palaeologoi. This signals the surface of arable land, rather than the fiscal value, which is the reason why these grants stand out. The monasteries involved in this type of grant are Chilandar,¹⁵³ Patmos,¹⁵⁴ and Zographou.¹⁵⁵ Land organized in smaller or grander estates (*agridia*, *proasteia*) was also given. St. John of Patmos and the monastery of Vatopedi received *metochia* as well, the first specifically with its fiscal revenue¹⁵⁶ and the latter with land counted in *modioi* as reimbursement for the appropriation of one of its domains. In this case it is probable that the revenues were taken into consideration, as the domain was small but very profitable.¹⁵⁷ St. Panteleemon received from the emperor four *agridia*, and from Despot John Palaeologos land at Rabenikeia with its *paroikoi*, their corresponding taxes of barely ten *hyperpyra*, and the right to settle more farmers. However, the donation of the emperor was later revoked.¹⁵⁸

The most important, and apparently the very first, imperial donations were ceded to the monasteries of Megiste Lavra and Iviron in January 1259, presumably immediately after Michael VIII's coronation. The chrysobull to Lavra even reveals the personal relationship of the emperor with the monastery (ὥσπερ οἰκείωσιν τῆς βασιλείας ἡμῶν), which accounts for the granting of ownership and use (κατέχεσθαι καὶ δεσπόζεσθαι, δεσποτείας καὶ νομῆς) of an entire village, Toxompous, and its fiscal revenue, including its fishing rights to the lake. The land of the village was more than 4,000 *modioi*.¹⁵⁹ Between 1259 and 1263 Lavra also received the generous donation of Despot John Palaeologos, sanctioned by Michael VIII, of the villages Selada, Metallin and half of Gradista. Along with Toxompous, this is the only donation attested to have been given in full ownership (δεσποτείαν καὶ κυριότητα). More importantly, however, Despot John's grant was completed with the privilege that Lavra would keep the surplus wealth produced by

153. *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), nos. 3, 4, 34.192–6; on the properties of the monastery see SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 38–42.

154. *Patmos* 1, nos. 14.45–52 and 27 and comments in pp. 124 and 131–2; See E. ΡΑΓΙΑ [E. RAGIA], *Η κοιλάδα του κάτω Μαιάνδρου, ca. 600-1300: γεωγραφία και ιστορία* (Βυζαντινά κείμενα και μελέτες 51), Θεσσαλονίκη 2009, pp. 419–20; SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 73–83.

155. *Actes de Zographou*, nos. 10.27–9; 11.45–8; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 536–8.

156. *Patmos* 2, nos. 68.47–52; 69.23–37, and 70; *Patmos* 1, nos. 31, 32; Μ. ΓΕΡΟΛΥΜΑΤΟΥ [M. GEROLYMATOU], *Βυζαντινά έγγραφα της μονής Πάτμου, Γ', Πατριαρχικά*, Αθήνα 2016, pp. 187–9, 191–2; EAD., *À propos des origines des monastères de la Vierge de l'Alsos et de la Vierge tòn Spondôn sur l'île de Cos*, *TM* 16, 2010, pp. 387–99.

157. See *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, p. 36 and nos. 16, 25.4–10.

158. *Actes de Saint-Pantéléemôn*, pp. 10–1, 93–4 for discussion and nos. 9, 10.40–6. The donation of John Palaeologos is placed to around 1271 judging from the donation to Chilandar. The editors consider the possibility that the *agridia* were taken as a consequence of the destruction of the monastery's archive, because the monks were unable to prove their possession. The *agridia* were small estates.

159. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 71.104; *Actes de Lavra* 4, p. 10, and see SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 52–5.

the *paroikoi*. Around 1300, these villages yielded more than 160 *hyperpyra* to Lavra.¹⁶⁰ When Andronikos II came to power, he gradually reduced the land tax of Toxompous, presumably with three different acts until 1298, annulled the *charagma* of the Lavriote estates at Thessalonike, amounting to 25 *hyperpyra* and confirmed the exemption from its payment for all Lavriote estates.¹⁶¹ The guarantee against any curtailment of the *kephalaion* of the *exkousseia* is the most important. In effect, the emperor secured that the monastery's revenues would not diminish by any existing or new burden (*epereia*) in the present or future time.¹⁶²

Several documents pertaining to Gomatou, Lavra's domain on the island of Lemnos, reveal how this particular estate was managed. In 1284 Gomatou was found with land of 12,000 *modioi*, to which 5,200 more were added; the duke of the island, Michael Makrembolites, attached to all these small blocks of vines and other assets, including a church and a mill, and abandoned *staseis*. As only five peasant families had been taking care of this vast territory, Makrembolites added 39 families,¹⁶³ and the monastery was allowed to settle even more who would remain unharmed by the employees of the state.¹⁶⁴ In 1304, the domain was subjected anew to a census; this time it was found with 139 *paroikoi*, settled in seven villages. Their employment by the monastery effected the exponential rise of Lavra's revenues from the *paroikoi* of the domain from about 40 *hyperpyra* in 1284 to more than 100 in 1304.¹⁶⁵ The tax exemptions of the monastery would certainly be a strong incentive for the peasants to enlist in its workforce.

By contrast, Michael VIII granted to Iviron the possession of Hierissos (κατέχειν τὸ τοιοῦτον χωρίον), "meaning the *agridia*, *proasteia*, fields, vines and *exaleimmata*," excluding the village of Symeon, which belonged to Despot John Palaeologos, and the possessions of Lavra in the region.¹⁶⁶ This grant was primarily composed of the fiscal revenue of Hierissos, while the land included came from the previous possessions of Michael Lascaris and Nikephoros Petraleiphas.¹⁶⁷ As we have seen, the income from Hierissos was later drastically reduced, perhaps already under Michael VIII, without the monastery suffering any revenue losses from its domains in the theme of Thessalonike. Important fiscal changes also took place in Kastrion, which had belonged to John

160. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 72; *Actes de Lavra* 4, pp. 10–1.

161. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 89; *Actes de Lavra* 4, p. 17. The land tax of Toxompous amounted to 260 coins, of which 20 represented the *charagma* (rate 1:12). On this tax see SVORONOS, Cadastre (quoted n. 14), pp. 77–81, 83, 85–6, 110–14; OIKONOMIDES, Role (quoted n. 13), pp. 995, 1030, 1034. The grant of the villages of Brestiane, Besaina and Dimyilia, with which *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 92 (discussion in pp. 117–8), is concerned, does not seem to have been Andronikos' grant; it was either an old possession or a recent donation by an individual donor.

162. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 89.157–63.

163. *Actes de Lavra* 2, no. 73, p. 17 for comments. Minor modifications are attested in nos. 74, 76, 77; see the comments in pp. 23, 37–9; *Actes de Lavra* 4, p. 16.

164. *Actes de Lavra* 2, nos. 73.100; 74.83–5; 77.114–16.

165. *Actes de Lavra* 2, nos. 96, 99. Fallow land of 700 *modioi* was added in this instance.

166. *Actes d'Ivion* 3, no. 58.76–87; *Actes de Xèropotamou*, no. 10.28–30.

167. *Actes d'Ivion* 3, pp. 13–15, 93–5, 149–50 and no. 59.4–67; see ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, Richesses (quoted n. 17), pp. 198–200; SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 47–8. On Michael Lascaris see PLP 14554. Nikephoros Petraleiphas had been allied by marriage with Michael II Angelos of Epirus. He is better known from acts saved in the Zographou archive. See *Actes de Zographou*, nos. 6, 7 (pp. 16–24); ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), p. 25.

Palaeologos and was donated to Chilandar in 1277. In that year, the village yielded income of 50 *hyperpyra* (*eis posoteta*).¹⁶⁸ By the time of its restitution in 1300, its value had reached 120 *hyperpyra* with the settlement of more farmers and the increase of the peasant households' value via land allotments. Andronikos II possibly also alleviated the *charagma* Chilandar had been paying.¹⁶⁹

Theotokos of Lembos, close to Smyrne, handled the dynastic change of 1259 differently. The monastery fortified itself against the claims of its neighbors that had been causing trouble since its renovation by John III Vatatzes. Many disputes seem to have come to a closure between 1259 and 1263.¹⁷⁰ In 1257 Lembos had sought for the protection of Patriarch Arsenios and received a letter threatening with excommunication all those who would dare contest its possessions.¹⁷¹ Later, the monks petitioned that Empress Theodora become *ephoros* of the monastery; following her acceptance (November 1262), the confirmation of the monastery's possessions by chrysobull is dated to December 1262. Lembos had also procured a *prostagma* confirming the previous chrysobulls (1259) and the sanction of the possession of *paroikoi* recently established in its domains (1260). In July 1261 the emperor ceded to it a part of the *perisseia* found in its domains.¹⁷² Later, the properties of Lembos increased with modest donations of Theodora and Andronikos II.¹⁷³ In April 1284, when Andronikos II was at Adramyttion for the synod held there for the Arsenite Schism, Lembos received another confirmation chrysobull. The text of this document is quite elaborate, as it enumerates by name and district all the possessions of Theotokos of Lembos.¹⁷⁴ On the contrary, the archive of Patmos is the only one containing evidence about confiscations of *metochia* that might be associated with the Arsenite Schism. In addition, Patmos had to contend with the control of an anonymous *epi tou kanikleiou*, who was appointed *ephoros* of the monastery in 1273.¹⁷⁵

Lastly, a few notes about the image of the aristocracy as it arises from the archives of the period should be added to this section. Despot John Palaeologos, brother of Emperor Michael VIII, was vested with wider authority in Macedonia and Thessaly. As he served as the emperor's primary general almost until his death around 1274, the domains and

168. *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), no. 8 (1271), and no. 10.15–21 (1277); see BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), p. 265.

169. *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), p. 15 nos. 32 and 49; no. 19 and App. II pp. 290–3.

170. MM 4, nos. 82–84 (pp. 153–7); 121–2 (pp. 208–10); 137 (pp. 223–4); 149 (pp. 238–9).

171. The letter of Patriarch Arsenios is the last document of the archive. As it bears no chronological indication, the dating to 1257 is preferred because of the mention of abbot Kyrillos, who is also mentioned in a document of soldier Michael Petritzes. His act is dated to June of 1257: MM 4, p. 71 and no. 181 (pp. 287–9); *Regestes* 4, no. 1330.

172. MM 4, nos. 5 (pp. 26–8); 135–6 (pp. 221–3); 159 (p. 254); 165 (pp. 260–1) for Empress Theodora's act. On the estates of Theotokos of Lembos, see generally SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 56–61.

173. MM 4, no. 99 (pp. 175–6), and p. 229. See AHRWEILER, Smyrne (quoted n. 97), pp. 63–4, 89 (on Petra) and 162. The information about Andronikos' grant, which was a reallocation of property once given to Manuel Thrakeses, comes from 1293.

174. MM 4, no. 6 (pp. 28–32). On the synod see A. FAILLER, *Chronologie et composition dans l'histoire de Georges Pachymérés*. [3.] Livres VII–XIII, *REB* 48, 1990, pp. 5–87, here pp. 15–17; LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 34–5.

175. *Patmos* 1, no. 34; *Patmos* 2, nos. 71–3. On the ephorates of Lembos and Patmos see ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 55–6.

pronoiai allocated to him were not random benefaction due to simple brotherly affection; rather, they were the expression of unconditional political support meant to reinforce John Palaeologos' influence in the army and thereby facilitate his campaigns,¹⁷⁶ and in particular to enhance his sway in Epirus and Thessaly after the battle of Pelagonia.¹⁷⁷ His documents were entered in particular into the archive of Chilandar¹⁷⁸ and Theotokos Makrinitissa of Thessaly; the latter ascertain that he had authority to distribute *pronoiai* and privileges.¹⁷⁹ Additionally, according to George Pachymeres, Despot John Palaeologos was at least for some time under the influence of some shady monks.¹⁸⁰ Two monks who appear in the archival material may be associated with him, Theodosios Skaranos and Modenos. The connection is explicit in the first case, as Skaranos qualified the despot as his own *authentēs* and even named him *epitropos*, executor of his will. After accusations of illicit enrichment, the grant was reduced by Michael VIII, and John Palaeologos issued an order to Skaranos about surrendering his *paroikoi*, mentioned by name, to Iviron monastery. The restitution of Skaranos' properties to his possession would have taken place sometime between 1262 and 1274, when Skaranos' testament is approximately dated.¹⁸¹ Modenos' relation with John Palaeologos, which, in the absence of real evidence, is only a hypothesis, can be surmised from the fact that John Palaeologos was beneficiary of Kasturin, close to Modenos' village, Sdrabikion. Modenos received a very peculiar grant from Michael VIII; specifically, he was freed from the *paroikia*, a privilege extended to his sons and sons-in-law with three different acts until 1282. Several documents about the affairs of the Modenoi are preserved in the archive of Chilandar.¹⁸²

176. Cf. Pachymeres, vol. 1, pp. 285–7; vol. 2, pp. 415–7. On John Palaeologos see *PLP* 21487.

177. On the battle of Pelagonia see FAILLER, *Chronologie* (quoted n. 56), pp. 30–9 on the date (late spring or summer 1259); and also Λ. ΜΑΥΡΟΜΜΑΤΗΣ [L. MAUROMMATES], *Οι πρώτοι Παλαιολόγοι : προβλήματα πολιτικής πρακτικής και ιδεολογίας*, Αθήνα 1983, pp. 17–9.

178. Unfortunately these are known only from the inventory of the archive: see *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), pp. 15 (no. 45), 16 (no. 55). Commentary on the office and the acts of despots is found in F. DÖLGER, *Aus den Schatzkammern des heiligen Berges : 115 Urkunden und 50 Urkundensiegel aus 10 Jahrhunderten*, München 1948, pp. 76–9.

