

Ποιος θα θερίσει τη σοδειά της καινοτομίας;

Τεχνολογική Στρατηγική


▷ ΔΠΜΣ «Επιχειρηματικότητα»

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Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών



ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ
ΘΕΣΣΑΛΙΑΣ



What determines
the share of profits
captured by the
innovator?
(Teece, 1986)


Taxonomy of outcomes from the innovation process (Teece, 1986)

| | Innovator | Follower-Imitator |
|------|--|---|
| Win | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Pilkington (Float Glass)● G.D. Searle (NutraSweet)● Dupont (Teflon) | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● IBM (Personal Computer)● Matsushita (VHS video recorders)● Seiko (quartz watch) |
| Lose | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● RC Cola (diet cola)● EMI (scanner)● Bowmar (pocket calculator)● Xerox (office computer)● DeHavilland (Comet) | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Kodak (instant photography)● Northrup (F20)● DEC (personal computer) |


Profiting from innovation

- “appropriability, and success at innovation more generally, is related not so much to the innovator’s ex-ante market share, but to the (complementary) asset structure of the innovator, management’s market entry timing decisions, and the contractual structures employed to access missing complementary assets” (Teece, 2006)
- *Appropriability regime*
- *Complementary assets and co-specialization*

Complementary Assets (Teece, 2006)




Appropriability regime: Key dimensions (Teece, 1986)





| Legal instruments | Nature of technology |
|-------------------|----------------------|
| Patents | Product |
| Copyrights | Process |
| Trade secrets | Tacit |
| | Codified |

Complementary assets: Generic, Specialized, and Cospecialized (Teece, 1986)




Alternative integration strategies



Specialized complementary assets and weak appropriability: Integration calculus,

| | | Optimum Investment for Business in Question | | Time Required to Position (Relative to Competitors) | |
|--------------------------|--------------|---|--|--|-------------------------------|
| | | Minor | Major | Long | Short |
| | | | | Minor | Major |
| How Critical to Success? | Critical | Internalize (majority ownership) | Internalize (but if cash constrained, take minority position) | OK If Timing Not Critical | Full Steam Ahead |
| | Not Critical | Discretionary | Do Not Internalize (contract out) | Forget It | OK If Cost Position Tolerable |

Market Entry Strategies for Innovators (Teece, 2006)



Key:






Fig. 2. Contract and integration strategies and outcomes for innovators: specialized asset case (Fig. 11 in Teece (1986)).


Summary of Characteristics That Drive Selection of Value Capture Mechanisms

| Mechanism | Factors That Affect the Effectiveness of a Given Value Capture Mechanism | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| | Institutional | Industry | Firm | Technological |
| Patents | Strength (ranking) of intellectual property rights | Competitive intensity, number of rivals, barriers to imitation | Scale and scope of R&D, innovation activity, ability to manage patenting process | Complexity or tacitness |
| Secrecy | Strength (ranking) of intellectual property rights | Fragmentation of suppliers, rivals, and buyers; signaling, technological standard | Scope of R&D, technological specialization, firm size | Complexity or tacitness, process innovations less likely to be reverse engineered than product innovations |
| Lead time | Conceptually yes, but none identified | Horizontal (differences in product attributes) vs. vertical (differences in quality and efficiency) differentiation | Absorptive capacity, ability to acquire and use information | Codifiability, teachability, complexity |
| Complementary assets | Strength of intellectual property rights, specialized/ co-specialized assets | Strength of intellectual property rights, specialized or co-specialized assets | Contractibility in factor market | Rapid or radical technological change, specialized or co-specialized assets |
| Patents & secrecy | Strength of intellectual property rights, specialized/ co-specialized assets | Strength of intellectual property rights, specialized or co-specialized assets | Scope of R&D, technological specialization | Complexity or tacitness, codifiability, process vs. product innovation |
| Patents & complementary assets | Strength of intellectual property rights, fragmented vs. concentrated ownership of intellectual property | Strength of intellectual property rights, incumbent vs. new entrant owns comp assets | Scope of technological capabilities (IP rights), incumbent owns specialized or co-specialized assets | Complexity, intellectual property generation, and utilization process |

WHO PROFITS FROM INNOVATION?



Relationship Among Exogenous Conditions, Selection of Appropriability Mechanisms, and Innovation Outcomes




Πηγή: James et al. (2013)

Absorptive capacity

- Similar to problem solving
- Individual or Organizational
- Communication channels
 - Transfer of knowledge? (no!!!)
 - Gatekeeping – boundary spanning
 - Centralized or not?
 - Receptors
 - Inward vs outward looking
- Challenge of rapid change
- Resource slack – redundancy
- Hiring?

Path Dependence and Absorptive Capacity

- Mining effect
- Level of aspiration – sensitivity to external events
- Self-reinforcing cycle



Technology Alliance Strategies, (Doz Y. and Hamel G., 1997)

| | Individual Alliance | Network of Alliances |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| Capability Complementation | A GE-SNECMA alliance | B Corning Glass alliances |
| Capability Transfer | C Thomson-JVC alliance | D Aspla |


Trade-offs between Different Modes of Collaboration (Schilling, M. A., 2017)

| | Speed | Cost | Control | Potential for Leveraging Existing Competencies | Potential for Developing New Competencies | Potential for Accessing Other Firms' Competencies |
|--|-------------|--------|---------|--|---|---|
| Solo Internal Development | Low | High | High | Yes | Yes | No |
| Strategic Alliances | Varies | Varies | Low | Yes | Yes | Sometimes |
| Joint Ventures | Low | Shared | Shared | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Licensing In | High | Medium | Low | Sometimes | Sometimes | Sometimes |
| Licensing Out | High | Low | Medium | Yes | No | Sometimes |
| Outsourcing | Medium/High | Medium | Medium | Sometimes | No | Yes |
| Collective Research Organizations | Low | Varies | Varies | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Η τεχνολογική στρατηγική θεώρηση συγχωνεύσεων και εξαγορών

| | Goals | Examples of Desired Outcomes |
|----------------------------|---|---|
| Horizontal | Learn new skills Gain ground on competitors | Improvements in manufacturing or marketing Reach critical size |
| | Access new technology Gain ground on competitors | Upstream or downstream control Cost reduction; Improve quality |
| Vertical | Learn new skills Gain ground on competitors | New customers Marketing or manufacturing improvements |
| | Access to new technology Learn new skills | New products, processes, markets Risk diffusion, new customers/suppliers |
| Related | | |
| Unrelated (most difficult) | | |

Δέντρο απόφασης τεχνολογικής εξαγοράς



Key literature

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