179. MM 4, nos. 6 (pp. 342–4); 19 (1259), 20 (1273), 21 (1267), 22 and 23 (1268), 24 (1270) [pp. 384–9]. No. 19 indicates that John Palaeologos received the title of despot after September of 1259, apparently at the end of the same year because he signed as *sebastokrator*. No. 6, *argyroboullon*, should be dated to 1262 rather than 1268: see FAILLER, *Chronologie* (quoted n. 56), pp. 38–9; P. MAGDALINO, Notes on the last years of the despote John Palaiologos, *REB* 34, 1976, pp. 143–9; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 336, 342.

180. Pachymeres, vol. 2, p. 289.5–19.

181. *Actes de Xéropotamou*, pp. 74–5 for comments, no. 9.A, B; *Actes d'Iviron* 3, no. 59; *PLP* 26036. On Skaranos' properties see J. LEFORT, Une exploitation de taille moyenne au XIII^e siècle en Chalcidique, in *Αφιέρωμα στον Νίκο Σβορόνο. 1* (quoted n. 14), pp. 362–72; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), p. 265–6; K. SMYRLIS, Woiving the petty elite : privilege and imperial authority in Byzantium, 13th–mid 14th century, in *Le saint* (quoted n. 17), pp. 657–81, here pp. 671–2; T. MANIATE-KOKKINE, Were Byzantine monks of the 13th–15th centuries holders of imperial grants?, *ZRVI* 50, 2013 (= *Mélanges Ljubomir Maksimović*), pp. 629–44, here pp. 630–1, 634–7 *passim*.

182. *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), nos. 26, 27; *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 5), nos. 52 (pp. 127–8), 53 (pp. 128–31), 59 (pp. 139–41), 62–3 (pp. 145–50). The first act freeing Modenos from the *paroikia* is to be dated to between 1259 and 1270 because of the implication of Theodotos Kalothetos, Michael VIII's uncle, who was active in Asia Minor in 1259, and of grand *adnoumiastes* Manuel Barrachonites, active around 1270. See on these *PLP* 2529, 10607, 10589. On Modenos see SMYRLIS, Petty elite (quoted

The material from the Lembiotissa chartulary is equally interesting regarding the behavior of the aristocracy. Michael Tarchaneiotes, the emperor's "cousin," *protosebastos*, *protobestiarios* and *megas domestikos*, had a private donation of a *metochion* annulled as a favor granted to him by the *prokathemenos* of Smyrne, George Kaloeidas. In his own words, Kaloeidas was "forced [to agree] because of the dynasty and magnificence of the man."¹⁸³ The *metochion* removed from the monastery of Lembos is perhaps identified with St. George Paspariotes, which comprised arable land and pastures, mentioned a single time in the chrysobull of 1258.¹⁸⁴ Apparently, it was never restored to Lembos. Later, when the *porphyrogennetos* Constantine, son of Michael VIII, arrived in the region of Smyrne (presumably in 1289), he took away the *metochion* of Virgin Maria Amanariotissa with its little dependence of St. Marina and then ceded it to the monastery of Studios.¹⁸⁵ Amanariotissa had been subjected to the jurisdiction of Lembos by the bishop of Monoikos.¹⁸⁶ The fall of the *porphyrogennetos* (March 1293) effected the restoration of Amanariotissa to Lembos by order of the emperor.¹⁸⁷ In addition to these cases, the monastery had to contend with the protection that Constantine Doukas Nestoggos, uncle of Michael VIII, and Michael Komnenos Branas, perhaps father in law of the emperor's brother, Constantine, offered their *paroikoi* regarding the exploitation of pastures. Nestoggos explicitly took the responsibility for his *paroikoi*'s criminal actions and even "cursed the monks and kicked them out."¹⁸⁸ Branas, on the other hand, fought for the rights of his *paroikoi* to the pastures of Baris, which he claimed had come into his

n. 181), pp. 673–4; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 423–4; LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), p. 150; A. ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ [A. KONTOGIANNOPOULOU], Η προσήγορία κυρ στη βυζαντινή κοινωνία, *Βυζαντινά* 32, 2012, pp. 209–26, here pp. 215–6; *PLP* 19219. There is nothing to indicate that Modenos ever received a *pronoia* from Michael VIII.

183. MM 4, no. 43 and p. 102. The name Tarchaneiotes is not revealed in the act of Kaloeidas, but no other individual held these titles at once except for him: see Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 155.10–12; Pachymeres, vol. 2, pp. 418 n. 1; 419.1–2; 593.6–9. Unfortunately, as the document of Lembos is mutilated, there is no chronological indication; it is therefore approximately dated to before 1274 by the mention of Abbot Kallistos. Michael Tarchaneiotes' award of the title of *protobestiarios* is noted with an extensive comment in the treatise on offices of Pseudo-Kodinos, pp. 135.27 – 136.18. On Michael VIII styling his most beloved people as "cousins," see Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 155.12–14; A. FAILLER, *Pachymeriana quaedam*, *REB* 40, 1982, pp. 187–99, here pp. 189–90, and cf. AHRWEILER, Smyrne (quoted n. 97), p. 157, whose chronology and analysis should, however, be rejected. Abbot Kallistos was in position from 1265 (MM 4, no. 38 [p. 93]) to 1268 (*ibid.*, no. 169 [p. 266]). His successor, Agathon, is attested in 1274 (*ibid.*, p. 95). Also see *PLP* 10559, 27505.

184. MM 4, pp. 24–5. The donation act is not saved.

185. MM 4, no. 176 (pp. 272–3); AHRWEILER, Smyrne (quoted n. 97), pp. 174–5; JANIN, *Géographie* 1, 3, pp. 446–7. Amanariotissa is mentioned in the chrysobull of 1284 of Andronikos II (see MM 4, p. 31), therefore the appropriation is dated after that year. On the income the emperor lavished on his favorite son: see Pachymeres, vol. 3, p. 175.26–34.

186. MM 4, no. 167–9 (pp. 262–6); ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 54–5. On Monoikos, suffragan bishopric of Smyrne, see AHRWEILER, Smyrne (quoted n. 97), pp. 88, 99.

187. MM 4, no. 177 (p. 273). The entire affair is found in Pachymeres, vol. 3, pp. 171–9; Gregoras, vol. 1, pp. 186–91. See the confiscation of Constantine Palaeologos' immense wealth in Pachymeres, vol. 3, p. 179.24–36, 180 n. 45; FAILLER, *Chronologie*. 3 (quoted n. 174), pp. 17–20; *Id.*, *Pachymeriana altera*, *REB* 46, 1988, pp. 67–83, here pp. 68–75; *Id.*, *Pachymeriana novissima*, *REB* 55, 1997, pp. 221–46, here pp. 229–32. On Constantine Palaeologos, see *PLP* 21492.

188. MM 4, no. 162–4 (pp. 257–60). Cf. CHARANIS, *Social structure* (quoted n. 1), pp. 99–100. On Nestoggos see *PLP* 20201.

possession via his wife's dowry. For many years he ignored the imperial decisions and the official examinations carried out on location and in Constantinople, until finally the monastery was forced to compromise in 1293.¹⁸⁹ In both these cases, it would be a mistake to think of these persons, who were very close to Michael VIII and were beneficiaries of Prinobaris and Mourmounta respectively, as typically representing aristocratic oppression. On the contrary, as the monastery was expanding its cultivations to areas that had been serving the communities as pastures, it encroached on the ancient rights of the farmers, which Nestoggos and Branas defended. The case of Branas especially is revealing of the intentions of the imperial administration toward village communities, the peasants and the beneficiaries in 1293, and Lembos, as in the past under John III Vatatzes, found itself on the losing side.

Pronoiai-oikonomiai and the soldiers

Michael Palaeologos had been very popular with the army. This is clear in George Akropolites' report, despite the biased narrative.¹⁹⁰ According to George Pachymeres, before his ascent to the throne Michael VIII had promised that the *pronoiai* would be transmitted to the soldiers' children, even if they were still unborn at the time of their fathers' death.¹⁹¹ However, as we have seen, Pachymeres also entwines the fiscal policy of Michael VIII with the situation of the frontier soldiers. The author praises the favoritism of the Lascarids, which allowed for the enrichment of a class of soldiers, in particular those settled along the eastern border, and presents fighting for tax exemptions and rewards in the form of *pronoiai* as the best system for defending Asia Minor, because it gave the soldiers a motive to fight. This account is very similar to that of Skoutariotes, who connected the Lascarid policy precisely with the prosperity of the soldiers.¹⁹² By contrast, Michael VIII's changes brought about the confiscation of the wealth of the frontier zones. As we have seen, the amount of 40 coins, coming in part from their own taxes, was left to them, and thus they were enrolled in the regular army.¹⁹³ The charge that this measure significantly weakened the eastern borders by causing a drop in the soldiers'

189. MM 4, nos. 102 (pp. 178–81); 178 (pp. 273–84). The marriage of Constantine Palaeologos with a daughter of the Branas family is noted by George Pachymeres. Her name is known from the typikon of the monastery of Theotokos of Bebaia Elpis: see Pachymeres, vol. 1, pp. 137.24 – 139.2; DELEHAYE, *Deux typica* (quoted n. 79), pp. 12, 142.

190. Acropolites (quoted n. 109), pp. 158.5–159.18.

191. Pachymeres, vol. 1, pp. 131.18–21; 139.3–8. See OSTROGORSKI, *Féodalité* (quoted n. 1), pp. 93–5 and cf. pp. 133–6; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 274–82; ID., *Byzantine army* (quoted n. 62), pp. 179–82; T. MANIATH-KOKKINH [T. MANIATE-KOKKINE], Προνομιούχοι υπήκοοι στα μέσα του 11^{ου} αιώνα, in *The Empire in crisis (?) : Byzantium in the 11th century (1025–1081) : NHRF/IBR international symposium 11*, Athens 2003, pp. 139–53, here pp. 149–50; ΕΑΔ., Γυναίκα και “ανδρικά” οικονομικά προνόμια, in *Κλητόριον εις μνήμην Νίκου Οικονομίδη*, επιμ. Φ. Ευαγγελατου-Νοταρα [F. Euangelatou-Notara] & T. Μανιατη-Κοκκίνη [T. Maniate-Kokkine], Αθήνα – Θεσσαλονίκη 2005, pp. 403–70, here pp. 405–6, 447–60, and cf. table 1 pp. 461–6 containing the known cases of women who were holders of *pronoiai*.

192. Pachymeres, vol. 1, pp. 29–31; Acropolites (quoted n. 109), p. 286.18–22 (Skoutariotes [quoted n. 109], p. 507.24–8). See ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 101, 124–5; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 225–6, 235–40.

193. Pachymeres, vol. 2, p. 403.11–16, on the composition of Despot John's army.

morale is explicit. Elsewhere, Pachymeres implies that their lack of money and the harsh fiscal policy of Michael VIII was the reason for the soldiers' defection to the Turks.¹⁹⁴ Some of this evidence is corroborated by Michael VIII himself. The emperor authorized his son to maintain his own court and to reward his own men, especially soldiers, with fiscal income (*oikonomia*) of 24 or 36 coins. This amount was reserved for already active soldiers. By this are meant not only *pronoia* holders, which is stated (ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ αὐτοῦ), but perhaps also soldiers who served under regular payment. Andronikos II was advised to retract this money from the excess wealth (*perisseia*) and confiscated goods. Apparently, the ensembles of assets funding a *pronoia* had been calculated in such a way that they would be sufficient for each soldier, and therefore mutilating already existing *pronoiai* would damage the army. Michael VIII reserved for himself the right to award amounts larger than 36 coins.¹⁹⁵

As no *praktika* of *pronoia* holders dated to the first forty years of the Palaeologan regime survive in the archives, there can be no certainty regarding the amount of a regular *pronoia* in the 13th century. The reward of 36 coins is already attested in Pachymeres' *History* under John III Vatatzes; allegedly, when the emperor fell ill after the death of Empress Irene, he made donations "to the destitute." It is nowhere mentioned that this sum was distributed in a *pronoia* title; on the contrary it was rather a one-time distribution.¹⁹⁶ An extraordinary amount is attested at the end of Michael VIII's reign, concerning Mourinos' *pronoia*, amounting to more than 800 coins. The profit margin of Mourinos increased even more because winter and summer pastures had been included in his *oikonomia*.¹⁹⁷ In the "normal" *praktika*, dated to the 1320s and later, these sums are fixed at 70–80 coins, with a potential for increase. The earliest example of *exaleimmata*—land—instead of taxes being delivered to a group of Michael VIII Palaeologos' supporters is found in the archive of Patmos and dates from 1261. Group *pronoiai*, although not the norm at this time, are attested again. The archive of Zographou preserves a piece of information about a *pronoia* belonging, it would seem, to four soldiers.¹⁹⁸

The grant of land marked as *exaleimmatike* effectively means that the beneficiaries could increase their income by leasing it out.¹⁹⁹ In reality, nothing excluded that the ultimate profits of the *pronoia* holders could, in fact, be much bigger than their *praktika*

194. Pachymeres, vol. 1 pp. 33.3–11, 291–3. See OIKONOMIDÈS, À propos des armées (quoted n. 102), pp. 359–60; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 546–7.

195. HEISENBERG, *Geschichte* (quoted n. 74), pp. 40.78–41.92. See BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 266–8; ID., *Byzantine army* (quoted n. 62), pp. 166–8; I. KARAYANNOPOULOS, Ein Beitrag zur Militärpronoia der Palaiologenzeit, in *Geschichte und Kultur der Palaiologenzeit: Referate des internationalen Symposions zu Ehren von Herbert Hunger*, hrsg. von W. Seibt (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Byzantinistik 8), Wien 1996, pp. 71–89, esp. pp. 75–8, 81–9.

196. Pachymeres, vol. 1, p. 101.5–7.

197. *Actes de Docheiariou*, no. 9.36–38. On Mourinos see PLP 19512; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 270–1.

198. *Patmos* 2, no. 66; *Actes de Zographou*, no. 12.24–25 (1290). At least two persons are involved in the grant of 1261. See similar cases in OIKONOMIDÈS, À propos des armées (quoted n. 102), pp. 367–8; cf. MANIATE-KOKKINE, Προνομιούχοι (quoted n. 191), pp. 151–2, and also the reconstruction of BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 260–3, 341, 342–3.

199. Demetrios Armenopoulos leased the *exalleimmatika stasia* of his *oikonomia* first to the monastery of Megiste Lavra, and then to Xenophon. The latter took up the obligation to pay each year the sum of three coins to Armenopoulos. The act is dated to 1303: *Actes de Xénophon*, no. 6.

allowed.²⁰⁰ Ultimately, it was up to the discretion of the state to either permit to the *pronoia* holders to enjoy that part of the yields not predicted in their *praktika*, or to confiscate it and re-allot it. Our testimonies indicate that the latter was most usually the case, which in turn explains well the complaints that permeate the sources of the period.

According to George Pachymeres, Michael VIII lamented the avarice and stinginess of the army commanders, who, in addition, were afraid for their own lives if they disclosed to the emperor the full truth about the condition of the eastern provinces.²⁰¹ The neglect of Asia Minor came very late to the forefront of Constantinopolitan policy. The cost of the mercenaries weighed heavily on the state budget and Andronikos II responded to the problem by disbanding the military fleet and imposing constant *syndosiai*.²⁰² We have seen that Andronikos II was indeed an emperor who considered the option of appropriating a part of the *pronoiai* for the treasury. The measure, although applied more than once, resulted in burdening the peasant population even more and did not precondition any change in the soldiers' *praktika*, until John Tarchaneiotes was sent to Asia Minor. But his attempt to level off the fiscal value difference between small and large *pronoiai* resulted in the violent reaction of the soldiers and the thwarting of these plans.²⁰³

In the context of the constant appropriations of the *pronoiai* and the attempt to consolidate the changes by transferring them to the *praktika*, the appeal of turning *pronoiai* into hereditary possessions, expounded by Thomas Magistros, is not surprising. Michael VIII's hereditability award to the soldiers might have influenced such assertions. Indirectly, Thomas disclosed the underlying problem of the discussion; the conversion of the soldiers' life-long income into hereditary revenue transmissible to their heirs on condition that the sons would take up their fathers' position in the army²⁰⁴ and would support the emperor and fight zealously in his name was apparently a longstanding demand.²⁰⁵ Thomas tried to compromise between the soldiers' concerns and the imperial pursuits, but he expediently did not touch on the status of the properties, and did not examine the impact such a measure would have on the state revenue and workforce. Indeed, even the term *pronoia* is blatantly absent from this section. Pachymeres, on the other hand, was troubled with the social ramifications of the harsh economic policy of the time, which affected the true producers of all this wealth, the farmers. Unlike Thomas, he pointed out that the distribution of new *pronoiai* to the soldiers in the beginning of the 14th century would come from ecclesiastical and monastic *pronoiai* and

200. *Actes de Xénophon*, nos. 15.16–21; 16.20–5; SCHREINER, *Praktika* (quoted n. 61), p. 38.22–4; *Actes de Zographou*, no. 29.77–86; cf. PAVLIKIANOV, *Karakallou* (quoted n. 61), no. 4 p. 101.37–42. The *praktikon* of Margarites contained two blocks of land of which only the second is explicitly given with an *anti oikoumenou* fiscal income. The first block, apparently a *zeugelateion* which had belonged to John Kantakouzenos, was granted with the amount of 20 *hyperpyra*, which gives the normal rate of 1:50 (1,000 *modioi* of land, given with the excuse that “it is marshy meadow”). In the *praktika* even amounts pertaining to *paktion* are signaled with the phrase *anti oikoumenou*.

201. Pachymeres, vol. 2, pp. 405.18–23; 635.5–9; Pachymeres, vol. 3, p. 235.16–19.

202. Pachymeres, vol. 3, pp. 81.27–83.3. See LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 74–6, 114–5; SMYRLIS, *Financial crisis* (quoted n. 133), p. 73–4; KONTOGIANNOPOULOU, *Πολιτική* (quoted n. 115), p. 59–60; BARTUSIS, *Byzantine army* (quoted n. 62), 67–70.

203. Pachymeres, vol. 3, pp. 287–9.

204. *Theoduli Magistri Oratio* (quoted n. 141), col. 461 chap. ι'.

205. *Ibid.*, col. 464 chap. ια'; LAIOU, *Débat* (quoted n. 101), pp. 99–100.

those of the magnates, implying a severe curtailment of their revenues.²⁰⁶ However, the implementation of this project stumbled upon the urgency of the times.

Although no *pronoia praktika* are extant from this time, examples of the practical aspects of *pronoia* allocation in the 13th and early 14th centuries are abundant. Potamos village near Smyrne is noted for successive allotments all throughout the 13th century, although the terminology is missing in most cases.²⁰⁷ By the 1290s a large part of Potamos' land had escaped state control via hereditary concessions such as that of George Melissenos,²⁰⁸ while landowners like Manuel Doukas Aprenos had somehow intruded in the community, which had previously belonged entirely to the state.²⁰⁹ Scrutinizing the chartulary of Lembiotissa reveals more examples of *pronoiai* turned into hereditary possessions, all dated to after 1259. The cases of Martha Thrakesina and her daughter Anna Angelina reveal that women stayed in charge of their husbands' *pronoiai* even after their deaths, but possession for more generations was secured only when the *pronoia* holder had male heirs. Thus, Martha Thrakesina's land was donated to Lembos by the emperor after her death, shortly after 1281, because she had no sons,²¹⁰ but her daughter Anna managed the *pronoia* of her husband, Michael Angelos, in the name of her son, John, and proceeded to make a land donation to Lembos by also forfeiting the *epiteleia*.²¹¹

Once a beneficiary managed to acquire the hereditability of a *pronoia* grant, he could donate it or pass it on to his heirs. Anna donated a field, but the cavalry soldier (*kaballarios*) Nikolaos Adam waived in favor of Lembos the minimal income a couple of trees growing in the courtyard of St. Polykarpos would have given him. In the perplexing donation document he claimed that he owned the trees (*gonikothern diapheronta*), but possessed them "without any tax and burden and completely exempted" by imperial grant, and by right of the late Lestes and Planites. These had been, apparently, his *paroikoi*.

206. Pachymeres, vol. 4, pp. 425.23–427.4, and cf. SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 179–81; LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 192–3.

207. MM 4, pp. 8, 37–8, 82 and no. 7.I–VI (pp. 32–43). The *prokathemenoi* of Smyrne, George Monomachos and his successor in office, John Alopas, are noted for drawing income from the village. Irene Komnene Branaina is known from around the middle of the 13th century, while the best known case is that of the soldier Syrgares. On the latter see MANIATE-KOKKINE, Δωρεές (quoted n. 64), pp. 25–9; EAD., Μισοβάρβαροι and λίζιοι: theory and practice regarding the integration of Westerners in late Byzantine social and economic reality, in *Byzantium and the West: perception and reality (11th–15th c.)*, ed. by N. Chrissis, A. Kolia-Dermizaki & A. Papageorgiou, London – New York 2019, pp. 286–305, here pp. 293–4; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 195–210. On Branaina see MANIATE-KOKKINE, Γυναικὰ (quoted n. 191), pp. 410–3; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 199–201, 205–6.

208. MM 4, nos. 170–2 (pp. 268–70).

209. MM 4, no. 47 (pp. 104–5). See GLYKATZI-AHRWEILER, *Politique* (quoted n. 1), pp. 58–9. It is not known how Aprenos came to the ownership of his fields in the region, which belonged entirely to the state, but a hereditary allotment by Andronikos II should not be excluded.

210. Manuel Thrakeses is known only from early documents from the Lembiotissa archive. His possessions were probably located between Mantaia and Potamos near Smyrne. See MM 4, pp. 7, 59, 229 and no. 145 (pp. 231–2). The documents show that Thrakesina's sons-in-law came from the families of Doukai Synadenoi, Petritzes and Gordatos families. In 1281 she had her testament drafted and proceeded to donations to Lembos. See MM 4, nos. 39 (pp. 94–6); 49–51 (pp. 106–13, p. 230); AHRWEILER, *Smyrne* (quoted n. 97), p. 177.

211. MM 4, nos. 93 (pp. 169–70); 151, 152 (pp. 244–7); 150.III (pp. 241–2). See BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 259–60. On the *epiteleia* see below.

Hence, Adam, like Anna, in reality donated the *epiteleia* of the trees to the monastery.²¹² The chrysobull awarded to Demetrios Mourinos by Michael VIII, on the other hand, mentioned specifically that he could bequeath his estates to his true-born children, donate them and sell them if he so wished. The alienation of this property by the descendants of Mourinos is the reason why this chrysobull entered in the archive of the monastery of Docheiariou.²¹³ Another similar alienation to the same monastery is that of the soldier Euthymios Philommates, known from a *praktikon* recording similar alienations, drafted perhaps between 1315 and 1318.²¹⁴

It seems then that Michael VIII remained true to his word and indeed turned the *pronoiai* into hereditary possessions, transmissible to the soldiers' heirs. But the conditions ruling the *pronoia* system surprisingly needed no clarification. Apart from Vatatzes' proclamation in one of the documents relating to the Rabdokanakes affair dated to 1233 that prohibits *paroikoi* from selling state land to the *pronoia* holders,²¹⁵ we have to wait for an act of 1321 for the written confirmation of the principle followed by the first Palaeologoi. John Sgouros Orestes had requested that a quantity of six *hyperpyra* from his *oikonomia* be ceded to him as his privately owned property. At the end of the text, however, the *apographeus* inserted a specific clause: "should the aforementioned Orestes die without issue [...] his *oikonomia* ought to be withheld by the state and be given to whomever our mighty and holy lord and emperor decides;" next, the *apographeus* predicted that Orestes' wife would continue to receive this amount (*posotes*) until her death, and then it would return definitively to the possession of the state.²¹⁶ These stipulations might as well have been included in other *praktika*, securing the "hereditability" only on condition that the *pronoia* holder had extant male heirs.

Two factors need to be taken into account regarding the hereditability of the *pronoiai*. An *oikonomia* could derive from land and various properties (vines, trees, mills, *vivaria*, etc.). These could belong to the state or an individual farmer, who would have been a *paroikos* of the state. In other words, a *pronoia* is clearly distinguished into its components, the land and the income, which might not—at least not always—coincide. The question of the status of these properties when they entered the *praktikon* of a hereditary allotment is a logical one. According to our meagre evidence, the ownership of these properties was neither contested nor debated. The land and other assets returned to state ownership, if it so happened, and were reallocated (i.e. the land of Thrakesina). In any case, the state was the ultimate manager of the land and its manpower. If, on the other hand, the *oikonomia*

212. MM 4, no. 35 (pp. 91–2). The bibliography on Nikolaos Adam is by now rich, although his case is largely misunderstood. Contrary to current views, St. Polykarpos was never allotted to him; it was the private property of the Planitai brothers and had already been donated to Lembos in 1242. On Adam, see OSTROGORSKIJ, *Féodalité* (quoted n. 1), pp. 78, 79; GLYKATZI-AHRWEILER, *Politique* (quoted n. 1), pp. 57, 58; MANIATI-KOKKINI, Δωρεές (quoted n. 64), pp. 29–30; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), p. 206. Cf. SMYRLIS, *Petty elite* (quoted n. 181), p. 664.

213. *Actes de Docheiariou*, pp. 112, 226–7 for discussion and no. 8.

214. *Actes de Docheiariou*, nos. 15, 22 and comments in p. 15. The second report reveals that Philommates alienated in total six *staseis*, but only four are mentioned in the first document.

215. MM 4, p. 199. ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 140–1 sees the decision as a strengthening of imperial control over the *pronoiai*. See below for more details.

216. *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, no. 52. The text is very damaged in the part regarding Orestes' wife but fairly readable about Orestes.

was composed of the taxes deriving from privately owned assets of the *paroikoi* (i.e. the olive trees in the region of Smyrne), and these had been alienated in part or in their totality, the *pronoia* holders would demand the payment of the sum belonging to their *oikonomia* from a different proprietor, because the *paroikos* liable for their tax was still registered in their own *praktika*.

This amount is called *epiteleia* in the sources. The *epiteleia* is nothing more than the basic tax, land-, vine-, olive tree-tax, etc. What sets it apart from the usual taxes is the fact that it was paid by the *paroikoi*, and the state would not forfeit it even after these properties had been alienated. The fiscus requested it from the dependent farmers because they were registered by name in the cadasters of the public domains.²¹⁷ The *telos* was paid either to the treasury, or to the *pronoia* holder, if one had been appointed.²¹⁸ As we have seen, monitoring these properties and their corresponding taxes was facilitated by the maintenance of the *biologia*. Thus, the monastery of Lembos was obligated to pay *epiteleia* to Syrgares for the trees sold to it by his *paroikoi*, Xenos Legas and Niketas Kaboures. In 1337 we learn about the *epiteleia* once paid to a certain Komnenoutzikos, dead at that point, which burdened the monastery of Docheiariou for land of 350 *modioi* at Hermeleia, and also of that of the monastery of Xenophon for land bought from *paroikoi*; the monastery was obliged to disburse this sum to whomever the state determined.²¹⁹ The rest of the mentions found in the Lembiotissa archive concern alienations of properties, ostensibly by *paroikoi* although it is not signaled. Some of these documents even belong to the dossier of the Gounaropouloi.²²⁰ Although there is no way to determine how many of these *epiteleiiai* had been assigned to *pronoiai* and not to monastic *oikonomiai*, the frequency of the mentions still indicates that the *pronoia* might have been very common in the region of Smyrne.

These observations are important for the institutional history of the *pronoia*. As the *oikonomiai* of the soldiers were composed in part of the taxes of the *paroikoi*, the state would not give up its right to claim these taxes despite the alienation of the properties. The underlying reason would be that the assets corresponding to it belonged to *paroikikai hypostaseis*, and the *paroikoi* were listed by name in the *praktika*, therefore the new owner would have to disburse the amount corresponding to the alienated property to the old

217. The bibliography on the *epiteleia* is already very rich. Unfortunately, this is not the place to delve into the problem. See, however, the views of H. GLYKATZI, L'épitéleia dans le cartulaire de Lemviotissa, *Byz.* 24, 1954, pp. 71–93; EAD., À propos de l'épitéleia, *Byz.* 25–7, 1955–7, pp. 369–72; F. DÖLGER, Review of H. Glykatzi, L'épitéleia [...], *BZ* 49, 1956, pp. 501–2; ID., Review of H. Glykatzi, À propos de l'épitéleia [...], *BZ* 51, 1958, p. 209; ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 228–52; Π. ΚΑΤΣΩΝΗ [P. KATSONE], “Επιτέλεια” : ένας οικονομικός θεσμός του Βυζαντίου κατά την ύστερη περίοδο της ιστορίας του, *Δίκαιο και ιστορία* 2, 2016, pp. 127–42. Also see the comments of ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ in *Actes de Docheiariou*, pp. 141–2.

218. Cf. BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 203–4.

219. MM 4, pp. 61, 73, 89, 134, no. 93 (pp. 169–70); *Actes de Docheiariou*, nos. 16, 22; *Actes de Xénophon*, no. 15; OSTROGORSKI, *Féodalité* (quoted n. 1), pp. 156–7.

220. MM 4, nos. 30 (pp. 84–5); 41 (pp. 98–9); 53–6 (pp. 115–23); 57 (pp. 124–5); 59 (pp. 126–7); 61 (pp. 129–30); 63 (pp. 131–2); 65 (p. 133–4); 67–9 (pp. 135–9); 104–5 (pp. 183–5); 109 (pp. 191–2); 112 (pp. 195–6); 116 (pp. 200–1); 148 (pp. 237–8). Cf. C. ZUCKERMAN, The dishonest soldier Constantine Planites and his neighbours, *Byz.* 56, 1986, pp. 314–31, here pp. 325–30; ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, Richesses (quoted n. 17), pp. 184–8.

owner, who was liable for delivering it to the *pronoiaros*. The fact that in most cases the latter is not mentioned by name in the alienation acts should not trouble us further, because, as noted in the *praktikon* of Xenophon, these amounts were being paid to “whomever the state determined:” the *pronoia* holders changed from time to time, but the *paroikoi* did not; they remained *paroikoi*, and their assets were burdened with the burdens of *paroikia*, one of them being the perpetual imposition of the basic tax. It would then be up to the new proprietor to try to be rid of the obligation to pay it to the previous owner, and through him to the *pronoia* holder.

The acts point in addition to a particular aspect of the *pronoia* institution to which George Pachymeres also alluded; specifically, assigning the taxes of the soldiers’ private properties to their own *oikonomiai* seems to have been a method chosen often. As we have seen, Pachymeres blamed Chadenos for allowing the frontier soldiers a sum of 40 coins which derived from their own taxes. Similar techniques had been followed by Byzantine state already before the 13th century.²²¹ Rather, it was the end of a long development and a practice followed for administrative and fiscal convenience. At the end of the 13th century or the beginning of the 14th century, *sebastos* Michael Spanopoulos donated to the monastery of Theotokos of Spelaion a mill field (*mylonotopion*) without including his *oikonomia* in the donation. Presumably, if the tax of the mill belonged to his *oikonomia* (unlike the field) the monastery would have to pay this sum to Spanopoulos each year.²²²

The case of John Sgouros Orestes, already mentioned above, is equally clear: some of the assets enumerated and described in the act of the *apographeus* had come into the possession of Orestes either by investment or purchase, therefore the tax of six *hyperpyra* which corresponded to them and was ceded as a hereditary revenue to Orestes came at least partly from his own properties.²²³ Orestes received in addition a rare privilege, namely the right to improve his *posotes* without running the risk of being harassed about it by the state officials. In other words, Orestes could keep the *perisseia* if indeed he managed to increase the value of his possessions.²²⁴ It seems that a privilege might have

221. For example the *solemnia legisima* or simply *logisima*, taxes left to the landowners in various ways: see LEMERLE, *Agrarian history* (quoted n. 84), pp. 82–5; AHRWEILER, *Concession* (quoted n. 59), pp. 10–7; OIKONOMIDÈS, *Fiscalité* (quoted n. 13), pp. 182–6; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 73–8.

222. *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, no. 21. See BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), p. 477. On the family of Michael Elaiodorites Spanopoulos see *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, p. 173 and cf. ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans*, p. 82 n. 340; on Spelaiotissa, granted to the monastery of Vatopedi in 1365, see generally K. ΧΡΥΣΟΧΟΪΔΗΣ [K. CHRYSOCHOIDES], *Ανενεργά μετόχια της μονής Βατοπεδίου στην Ορθόδοξη Ανατολή (Καταγραφή πρώτη)* (Κύρτου πλέγματα. Κρητίζ), Αθήνα 2015, pp. 2, 4, 16–21.

223. *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, no. 52. Apparently, Orestes had built houses at his own expense (l. 9) and seems to have bought fields and vines (ll. 12, 23).

224. *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, no. 52. It is interesting that in the document the value of the assets made hereditary is expressed as *posotes* (ll. 26, 30), while *oikonomia* in this particular extract is used to designate the ensemble of his *pronoia* (l. 29,) and the *perisseia* is not mentioned at all. The *apographeis* were prohibited from increasing the hereditary *posotes* or removing anything from it. Later, Orestes asked for and received a chrysobull about the ownership of his properties, consisting of fields, vines and houses which he had inherited, bought (and exchanged) and received in dowry. See *Actes de Vatopédi* 1, no. 60; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 413–4, 451–6, 469. Bartusis’ interpretation is slightly different, in answer to OSTROGORSKI, *Feodalité* (quoted n. 1), pp. 110–11, who claimed that the ameliorations increase the *posotes*. Similar examples are those of John Margarites and the Klazomenitai soldiers. See

been attached in those cases where an *oikonomia* derived from the private properties of the beneficiary. The example of Manuel Garianos is similar; he asked that his property (*goniken hypostasin*) at Euniane be exempted from the payment of the tax except for the amount of his *oikonomia*. His wish was granted in 1318, and the chrysobull of Andronikos II is preserved in the archive of Chilandar Monastery, but the fiscal value of his properties is unknown.²²⁵ In any case, after the awarding of the exemption, the properties from which the *oikonomia* derived continued to pay the tax to Garianos, while those that did not belong to it would be exempted.

The information surviving about *pronoia* holders between the 13th and the 14th centuries prove that Orestes' and Garianos' cases are not the norm. Most of the recipients of an *oikonomia* were aware that their privilege was granted for life, and that perhaps the properties of their *oikonomia* could at some point be taken away and allotted to someone else.²²⁶ In 1292 *sebastos* Petros Doukopoulos donated to the monastery of Ivron a mill he had erected in the village of his *oikonomia* with its attached garden and trees. Since the plot of land where the mill stood was liable for a tax of 2 *hyperpyra* which belonged to his *oikonomia*, Doukopoulos forfeited the amount to the monastery "not forever, but for as long as I shall be among the living." As the mill itself was the private property of Doukopoulos, its ownership was on the contrary transferred to Ivron in perpetuity.²²⁷ If the monastery wished to stop paying the tax to the next beneficiaries of the *oikonomia*, it would have to request a particular exemption. In 1313, an anonymous *pronoia* holder leased the plots and *exaleimmata* of his *oikonomia* to the monastery of Docheiariou on condition that the monastery would exploit them for as long as he and his children were in possession of the *pronoia*.²²⁸

The monastic *praktika* and even imperial chrysobulls also contain useful information about the re-allotments.²²⁹ All these are listed in the Appendix. The most notable case concerns Kastrion, which was taken from Chilandar, presumably around 1282. By the time it was restituted to the monastery in 1300, six *pronoia* holders and a collective *pronoia* of "the children of Kyprian" are noted in the *praktikon*. In addition, five peasant holdings in the village of Kontogrikou were detached from the "*pronoia* of Skores" and allocated to Chilandar.²³⁰ Soldiers, who without any obvious reason other than fiscal convenience had had their assets removed from their *pronoiai*, should normally expect a grant of equal value elsewhere.

Actes de Kutlumis, no. 20; PAVLIKIANOV, *Karakallou* (quoted n. 61), no. 4.6–7; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *À propos des armées* (quoted n. 102), pp. 368–9.

225. *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), no. 37. See the comments of SMYRLIS, *Petty elite* (quoted n. 181), pp. 664–5; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), p. 463; MANIATE-KOKKINE, *Δωρεές* (quoted n. 64), pp. 38–40.

226. Cf. T. MANIATH-KOKKINH [T. MANIATE-KOKKINE], *Πρόνοια-οικονομία και μοναχοί-λαϊκοί: η διεκδίκηση των οικονομικών προνομίων στη Μακεδονία (12^{ος}-15^{ος} αι)*, *Βυζαντινά* 21, 2000, pp. 251–70, here pp. 263–5.

227. *Actes d'Ivion* 3, no. 66.30–3 for the status of the mill. See MATTHΑΙΟΥ, *Ακίνητη περιουσία* (quoted n. 84), p. 169; BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 413, 474–5.

228. *Actes de Docheiariou*, no. 13 and comments in pp. 124–5; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, *Role* (quoted n. 13), p. 1048.

229. See the report of BARTUSIS, *Pronoia* (quoted n. 11), pp. 394–7, 463–5.

230. *Actes de Chilandar* 1 (AA 20), App. II.

From all the pieces of information discussed here, several interesting conclusions may be drawn. Primarily, there is no way of knowing how much of the land, the various assets and income escaped from state control with Michael VIII's conversion of soldiers' *pronoiai* into hereditary possessions. After his death, the award of a hereditary *oikonomia* seems to have remained an exceptional privilege even for members of the royal family under Andronikos II.²³¹ However, this does not affect the main impression that more and more public land and income were being allocated to monastic beneficiaries that would therefore hold them in perpetuity to the exclusion of soldiers. On the other hand, while it is certain that individual *pronoia* holders managed their own allotments and could increase their income, the constant reallocation of lands and *exaleimmata* would have reasonably prevented the investment of much effort and expense on their part. We see them building mills and leasing out fields, but only John Sgouros Orestes' efforts resulted in securing the possession of what he had built himself for his descendants. In essence, despite the allotment of various assets and land, the *pronoia* remained a monetary income, and the beneficiaries were mostly interested in the monetary beneficium rather than anything else.²³² The state, however, displayed a deeper interest in its effort to protect, monitor and control the resources, not only the land, but also the farmers who produced this wealth.

CONCLUSIONS

When Michael VIII Palaeologos ascended the imperial throne, he found a fiscal system oriented toward the small peasant properties. Their tax, called *epiteleia* in the sources, fueled the treasury and funded the *pronoiai* distributed under the Lascarids. The state had found a way to monitor the peasant properties and in particular those that belonged to dependent farmers, for which they were liable to pay the *epiteleia*. These were registered in the *biologia/biotikia*, which enabled the fiscal administration to follow their alienation and therefore claim the tax from the new proprietor. The method seems to have been of Komnenian inspiration or even older; the Palaeologoi did not add anything to it, as it was well in place during the period of exile. Therefore, the modifications made to the registration system immediately after 1259 represent the culmination of previous methods rather than a true reform. These modifications allowed the empire, for the rest of its time, to keep close track of the peasant properties, because they were the source of state revenue, even if this revenue had been allocated to a beneficiary. As the empire shrank, thereby losing more and more resources in the form of land and other properties, the importance of the peasant households grew disproportionately. The registration of peasant properties in these separate registers, and, under the Palaeologoi, their introduction in their *stichoi* in the *praktika* of the beneficiaries, was a fundamental process for the fiscal progression of the late Byzantine state.

The introduction of the totality of the peasant *stichoi* into the *praktika* took place as early as 1262 and was probably the reason why so many *apographai* were carried out in the first years of Michael VIII Palaeologos' reign. This was a true novelty effected under the first Palaeologos. Its purpose was to reveal the wealth actually in the hands of the various

231. This was already noted by OSTROGORSKI, *Féodalité* (quoted n. 1), p. 95.

232. See MANIATE-KOKKINE, *Δικαιούχοι γαιοπροσόδων* (quoted n. 81), pp. 223–35.

lay and ecclesiastical beneficiaries, to take control of it and (re)allocate it as a privilege, and thereby restrict it. The administration of Michael VIII Palaeologos took this a step further. If the workforce, meaning the manpower, was valued as capital, and gave value to the land itself, then the only way to take complete charge of it was to disassociate it from the fiscal value of the land.²³³ As we have seen, this was done without affecting the fiscal rates of taxation. The change was accomplished before 1279. Thereafter the human capital and the land were managed differently. The workforce of the countryside was under close surveillance, and so were the landlords. But, while Michael VIII reached the necessary decisions, it was Andronikos II who took most advantage of the new registration method.

Although it is difficult to shake the impression that, under the Palaeologoi and in particular under Andronikos II, for whom the archival records are more satisfying, the great landlords had been collecting enormous amounts granted as *oikonomiai*, it might be misleading, at least to a degree. By determining the size of the peasant households and registering them inside the great *praktika*, the state could keep better track of wealth that existed, wealth that was handed out and, ultimately, wealth it could reclaim. The fiscal administration could tamper with the revenues allocated to the various recipients, notwithstanding their status, for increasing or decreasing them. Thus the various exploitation rights (*ennomion*, fishing rights, milling rights, etc.) and even the smallest concession, such as the grant of the *abiotikion*, could become a matter of high economic policy and be presented as a grand favor of the emperor to the recipients. The discovery of the *perisseia*, which represents the profit procured through investments and the work of the peasants, was central in the administrative praxis at this time and it seems that what facilitated its application was not the surveillance of the great properties, but that of the peasants.²³⁴ Thus the *posotes* corresponding to the expansion was taken away, appropriated by the state and reallocated. For this reason it is not entirely accurate to speak of “confiscations;” it was in fact a standard method for refueling the state treasury, a reshuffling of the state revenue in the context of the new procedure of the fiscal administration which might have been abused in times of crisis, especially because it seems so flexible.²³⁵

However, the practical result of the new system seems to have been that the state retrieved properties that had been long abandoned to the various recipients of imperial privileges. The re-appropriation of state resources might indeed have been on a larger scale than our evidence allows us to see. Michael VIII probably had two aspects of his program in particular in mind for making these changes. The first consideration would be to satisfy his supporters, and the second to fund the military campaigns of the 1260s. The emperor was apparently well aware that the new fiscal procedure and the ensuing removals of property from the possession of the grand beneficiaries would cause great dissatisfaction. For this reason he created the office of the *domestikoi* of the themes, probably already in

233. LEMERLE, *Agrarian history* (quoted n. 84), p. 245, characterizes the *paroikoi* as “a kind of currency,” and “a unit of value.”

234. G. OSTROGORSKIJ, *Quelques problèmes d'histoire de la paysannerie byzantine* (Corpus bruxellense historiae byzantinae. Subsidia 2), Bruxelles 1956, p. 37, observed that the surveillance of the agrarian manpower was deeply rooted in the political and economic traditions of the Byzantine Empire, but he perceived a relaxation of this policy, which he attributed to the weakness of the state.

235. Cf. SMYRLIS, *Financial crisis* (quoted n. 133), p. 75.

the 1270s at the latest, for dealing with the fallout of his policy. The officers in charge dealt specifically with disputes arising in the public domains, which betrays just how much the state properties became central in the economic policy of the period. The testimonies about the removals may at first seem random, but they are explained when seen in this light, and Emperor Michael VIII's interest in taking firm control of the wealth of the empire can hardly be doubted. It seems that his decisions and his efforts paid off, as he was able to finance his campaigns and his expensive foreign policy. The military tax (*kephalaion stratotikon*) which replaced the old *strateia* was probably raised on the entire population of the countryside and seems to have been better suited for funding the large armies of the period and in particular the mercenaries. Strangely, the critique hurled against him by George Pachymeres focused not on the taxation itself, but on the ramifications of the changes on the population, which the author could point out clearly by showcasing the evolution of the eastern frontier. Again, the charge was about the "confiscations," not about the fiscal policy per se. It is indeed rather astounding that Pachymeres did not blame this emperor for increasing the taxes, but for collecting them.

According to Laiou, Andronikos II "inherited an appallingly poor state from his father."²³⁶ This judgement is harsh, although correct. In reality, Michael VIII did not have the time to use the new fiscal technique for rebuilding the gold reserves which had been depleted in the last years of his reign. This task fell to Andronikos II. With the advice of his councilors the new emperor disbanded the fleet, channeled the money to the treasury, and decided to not touch the *kephalaia*, meaning whatever gold remained in it. Seeking to remedy the deep rifts his father's reign had opened in Byzantine society, Andronikos II reverted to a more conservative policy. His resolution to truncate the *pronoiai* was certainly a fundamental change in the economic relations of the beneficiaries with the state. However, the incoherence with which the measure was applied shows that it was not meant as a reform. The thought underlying this decision was not the restructuring of the *pronoia* system, but finding cash. It was the easy solution to the liquidity problem of the empire in the last twenty years of the 13th century. Desperate for money, Andronikos II not only proceeded to further adulterate the gold coin, but taxation rose as well, and the agrarian population in particular suffered from the increased levies (paid in kind or in gold) for the needs of the mercenaries, which had not been an issue under Michael VIII. The situation was clearly out of control. Yet if Andronikos II is to be blamed for something, it is not that he sat idle and watched events unfold; on the contrary, he strove to save Asia Minor and to find the coin necessary for the crisis the empire was going through in the beginning of the 14th century. But Andronikos II lacked the courage to impose sweeping reforms and lead the policy introduced by Michael VIII to culmination, namely to reclaim the state property and the wealth deriving therefrom for the treasury. Although there is information that he tried to tax the great beneficiaries and retrieve a part of the *kephalaia* for the state, there is not enough evidence to suggest that it ever became standard policy. On the contrary, the impression arising from the archives is that the administration of Andronikos II operated on double standards and that the new fiscal method was not used to reform taxation. As a tool for monitoring the

236. LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 14–5; KONTOGIANNOPOULOU, Πολιτική (quoted n. 115), pp. 51–2, 207; MAUROMMATES, Παλαιολόγοι (quoted n. 177), p. 33.

workforce, the wealth of the countryside and the beneficiaries, the method introduced and completed between 1262 and 1279 facilitated the reallocations of state property and could serve as a basis for taxing the latter, but it was only occasionally used for that purpose. It is not arbitrary that most of our information about the *pronoia* reallocations concerns properties and income that ended up in the possession of monasteries, and most of them indeed by imperial initiative. Andronikos II in reality never dared to displease the great beneficiaries who were the supporters of the throne, meaning the high aristocracy and the monasteries.

Michael VIII was admittedly generous, although the types of grants he distributed mitigates this impression. The concession of the workforce to the beneficiaries was without a doubt beneficial to them and to the land, and of course—and perhaps most importantly—to the farmers themselves. This explains a lot of the grievances against Andronikos II: if the beneficiaries had striven to make the land flourish, then removing it and reallocating it would seem like a dishonorable confiscation despite the fact that most of the grants were not granted with ownership attached. Andronikos II was the emperor who capitalized on this aspect of Michael VIII's fiscal method. In his reign, the monasteries could indeed prosper by settling more farmers on their land and more than double their income. In the context of the late 13th century, this seems to have been much more important than the land itself, since the grants of Andronikos dated to the first half of his reign made no lasting impression.²³⁷ In the case of Megiste Lavra, the emperor effectively guaranteed that his own policy would not apply.

It is rather contradictory and surprising that the information surviving about the grants to individuals is significantly less detailed because it comes mostly from indirect evidence and details inserted into posterior acts, sometimes with an interval of several years between them. In addition, the documents usually only disclose part of an individual property, with only a few exceptions. Unless the material discloses the enactment of a donation made by an individual, which proves that he or she had been awarded ownership rights on some property, it cannot be claimed that any of them had been treated with any exceptional favor. Although few of the grand individual beneficiaries of the early Palaeologoi received a right to transmit their domains to their heirs, it is not to be excluded that many *pronoia* holders might have benefitted from this privilege granted by Michael VIII to soldiers. The data, however, is piecemeal; this scarcity, in an environment where dozens of documents are preserved, is an indication that perhaps the application of this measure was not as generalized as it appears at first, while the archival material certainly suggests in addition that it was conditional on the existence of male heirs. Plausibly, as we have seen, a part of the domains belonging to the state in the beginning of Michael VIII's reign escaped from state control, which might have been a reason for the extensive reappropriations. At this stage, unfortunately, because of the lack of evidence, little can be said about the duration of the hereditability of the *pronoiai*. It seems certain, however, that even wives without sons could keep their husbands' allotments until their

237. Cf. ŠEVČENKO, Discourse (quoted n. 66), p. 156; LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant society* (quoted n. 11), p. 6; SMYRLIS, Financial crisis (quoted n. 133), pp. 80–1.

deaths.²³⁸ On the other hand, the number of reallocations attested in the archives, dated mostly to after ca. 1290, reveals that no beneficiary, lay or monastic, around the turn of the 13th to the 14th century could be secure about the possession of this wealth, and while the ecclesiastical and monastic recipients of privileges could carry out significant ameliorations to their properties, this was much more difficult for the *pronoia* holders. This situation affects the image our sources paint about the recipients of such grants.

It has been argued that the state participated very little in the agrarian economy of the time.²³⁹ This view needs to be modified, because it attaches paramount importance to the role of the grand proprietors and beneficiaries but excludes the significance of the land reallocations, the appropriation of the *exaleimmata* and the *perisseia*, and the distribution of fields and other properties to the peasants. At this time, the farmers do not appear to have been bound to the landlords. On the contrary, there was a bilateral and indissoluble connection with the state. Its role in the management of the workforce of the countryside was even more important as it used them as capital, for increasing or decreasing the beneficiaries' benefits, balancing out their income, and even for boosting local economies. The allotment of land to the farmers was an accounting tool which it used for itself and in favor of the beneficiaries when there was a decision about the increase of their revenue. Andronikos II was par excellence the emperor who made most use of it. Although much of the documentation dates from the beginning of the 14th century, it is probable that it was used in the 13th century as well.

The allocation of land to the farmers created a healthy stratum of middle-class farmers in the countryside, which contributed greatly to the image of prosperity at this time. But if the peasants were recognized as the productive force exploiting the resources of the land, the state had also reserved for itself the part of the bare licensee, regularly claiming the revenue but also the ownership of various properties and resources when the workforce was lacking. It appears indeed that the orphan properties gained significance in the 13th century. This is rather in direct analogy to the fiscalization effected under Michael VIII, but in reverse analogy to the territorial losses of the empire. There can be no doubt that the *abiotikion*, the appropriation of the peasants' assets, as well as the incorporation of the *exaleimmata* in the imperial domains were old practices of the fiscal administration. While the *epiteleia* burdened the properties of the peasants in perpetuity, the *abiotikion* seems to be a genuine class distinction, as these properties were withheld by the state exactly because they had belonged to dependent farmers. In the 13th and 14th centuries the state used the abandoned peasant *staseis* and the *exaleimmata* for making up for the revenue deficits of the beneficiaries.

Finally, although the present research is not suitably developed for adding on the issue of taxation, it must be noted that the fiscal impositions, as these arose from the *praktika*, responded to the diversity of the economic activities of the peasants and their own expansion. The general impression from the archives is one of prosperity. And yet,

238. The hereditary rights awarded by Michael VIII to the soldiers gave rise to views about the "feudalization" and "decentralization" of Byzantium: see generally LAIOU, *Constantinople* (quoted n. 107), pp. 114–26; EAD., *Aristocracy* (quoted n. 1), pp. 141–3; ANGOLD, *Government* (quoted n. 2), pp. 141–3; OSTROGORSKI, *Féodalité* (quoted n. 1), pp. 124–5; with regard to the role of women in the hereditary *pronoiai*, see also MANIATE-KOKKINE, Γυναικὰ (quoted n. 191), pp. 449–60.

239. OIKONOMIDES, *Role* (quoted n. 13), p. 1050.

especially around the turn of the 13th to the 14th century, this prosperity clearly did not translate into prosperity for Byzantium. The reason for this has already been adequately explained by the Byzantinists: as a large part of this wealth was granted in the form of privileges or simple rewards to the various lay, ecclesiastical and monastic, and military recipients, the state was unable to capitalize on its own economic forces. Although different in their particulars, the views expressed so far converge in the significance of the distribution of privileges in the form of fiscal income from the land, which remained untaxed as revenue.²⁴⁰ Through the commercialization of the agrarian production the beneficiaries were, in fact, becoming richer, unlike the farmers whose surplus was limited and unlike the state that had given up on its role as beneficiary of the wealth and regulator of the commercial activity in Byzantium.²⁴¹ This simple mechanism deepened the economic gap between the productive population and the aristocratic beneficiaries on the one hand, the aristocracy and the state on the other. It is not by chance that patronage of the arts reached new peaks under the Palaeologoi, as the grandest works of art were funded by the higher aristocracy and religious foundations at this time. However, it would not be appropriate to blame Byzantium for not taxing revenues, which was an unthinkable *modus operandi* in the medieval world. Essentially, wealth was derived from the land and various assets, and imposing taxation on the private properties of the beneficiaries would simply not be enough to meet the needs of the state. Instead, the first Palaeologoi followed the ancient customs of the empire. Under their guidance the state remained fiercely attached to its diminishing possessions and resources even as the recipients were claiming them as their own. Neither dared to earnestly question the fundamental principles of the system, in which the former was recognized as the bare licensee and held the role of the simple distributor of wealth, and the latter had the role of the simple recipient. In the beginning of the 14th century, after the loss of Asia Minor, Byzantium entered the last period of its history while still hanging on to its ancient traditions.²⁴²

University of Thessaly

240. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, Role (quoted n. 13), pp. 1055–6; SMYRLIS, Financial crisis (quoted n. 133), pp. 71–82; LAIOU, Aristocracy (quoted n. 1), pp. 144–51.

241. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΔΗΣ, Role (quoted n. 13), p. 1026, outlined how the economy of privileges, which first becomes obvious in the 11th century and is solidified in the 12th as a mode of operation of the Byzantine state, led to the demonetization of the state economy. On the commercialization of the agrarian production, see in particular SMYRLIS, *Fortune* (quoted n. 8), pp. 219–27; ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *Byzance face aux Ottomans*, pp. 499–529.

242. See LAIOU, Aristocracy (quoted n. 1), pp. 149–51; D. KYRITSES, Κράτος και αριστοκρατία την εποχή του Ανδρονίκου Β΄ : το αδιέξοδο της στασιμότητας, in *Μανουήλ Πανσέληνος* (quoted n. 45), pp. 178–94.

APPENDIX – THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE EARLY PALAEOLOGAN REGIME, ca. 1259-1300

<i>Beneficiary</i>	<i>Grant/asset/income</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>
Lavra	Toxompous village, ownership and use; fiscal income; the right to refer to the emperor bypassing any civil or ecclesiastic authority.	January 1259	<i>Actes de Lavra</i> 2, no. 71.
Iviron	Hierissos village (fiscal income) of Nikephoros Petraleiphas and Michael Lascaris; possession and use.	January 1259	<i>Actes d'Iviron</i> 3, nos. 58, 59.63-65.
Despot John Palaeologos	Villages Symeon, Selada, Metallin, half of Gradista, Kastrin; (<i>oikonomia</i>).	(Plausibly in January) 1259	<i>Actes d'Iviron</i> 3, no. 58.83; <i>Actes de Xèropotamou</i> , no. 10.28-30; <i>Actes de Lavra</i> 2, no. 72.
Michael Angelos	Use of Hermos river; <i>oikonomia</i> .	February 1259 or earlier	MM 4, no. 150.3 pp. 241-2.
Michael Angelos and Anna Angelina	Hereditability rights of the <i>oikonomia</i> ; land and the use of Hermos river with the <i>lampe</i> [stagnant water or marshland].	February 1259 until September 1264	MM 4, nos. 93 pp. 169-70; 151, 152 pp. 244-7.
St. John Theologos of Patmos	Gonia tou Petake (four <i>zeugaria</i>) and the Mangragouriou (five <i>zeugaria</i>); possession.	May 1259	<i>Patmos</i> 1, nos. 14.45-52; 27.
Esphigmenou	Half of Portarea village; possession (<i>oikonomia</i>).	Before June 1259	<i>Actes d'Esphigménou</i> , no. 6.50-62.
Esphigmenou	Two thirds of Chrousobo village; possession (<i>oikonomia</i>).	June 1259	<i>Actes d'Esphigménou</i> , App. A.34-9.
Theodosios Skaranos	<i>Stasis</i> of Petrakas, <i>choraphia</i> , <i>kellion</i> , <i>oikonomia</i> with <i>paroikoi</i> .	Between 1259 and March 1262	<i>Actes de Xèropotamou</i> , nos. 9.A.29-31, 63-4; B.45-6, 91-4, 101-2; <i>Actes d'Iviron</i> 3, no. 59.82-7.
Demetrios Spartenos	Land of three <i>zeugaria</i> at Lozikion village; ownership.	Between 1259 and September 1265	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), p. 16 (nos. 49 and 53) and no. 7.
St. John Theologos of Patmos	Proasteion Anabasideion.	Between May 1259 and May 1263	<i>Patmos</i> 1, nos. 31, 32.
George Komnenos Angelos	Malachiou village; <i>pronoia</i> .	Between May 1259 and September 1262	<i>Patmos</i> 1, no. 30.3-4.

<i>Beneficiary</i>	<i>Grant/asset/income</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>
Basileios Metretopoulos	700 <i>modioi</i> at Mounziane; ownership.	Between 1259 and 1282	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), no. 17.84–5.
Manuel Thrakeses (soldier) or Martha Thrakesina	Hereditability of allotment (<i>pronoia</i> ?).	After 1259	MM 4, p. 229.
St. Panteleemon	Four <i>agridia</i> in Rabenikeia.	Between 1259–82	<i>Actes de Saint-Pantéléemôn</i> , no. 10.40–6.
Chilandar	Land of three <i>zeugaria</i> near Thessalonike.	Between 1259–82	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), no. 34.193–6.
Nikolaos Adam	Hereditability of <i>pronoia</i> income; <i>paroikoi</i> contributions.	Before April 1260	MM 4, no. 35 pp. 91–2.
Soldiers (? anonymous)	Olive trees (contributions of <i>paroikoi</i> ?).	After April 1260	MM 4, p. 104.
Priest Modenos	Freedom from the <i>paroikia</i> and its obligations (<i>paroikikon baros</i> , outside all <i>paroikia</i>) and tax exemption of his <i>hypostasis</i> with the right to hereditary transmission.	Between 1260–70	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), nos. 26.6–9, 14–15; 27.3.
Theotokos of Lembos	New <i>paroikoi</i> settled in the domains.	December 1260	MM 4, no. 136 pp. 222–3.
Constantine Peplatysmenos and <i>archontopouloi</i> of Michael VIII	<i>Exaleimmata</i> calculated in monetary quantity (<i>posotes</i>); <i>oikonomia</i> .	May 1261	<i>Patmos</i> 2, no. 66.1–4.
Theotokos of Lembos	<i>Perisseia</i> of 15 coins.	July 1261	MM 4, no. 159 p. 254.
Michael Komnenos Branas	Part of Mourmounta village.	After 1261	MM 4, nos. 100 pp. 176–7; 102 pp. 178–81; 178.1–6 pp. 273–84.
Son of ‘Izz ad-Din Kaikaus II	<i>Zeugelateion</i> of Komanitze at Berroia; (possession and) use.	After 1261 until 1282	<i>Actes de Vatopédi</i> , nos. 62.69–75; 64.64–70.
Theodosios Skaranos	Restitution (the <i>stasis</i> of Petrakas, <i>choraphia</i> , <i>kellion</i> , <i>oikonomia</i> and <i>paroikoi</i>); ownership.	Between 1262 and 1274	<i>Actes de Xèropotamou</i> , nos. 9.A.32–3, 63–6; B.47–9, 91–4, 101–2.
Theotokos Makrinitissa	Village of Kapraina, possession and use.	1262 or 1263 (?)	MM 4, nos. 6 pp. 342–4; 24 p. 389.
Alexios Strategopoulos	Village Megale.	Between 1262/3 and December 1270	MM 4, no. 25 pp. 390–1.

<i>Beneficiary</i>	<i>Grant/asset/income</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>
Lavra	Villages of Selada, Metallin and half of Gradista; ownership; with the right to keep the future ameliorations.	April 1263	<i>Actes de Lavra</i> 2, no. 72.
Zorianos	Kyrkale village.	Between 1263 and October 1273	MM 4, no. 20 p. 385.
Christophoros Tzekon and Papanikolopoulos	Kapraina village; (<i>oikonomia</i> of fifty <i>hyperpyra</i>).	Between 1263 and December 1268	MM 4, nos. 23, 24 pp. 388–9.
Nikolaos Dermatas	Land at Palatia near Smyrne; ownership.	Before April 1265	MM 4, no. 80, pp. 150–2.
Vatopedi	<i>Metochion</i> of St. Anargyroi (reimbursement for a previous confiscation).	October 1265	<i>Actes de Vatopédi</i> , no. 16.
Theotokos Makrinitissa	Land at Megale village (in exchange); ownership.	September 1267	MM 4, no. 21 pp. 386–7.
Monastery of St. Ilarion	Tax exemption of the <i>ambelia</i> , 33⅓ <i>hyperpyra</i> .	August 1268	MM 4, no. 22 pp. 387–8.
Theotokos Makrinitissa	Kapraina village (restitution); <i>oikonomia</i> of fifty <i>hyperpyra</i> .	December 1268/May 1270	MM 4, nos. 23, 24 pp. 388–9.
Theotokos of Lembos	Land at Hagia near Palatia of Smyrne.	March 1270	MM 4, no. 99 pp. 175–6.
St. Panteleemon	Land at Rabenikeia; six <i>paroikoi</i> ; the right to settle more <i>paroikoi</i> .	1271?	<i>Actes de Saint-Pantéléèmôn</i> , no. 9.
Theotokos Makrinitissa	Kyrkale village, restitution.	October 1273	MM 4, no. 20 p. 385.
Xeropotamou	Symeon village; <i>oikonomia</i> of fifty <i>hyperpyra</i> .	1274?	<i>Actes de Xèropotamou</i> , no. 10.28–30.
Priest Modenos and Michael Borkinos	Freedom from the <i>paroikia</i> and its obligations (<i>paroikikon baros</i> , outside all <i>paroikia</i>) and tax exemption of his <i>hypostasis</i> with the right to hereditary transmission.	Presumably between 1274 and 1281	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), no. 26.
Constantine Doukas Nestoggos	Olive trees (contributions of <i>paroikoi</i>); Prinobaris village near Smyrne.	Before February–March 1276	MM 4, nos. 45 pp. 103–4; 163–4 pp. 257–60.
Komnenos Raoul	Village of Prinobaris or neighboring village.	Before 1277	MM 4, p. 259.
Chilandar	Kastrion village, <i>oikonomia</i> of 50 <i>hyperpyra</i> ; possession and use.	After April 1271 until 1274	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), nos. 8 (1271), and 10.15–21 (1277).
Docheiariou	Land close to Thessalonike (restitution?).	1274 (?)	<i>Actes de Docheiariou</i> , no. 23.17–21.

<i>Beneficiary</i>	<i>Grant/asset/income</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>
Theotokos Makrinitissa	Monastery of Christ Latomou (Thessalonike).	1274–82	MM 4, no. 3 pp. 336–9.
Demetrios Mourinos	Villages of Goggyle, Derkon, Hermelia, Krabbata, Antigoneia, land of Sthlanitza with its pastures, winter pasture at Kassandreia; (<i>oikonomia</i> of) 830 <i>hyperpyra</i> ; ownership.	1280–1	<i>Actes de Docheiariou</i> , no. 9.
Priest Modenos and John Porianites	Freedom from the <i>paroikia</i> and its obligations (<i>paroikikon baros</i> , outside all <i>paroikia</i>) and tax exemption of his <i>hypostasis</i> with the right to hereditary transmission.	November 1281	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), no. 27.
Vardan	<i>Pronoia</i> , village of Kastrion (peasant households).	After the end of 1282–beginning of 1283 (?)	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), App. II, pp. 290–1.
Manuel Debeltzenos	<i>Pronoia</i> , village of Kastrion (peasant households).	After the end of 1282–beginning of 1283 (?)	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), App. II, p. 291.
Gazes Syrgiannes	<i>Pronoia</i> , village of Kastrion (peasant households).	After the end of 1282–beginning of 1283 (?)	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), App. II, p. 292.
Nikephoros Chrysos	<i>Pronoia</i> , village of Kastrion (peasant households).	After the end of 1282–beginning of 1283 (?)	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), App. II, p. 292.
George Kapsokabades	<i>Pronoia</i> , village of Kastrion (peasant households).	After the end of 1282–beginning of 1283 (?)	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), App. II, p. 292.
Nikolaos Philomates	<i>Pronoia</i> , village of Kastrion (peasant households).	After the end of 1282–beginning of 1283 (?)	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), App. II, p. 292.
Children (re: sons?) of Kyprian	<i>Pronoia</i> , village of Kastrion (peasant households).	After the end of 1282–beginning of 1283 (?)	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), App. II, pp. 292–3.
Leon Koteanitzes	Land at Preasnitz; <i>pronoia</i> (?).	1282 until May 1293	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), no. 12.4–5.
Theotokos of Lembos	Land of Thrakesina.	1284 (?) until before May 1293	MM 4, p. 229.
Lavra	Addition of 5,000 <i>modioi</i> of land to the domain of Gomatou on Lemnos island; addition of a block of 1,000 <i>modioi</i> ; addition of the land of Papias, 400 <i>modioi</i> ; addition of 39 <i>paroikoi</i> .	January 1284–January 1285	<i>Actes de Lavra</i> 2, nos. 73, 74, 76, 77.

<i>Beneficiary</i>	<i>Grant/asset/income</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>
Theodore Komnenos Angelos	Part of Mourmounta village.	Before June 1286	MM 4, pp. 276, 279–80.
Gazes, soldier	Four <i>zeugaria</i> (400 <i>modioi</i>) at Lozikion (<i>pronoia</i> ?).	Before September 1286	<i>Actes de Zographou</i> , no. 10 pp. 27–8.
Zographou	Excess land of Gazes at Lozikion (400 <i>modioi</i>).	September 1286	<i>Actes de Zographou</i> , no. 10 pp. 27–9.
Loubros	Land at Pylorhegion.	Before August 1289	<i>Actes de Zographou</i> , no. 11 p. 30.45–7.
Zographou	Land of Loubros at Pylorhegion.	Before August 1289	<i>Actes de Zographou</i> , no. 11 p. 30.45–8.
The brothers Constantine, Alexios, Isaakios Amnon and George Ozianos	<i>Pronoia</i> .	Before April 1290	<i>Actes de Zographou</i> , no. 12 p. 32.24–5.
Petros Doukopoulos	Daphne village; <i>pronoia</i> .	Before May 1292	<i>Actes d'Iviron</i> 3, no. 66.
George Melissenos	Land at Potamos village, houses at Magnesia (exchange with others at Nymphaion), and other assets; ownership.	Presumably between 1290–3	MM 4, nos. 170–2 pp. 266–9.
(Constantine?) Maurozomes	Part of Neochorion (?)	Before May 1293	MM 4, p. 229.
Manuel Doukas Aprenos	Part of Neochorion (?)	Before May 1293	MM 4, p. 229.
Leon Koteanitzes	Land at Preasnitza; ownership; freedom from any <i>douleia</i> .	May 1293	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), no. 12.
Constantine Komnenos Lascaris	Land of 600 <i>modioi</i> at Kalliste village.	Before July 1294	PAVLIKIANOV, <i>Karakallou</i> (quoted n. 61), no. 1.32–5.
Karakala	Land of 600 <i>modioi</i> of Constantine Lascaris at Kalliste village.	July 1294	PAVLIKIANOV, <i>Karakallou</i> (quoted n. 61), no. 1.I.33–5.
Alexios Komnenos Raoul	<i>Oikonomia</i> of Prebista village.	Ca. 1297	MAUROMMATES, <i>Pronoia</i> (quoted n. 78), pp. 213–19.
Lavra	Cancellation of the <i>charagma</i> of Toxompous village and of the <i>charagma</i> of the estates of Thessalonike. <i>Exkousseia</i> for the totality of the <i>kephalaion</i> .	Until June 1298	<i>Actes de Lavra</i> 2, no. 89.80–90, 157–63, 172–8.
Michael Spanopoulos	<i>Oikonomia</i> .	Before September 1298	<i>Actes de Vatopédi</i> , no. 21.
Docheiariou	Land (restitution ?).	Unknown, perhaps 1299	<i>Actes de Docheiariou</i> , no. 16.1–6.

<i>Beneficiary</i>	<i>Grant/asset/income</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>
Spartenos	Land at Potamos village (<i>pronoia</i> ?).	Before January 1300	MM 4, p. 268.
Skores	Five peasant <i>staseis</i> at Kontogrikou village.	Before June 1300	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), p. 294.
Chilandar	Kastrion village, <i>oikonomia</i> of 120 <i>hyperpyra</i> , plus the land tax of 8,000 <i>modioi</i> and an <i>exaleimmatike stasis</i> (restitution); five peasant households at Kontogrikou village.	June 1300	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), no. 19 and App. II, pp. 290–3, 294, 295.
Demetrios Doukopoulos	Land of Neakitou, 300 <i>modioi</i> at Psallis.	Before October 1300	<i>Actes de Xénophon</i> , no. 4.8–9.
Syr Pero Martino	Land of Kastamonites, 325 <i>modioi</i> ; <i>oikonomia</i> .	Before October 1300	<i>Actes de Xénophon</i> , no. 4.23–4.
Xenophon	Land of Neakitou, 300 <i>modioi</i> at Psallis; land of Kastamonites of Pero Martino, 325 <i>modioi</i> .	October 1300	<i>Actes de Xénophon</i> , no. 4.8–9.
Chilandar	Decrease or alleviation of the <i>charagma</i> .	Between 1282 and 1300	<i>Actes de Chilandar</i> 1 (AA 20), p. 15 no. 32.
Germanos Kladon and Demetrios Roufinos*	Land of three <i>zeugaria</i> at Libadion near Serres.	Before 1301	BÉNOU, <i>Prodrome</i> (quoted n. 37), no. 18.
Soldiers (anonymous)	Land at Longos village.	Before April 1304	<i>Actes de Lavra</i> 2, no. 97.6–7.
Ameras Batatzes	<i>Pronoia</i> ; exchange with <i>exaleimmata</i> .	Before October 1304	BÉNOU, <i>Prodrome</i> (quoted n. 37), no. 160.1–5.
Symeon Madarites	<i>Zeugelateia</i> of Karabidia and Esphagmenos (4,000 <i>modioi</i>) at Zelichova; ownership.	Before 1305 (plausibly between 1282 and 1305)	BÉNOU, <i>Prodrome</i> (quoted n. 37), nos. 19, 20, 26, 194.
<i>Authentopouloi</i> or <i>paidopouloi</i> of Michael IX Palaeologos	<i>Ktemata</i> at Popolia around Serres.	Before 1305	BÉNOU, <i>Prodrome</i> (quoted n. 37), no. 194.1–8.
Megalonas	Land of Keranitzia.	Before 1305–1306	BÉNOU, <i>Prodrome</i> (quoted n. 37), no. 129.17–20.

* These last allotments are attested after 1300 but may be dated to before that year.

ABSTRACTS/RÉSUMÉS

Panagiotis Ch. ATHANASOPOULOS, *Religious polyarchy and its consequences: a hitherto unknown Consilium ad Graecos in Demetrios Kydones' unedited De processione Spiritus sancti ad amicum*

p. 761

Demetrios Kydones' *De processione Spiritus sancti ad amicum* is a (still unedited) epistolary discourse in defense of the *Filioque*, addressed to one of his friends. Towards the end of this treatise, in chapter 42, the author cites a quite lengthy *Oratio*, which, he claims, was given by a Latin in a meeting of Byzantines and Latins, in Kydones' presence. The second part of the *Oratio* (*Consilium ad Graecos*) includes a critique of the Byzantine Church and exhibits the situation in Constantinople ca. 1384–1386/7. In this paper, I present a provisional critical edition of this interesting source, an English translation and an interpretation of the text. On this basis, I attempt to date Kydones' treatise and to trace the identity of this unknown Latin speaker. Last, I present our limited knowledge regarding the unknown addressee's identity.

Ivan BILIARSKY, *La transmission et la légitimation du pouvoir des derniers souverains bulgares de la dynastie des Assénides (1323-1396)*

p. 89

The article is dedicated to a problem that was for a long time viewed as naturally clear insofar as the ruler's power was supposed to be hereditary. The idea of the study is to examine the transmission of power among the last rulers of the last century before the Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria and to project it onto the background of the whole mediaeval history of Bulgaria and neighbouring countries. This panorama begins with the pagan period and continues up to the Second Bulgarian Empire. The following part of the study presents case studies on the transmission of power in the framework of the Asen family in the 14th century. After the historical cases, the study presents the different models of legitimation of the imperial power in Bulgaria as follows: 1) Charisma of the family and the heritage with its variants: *corpus fratrurn*, primogeniture, *porphyrogeniture*, the title of "Young tsar;" 2) Election; 3) Association with the power and choice of the father, representing God. In conclusion, we can say that the manner is complex but was certainly based on God's choice of the future lieutenant of Divine power on the earth. The people of that period sought ways to legitimate the ruler's power inasmuch as God does not contact humans directly. These ways differed but the usual one was the will of the former ruler as the lieutenant of the Lord God in his realm.

Marie-Hélène BLANCHET & Raúl ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ, *L'Empire byzantin sous les Paléologues, entre déclin et ruine : révision en six étapes d'un legs historiographique ancien*

p. 7

The history of the Palaiologan period (1261–1453) has traditionally been understood as an era of decadence and decline heralding the end of Byzantium. This view is very old and goes back to eighteenth-century authors such as Charles de Montesquieu and Edward Gibbon. Despite more

nuanced narratives, this pattern is still widely in use in the current historiography. In this article, we discuss this declinist approach to the period through six questions that we consider particularly significant in the construction of this interpretative scheme:

1. Roman identity, Hellenic identity, Greek (protonational) identity?
2. An Empire that was no longer one: the end of the universalist ideology?
3. The project for union between the Churches: a red herring?
4. The strengthening of the Patriarchate of Constantinople's authority versus the weakening of the imperial power?
5. The decadence of the State?
6. Byzantines and Ottomans, two rival empires?

The aim of this historiographical review is to highlight the basis of the teleological approach applied to the Empire's history during the last centuries of the Middle Ages.

Marie-Hélène CONGOURDEAU, *Le discours de Nicolas Kabasilas Sur les audaces contre les biens sacrés commises par les archontes en enfreignant la loi* p. 391

Nicolas Kabasilas' *Discourse against the archons*, edited by I. Ševčenko in 1957 in the *Dumbarton Oaks papers*, from *Paris. gr.* 1213, continues to raise questions and hypotheses. Who are these archons whom he accuses of committing illegalities? Under what circumstances did he write it? We propose here a full translation of the Greek text edited by Ševčenko, to which we have added some variants appearing in the critical apparatus established by Ševčenko in 1960 from *Paris. gr.* 1276 (identified as a draft of the discourse). This first full translation into a modern language will hopefully allow researchers to unravel some of the mysteries of a text that appears fundamental for the understanding of many legal, economic and social issues of the fourteenth century.

John A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Scholarios' Inserta thomistica in his Compendium of Demetrios Kydones' translation of Thomas Aquinas' Summa theologiae, I^a: a re-edition and its textual setting* p. 803

MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1273 contains two autograph Thomistic *Compendia* by George Scholarios-Gennadios II: an abridgment of Demetrios Kydones' translation of the *Summa contra Gentiles* and an abridgment of Kydones' translation of *Summa theologiae*, I^a. An interpolation by Scholarios himself (*Inserta thomistica*) occurs between *Quaestiones* 45 and 46 of the latter. Item I derives from *Summa contra Gentiles*, Book II, Chapter 31, Item II derives from Chapters 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 68, 69 and 79, whereas Item III is identical to a passage from *Summa theologiae*, I^a, *Quaestio* 32, *Articulus* 3, *Respondeo*. The study offers a critical edition of the *Inserta thomistica*, identifies its exact provenance and discusses why and how Scholarios inserted this material at the precise point of his abridgment of the *Summa theologiae*. Part of the material of Item II fully coincides with parts from Scholarios' *Florilegium thomisticum I* in a way that shows direct dependence on it.

Marco FANELLI, *L'Islam dans la vie et l'œuvre du patriarche Kallistos I^{er} (ca 1290 – † 1364)* p. 727

Patriarch Kallistos I is one of the most relevant figures of the 14th century. Although he was a leading character during the troubled decades of the civil wars and the Palamite controversy, a definitive study on his life and his works has to be published, excluding Gones' dated monograph.

Moreover, Kallistos' pastoral activity took place in the years of the Ottoman occupation of Gallipoli and other cities in western Anatolia.

The article aims at providing an overall evaluation of Kallistos' perception of Islamic matters (Muhammad's role and preaching, Muslim practises, cases of apostasy). We start from a biographical episode during which Kallistos was captured by Turkish pirates. We then provide an in-depth analysis of passages from his edited and unedited works (homilies and prayers) in order to retrace the knowledge and reactions of a key figure in the Byzantine religious and intellectual *milieu* facing the Turkish (and Islamic) threat.

Christian GASTGEBER, *Anti-Palamism in the chancery of Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos (second term: 1364–75): the case of Demetrios Chloros*

p. 695

After the official recognition of the doctrine of Gregory Palamas, anti-Palamite opponents were no longer accepted and ran the risk of being accused of heresy. Besides the famous trial against Prochoros Kydones (April 1368), the so-called Register of the patriarchate of Constantinople provides insight into still-active anti-Palamites under the Palamite patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos. On the one hand, some confessions of faith, required from clerics, attest that they felt attracted by the doctrines of Barlaam and Gregory Akindynos; on the other hand, so-called "latinophrones" were generally suspected of adhering to Barlaam's doctrine. At the beginning of Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos' second term, the drafters of rhetorical documents were indicated in the register; we can thus follow the engagement of the officials in the chancery of the patriarchate to some extent. One of these officials is Demetrios Chloros. A biographical summary is included in one of the biggest show trials in the patriarchate of Constantinople, against magical practices by clerics and doctors; its final judgements date from May 1370. Chloros, just promoted to *protonotarios*, is the key figure of this trial; this former anti-Palamite was not only degraded, but nearly anathematized. The article investigates the circumstances and the persons supporting or opposing him.

Mihai-D. GRIGORE, *Eastern Orthodoxy as confession: an essay on principles or Bringing the Synodikon of Orthodoxy into discussion of paradigms*

p. 827

Every confession is a Church, but not every Church is a confession. The inclusion of the Orthodox world in the integrative confessional history of Europe is long overdue. The following contribution addresses this *desideratum*. It describes the Orthodoxy as being a confession because it fulfills the three momenta defining any confession: the universal, the temporal, and the confessional momentum. Using a complex approach combining ecclesiology, theory of history, and historical analysis, it shows that Eastern Orthodoxy is a Christian confession, just as Catholicism, Lutheranism, the Reformed faith, and Anglicanism are confessions. To this end, I contrast, on the one hand, the dogmatic-traditionalist paradigm of the neopatristic synthesis developed by the Russian theologian Georges Florovsky with a historiographical paradigm of the historical presence of Orthodoxy in the world and history. For this purpose, I comment abundantly on the concepts of confessionality developed by the German hermeneutics of history in the 20th century. On the other hand, I point out how Orthodoxy historically became a confession by possessing in the *Synodikon of Orthodoxy* its *Bekenntnisschrift* and thus a confessional identifier. In conclusion, I maintain that only that study of the Eastern Church which is based on historical methodology and on the historical observation of plurality can guarantee the integration of Orthodoxy into the pan-European history of Christianity, into a fair Ecumenism, and thus overcome the East-West polarity.

Martin HINTERBERGER, *Passions in Paleologan spiritual writing: affection, vanity and sorrow in Eulogia Choumnaina's correspondence and other contemporary texts* p. 565

Next to journals and memoirs, letters have been the source material of choice for the study of the emotions of the past. The letters of Eirene/Eulogia Choumnaina (1291–1355) constitute one of the few examples of such intimate writings preserved from the Byzantine era. Through Eulogia's own letters as well as letters and other texts addressed to her and other women (in particular by Theoleptos of Philadelphia and Gregory Palamas), the modern scholar is in a privileged position to gain a certain insight into Choumnaina's inner life and the emotional environment within which it unfolded. After an overview of the "theories" about emotions that underly these writings, particular emphasis is given to the following emotions: διάθεσις "(spiritual) affection," κενοδοξία "vanity" and οἷσις "conceit" as well as λύπη "pain/sorrow/distress" and ἀκηδία "listlessness/dejection."

Tonia KIOUSOPOULOU, *Une approche du pouvoir impérial au début du XIV^e siècle* p. 159

This article examines the weakening of the imperial power in the early 14th century in relation to the coexistence and the conflict between the two powerful social groups, the aristocracy and the middle class (the *mesoi*). My hypothesis is that Andronikos II Palaiologos, through the activity of his *mesazon* Theodoros Metochites, sought to give political power to the most prominent of the middle class as compensation for the groups of the aristocracy that were hostile to him, since the most important for him was to maintain the political power of his family.

Sebastian KOLDITZ, *Opposition, conspiracy, révolte : quelques remarques pour une histoire de la contestation politique à l'époque des Paléologues* p. 169

The systematic study of rebellion, revolt and political unrest in late Byzantium is still a major *desideratum* in research. Proceeding from a recent study on coups in Palaiologan times, the present article combines some general and methodological remarks with a number of case studies, which illuminate various forms of political contestation and problems of their interpretation. The rebellion of Alexios Philanthropenos is analyzed with regard to the significant differences in the main historiographical accounts of this event. The abdication of John VI shows the crucial role the people of Constantinople still played for maintaining and disputing political stability in the 14th century. Finally, the career of Despot Demetrios in the 15th century is discussed in order to question the construction of continually unruly and treacherous political behaviour. We finally make some suggestions for the categorization and comparative evaluation of phenomena of political unrest and opposition.

Anastasia KOTOGIANNOPOULOU, *Autonomy, apostasy and the administration of Macedonia and Thrace in the Palaiologan period (mid-14th – mid-15th century)* p. 333

The Palaiologan emperors were called to face the precarious political reality of Byzantium's external enemies and its internal rivalries and this determined their handling of the provincial administration. More specifically, the progressive loss of Byzantine territory due to hostile attacks and the internal disruption caused by civil strife led Andronikos II, initially, and John VI, subsequently, to form large administrative agglomerates in the provinces, where members of the imperial family or the court aristocracy were appointed as governors. Modern research does

not delve into the institutional nature of these regions nor does it answer questions about the relationship between the heads of these administrative entities and the central authority. This paper investigates the formation and the institutional features of the administrative agglomerations governed, whether by imperial command or arbitrarily, by descendants of the imperial family from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth century and the relationship between these rulers and the central authority. It studies their degree of autonomy, the organization of the local administration and its relationship with the imperial governors. It also examines the existence of an advisory body supporting the administrator in charge of a city council, as well as its social composition. The regions under investigation are Macedonia and Thrace, which formed the backbone of the Palaiologan state.

Florin LEONTE, *Ethos in late Byzantine court rhetoric (ca. 1350–1453)* p. 625

This article provides a discussion of *ethos* as one of the rhetoricians' main persuasive devices in late Byzantine encomiastic rhetoric (ca. 1350 – ca. 1450). First, I consider the markers of *ethos* and the conditions of its formation in a selection of the most representative texts of praise written in the last hundred years of Byzantine history. Second, I explore how the combinations of personal and impersonal perspectives generated two main types of *ethos*: on the one hand, a static one that privileged contemplation and awe for the object of praise; and on the other hand, a dynamic kind of *ethos* whereby authors enacted calls for public action. And third, I look at the functions of *ethos* in the social and intellectual landscape of late Byzantium.

Smilja MARJANOVIĆ-DUŠANIĆ, *La représentation du souverain serbe dans les Histoires de Jean VI Cantacuzène* p. 133

This paper analyzes the representation of the Serbian ruler in the *Histories* of Emperor John Kantakouzenos and gives an account of the political context in which this portrait was composed. But it also attempts to retrace the stages through which Stefan Dušan, the future emperor, went to achieve his imperial project. The elevation of the Serbian kingdom to the dignity of empire found its direct justification in the world of ideas, which of course is not to say that it was seen as a straightforward realization of a conceptual blueprint. The authors within Dušan's entourage were divided: some saw the emerging empire as a single coherent whole, while others sought to preserve the dynastic traditions and organizational continuity of the Serbian kingdom within this new entity. Despite the weaknesses, real or apparent, of Dušan's offensive military and political policy, the Serbian ruler saw himself as a participant in the Byzantine civil war and a candidate for the imperial throne. The testimonies analyzed here show that Dušan was consciously aiming to achieve his universalist claims and that he had carefully prepared the ideological model of his eventual reign by presenting himself as a New Constantine. Kantakouzenos's portrait of Dušan clearly shows that he was aware both of the threat that the Serbian king presented to Constantinople and of his complex role in the Byzantine civil war. By writing his memoirs with the overall intention of justifying his actions and presenting himself in the best possible light, the emperor-author had little choice but to portray Stefan Dušan as the main anti-hero of his narrative. This representation of the "other," while being characteristic of Kantakouzenos as a historian, also clearly reveals the weaknesses of Kantakouzenos as an emperor and of the empire over which he ruled.

Brendan OSSWALD, *La Chronique de Ioannina : introduction, traduction et notes* p. 277

The so-called *Chronicle of Ioannina*, first published in 1821 by François Pouqueville, constitutes a major source for the history of Epirus in the second half of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th centuries. It is notably the main source of information about historical characters such as Emperor of Trikala Symeon Uroš Palaiologos, Despot of Arta John Spatas (Shpata) and Despot of Ioannina Thomas Preloumpos (Preljub). The present paper provides the reader with an introduction to the text, presenting various themes such as content, manuscripts, editions and translations, title, genre, date, author, redactional context, historical value and posterity. Then it gives a new French translation, based on the edition by Leandros Vranoussis, whose version stops in 1399, completed with variants from the Oxford manuscript including some additional notes up to 1418. The translation is accompanied by historical, literary and philological notes, in order to facilitate the understanding of the text and of its historical and literary significance and to give bibliographical indications.

Inmaculada PÉREZ MARTÍN, *Enseignement et service impérial à l'époque paléologue* p. 451

The contribution considers an aspect of Byzantine culture never studied as a whole until now, namely the training acquired by the Byzantines who were in the service of the Palaiologan emperors, both in the army and in the restoration of fortifications, and of course in the offices of the administration, especially the tax office. From the sources we can deduce a panorama of little specialization and great versatility in the tasks entrusted to the emperor's officials and servants. In this context, only the trades linked to the bureaucracy, accustomed to the use of writing materials, have left treatises and other manuscript testimonies, while the trades far from the offices of the treasury and the imperial secretaries, such as the sailors or the builders, seem to have transmitted orally the knowledge required for their work. Our study also stresses the importance of the model offered by Nicaea for the education sponsored by Michael VIII Palaiologos after 1261, the absence of an imperial or patriarchal school that was more than just teaching organized around the figure of a teacher, and the lack of a fixed program of disciplines that responded to the scheme inherited from the seven liberal arts (*trivium* and *quadrivium*). Likewise, we have seen how it was the very social group that benefited from its proximity to the emperor that was concerned with facilitating the training of future servants and transmitting the privileges granted by education to their descendants.

Efi RAGIA, *Agrarian policy in the early Palaeologan period, ca. 1259–1300 from the archives of Mt. Athos and West Asia Minor* p. 503

Perspectives on the reigns of Michael VIII and Andronikos II Palaeologos have so far been influenced by the information and the commentary, mostly negative, provided by George Pachymeres in his *History*. By taking into consideration the evidence of the archives of Mt. Athos and West Asia Minor in particular, the present research attempts to reinterpret this early period of the Palaeologan dynasty through its fiscal and financial aspects. Important changes of a fiscal nature had already taken place long before Michael VIII ascended the throne of the empire. A comparison with evidence from the archives dated to after 1259 brings out the novelties of the new regime, with particular reference to the fiscal measures of Michael VIII and Andronikos II and analysis of the renewed managerial role of the Byzantine administration and the methods followed, which aimed at registering and re-allocating the wealth produced in the provinces by re-claiming it for the state. By enhancing the state's control of its diminishing possessions, Byzantium remained attached to its resources and this enabled its survival after 1302.

Alexander RIEHLE, *Literature, politics and manuscripts in early Palaiologan Byzantium: towards a reassessment of the Choumnos-Metochites controversy* p. 591

The present essay offers a critical response to Ihor Ševčenko's assessment of the controversy between Theodore Metochites and Nikephoros Choumnos, which has had a lasting impact on scholarship on these two important political and intellectual figures in the reign of Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos. While Ševčenko contended that the feud was an outgrowth of a personal rivalry originating with Metochites' replacement of Choumnos as the right-hand man of the emperor, this essay argues that it should instead be understood as a conflict of diametrically opposed ideas about the role of literature and philosophy in civic life and society. To this end, first the evidence about the date and background of Metochites' assumption of the office of *mesazōn* is reevaluated. This is followed by a fresh look at the "dossier polémique" comprising four successive treatises by Choumnos and Metochites, which, as is shown, bears striking affinities to their previous, "friendly" correspondence. The final part of the essay focuses on the first text of the "dossier" which triggered the quarrel: Choumnos' Discourse 27, *On literary criticism and composition*. An earlier version of this text, which was unknown to Ševčenko, supports the view that it was not intended as an attack on Metochites but rather continued their prior letter exchange. In an appendix, Discourse 27 is for the first time critically edited based on both the earlier and later redactions and rendered into English.

Antonio RIGO, *Le séjour de Grégoire Palamas au monastère de Saint-Michel de Sôsthénion (octobre 1341 – 24 mars 1342)* p. 667

The article, which emphasizes the need for a new biography of Gregory Palamas, deals with a brief span of time (a little more than six months) of his life, showing how the direct analysis of his works, as well as of the rest of the available documentation, sheds light not only on some events of his life, but also on his work and his feelings. These six months are a decisive moment, during which Gregory Palamas was confronted with the civil war, a conflict that profoundly influenced the destiny of Byzantium.

Oliver Jens SCHMITT, *Traîtres ou champions de la survie? Les seigneurs de tendance ottomane dans les Balkans à l'époque de la conquête ottomane* p. 213

As an explanation for the success of the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, it is repeatedly claimed that important nobles of the region cooperated with the Ottomans and thus facilitated their conquest. The present study aims to shed critical light on this claim by examining it in several steps. First, region by region, the policies of regional nobles towards Ottoman actors are examined. It is particularly significant that on the Ottoman side it was less a question of a power bloc centrally controlled by the sultan, but rather until the time of Mehmed II, Ottoman marcher lords represented the counterpart of regional Christian nobles. In the late medieval Balkans, we can therefore observe an unstable mix of Christian and Muslim actors who often knew each other well and, in some cases, entered into alliances with each other. In a second step, we will examine how the selective cooperation of Christian and Muslim regional actors in the late medieval Balkans was interpreted. In a third step, the results of the detailed investigations are evaluated and the following conclusion is drawn. Until the final conquest by the Ottomans, the regional Christian lords tried to secure as much political leeway as possible. In the first hundred years of the presence of Ottoman actors in the Balkans, regional Christian lords repeatedly called in troops of marcher lords to help in regional feuds. But nowhere is it actually apparent that a regional lord wanted to give up his independence in favour of submission to the Ottoman Empire. This also applies to princes who had recognised Ottoman suzerainty as vassals or who had been set up as counter-kings by the marcher lords or the sultan.

Mariyana TSIBRANSKA-KOSTOVA & Desislava NAYDENOVA, *From the Nomocanon Cotelarii to the Slavonic Pseudo-Zonaras' Nomocanon: the history and reception of compilations of canon law among the 14th-century Balkan Slavs* p. 361

This study focuses on the written tradition of the so-called Slavonic Pseudo-Zonaras' *Nomocanon (PsZ)*, one of the most widespread juridical texts among Slavs in the Balkans, in Russia, and in the contact zones between Orthodoxy and Catholicism in Central Europe from the 14th to the 18th centuries. It aims at providing consistent and up-to-date information about its connection with the possible Greek prototype called *Nomocanon Cotelarii*. It is paradoxical that the 14th-century Slavonic tradition turned a peripheral Greek text that for all intents and purposes lacked imperial ideology, and was not distinctly valued in Byzantine legal literature, into a popular legal corrective that was passed down through the centuries and became well known in different languages and among different ethnic groups. The purpose of the present study is to offer an explanation for this phenomenon by examining the history and typological features of the *PsZ* in the context of the Byzantine legal literature of the Palaiologan era. The authors analyze some peculiarities in its textual structure, as well as its special emphasis on degrees of kinship and legal marriages, its strong anti-heretical line in two directions—against dualist heresies and against the Latins—, its penal provisions from secular law, and the predominance of canonical norms covering different social strata. The large number of rules for monks, priests, women, and for relations with representatives of other religious communities, fit into the political and literary trends of the Balkans during the 14th century.

TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Abréviations	v
Avant-propos, par Marie-Hélène BLANCHET & Raúl ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ	1
Carte – Le monde byzantin vers 1370	4
Marie-Hélène BLANCHET & Raúl ESTANGÜI GÓMEZ	
L'Empire byzantin sous les Paléologues, entre déclin et ruine : révision en six étapes d'un legs historiographique ancien	7

EMPEREURS ET SOUVERAINS

Ivan BILIARSKY	
La transmission et la légitimation du pouvoir des derniers souverains bulgares de la dynastie des Assénides (1323-1396)	89
Smilja MARJANOVIĆ-DUŠANIĆ	
La représentation du souverain serbe dans les <i>Histoires</i> de Jean VI Cantacuzène	133
Tonia KIOUSOPOULOU	
Une approche du pouvoir impérial au début du xiv ^e siècle	159
Sebastian KOLDITZ	
Opposition, conspiration, révolte : quelques remarques pour une histoire de la contestation politique à l'époque des Paléologues	169
Oliver Jens SCHMITT	
Traîtres ou champions de la survie ? Les seigneurs de tendance ottomane dans les Balkans à l'époque de la conquête ottomane	213
Brendan OSSWALD	
<i>La Chronique de Iôannina</i> : introduction, traduction et notes	277

LE FONCTIONNEMENT DE L'ÉTAT

Anastasia KONTOGIANNOPOULOU	
Autonomy, apostasy and the administration of Macedonia and Thrace in the Palaiologan period (mid-14 th – mid-15 th century)	333
Mariyana TSIBRANSKA-KOSTOVA & Desislava NAYDENOVA	
From the <i>Nomocanon Cotelerii</i> to the Slavonic Pseudo-Zonaras' <i>Nomocanon</i> : the history and reception of compilations of canon law among the 14 th -century Balkan Slavs	361
Marie-Hélène CONGOURDEAU	
Le discours de Nicolas Kabasilas <i>Sur les audaces contre les biens sacrés</i> commises par les archontes en enfreignant la loi	391

Inmaculada PÉREZ MARTÍN	
Enseignement et service impérial à l'époque paléologue	451

Efi RAGIA	
Agrarian policy in the early Palaeologan period, ca. 1259–1300	
from the archives of Mt. Athos and West Asia Minor	503

CULTURES ET ÉLITES D'EMPIRE

Martin HINTERBERGER	
Passions in Paleologan spiritual writing: affection, vanity and sorrow	
in Eulogia Choumnaina's correspondence and other contemporary texts	565
Alexander RIEHLE	
Literature, politics and manuscripts in early Palaiologan Byzantium:	
towards a reassessment of the Choumnos-Metochites controversy	591
Florin LEONTE	
<i>Ethos</i> in late Byzantine court rhetoric (ca. 1350–1453)	625

ORTHODOXIE, PALAMISME ET THOMISME

Antonio RIGO	
Le séjour de Grégoire Palamas au monastère de Saint-Michel de Sôsthénion	
(octobre 1341 – 24 mars 1342)	667
Christian GASTGEBER	
Anti-Palamism in the chancery of Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos	
(second term: 1364–75): the case of Demetrios Chloros	695
Marco FANELLI	
L'Islam dans la vie et l'œuvre du patriarche Kallistos I ^{er} (ca 1290 – † 1364)	727
Panagiotis Ch. ATHANASOPOULOS	
Religious polyarchy and its consequences: a hitherto unknown <i>Consilium ad Graecos</i>	
in Demetrios Kydones' unedited <i>De processione Spiritus sancti ad amicum</i>	761
John A. DEMETRACOPOULOS	
Scholarios' <i>Inserta thomistica</i> in his <i>Compendium</i> of Demetrios Kydones' translation	
of Thomas Aquinas' <i>Summa theologiae</i> , I ^a : a re-edition and its textual setting	803
Mihai-D. GRIGORE	
Eastern Orthodoxy as confession: an essay on principles or Bringing	
the <i>Synodikon of Orthodoxy</i> into discussion of paradigms	827
Abstracts/Résumés en anglais	869
Index	
Index des manuscrits	877
Index des anthroponymes	881
Index des toponymes et ethnonymes	903
Table des illustrations	913
Table des matières	915